
Glass Etc 

Book S 



, 



THE ELEMENTS 



OF 






" 



LOGIC. 



. &Vw*/«t 1 J u 



CAMBRIDGE: 

PRINTED BY JOHN SMTTH, 

Printer to the UnirersHy. 

1826 



» 

< 






Since Locke was the expounder of a new system of 
opinions on a difficult subject, he was led to enforce 
them by repetition, and to illustrate them by more 
examples, and with greater diffuseness of language, than 
he would probably have thought necessary, if he had 
been writing at the present time. For the same rea- 
son, it is not surprising that some of his statements 
have been controverted by subsequent writers, and 
shewn to be erroneous or defective. 

Although therefore the substance of many of the 
following Articles is derived from his Essay on the 
Human Understanding, yet, to suit the purpose for 
which this compendium of Logic has been made, it 
was necessary to omit many parts of that Essay, and 
to abridge the language of those parts that are retained; 
also, some things are here advanced which are not 
supported by the authority of Locke; but where this 
is done in any matter of importance, a note of it is 
annexed, lest the reader should be misled to ascribe 
opinions to Locke, which more recent writers have 
maintained in opposition to him- 



CONTENTS. 



ART, Page 

1. The mind acquires ideas, Jirst, by Sensation; 
secondly, by Reflection 1 

2. Though the mind has no innate ideas, yet it has 
some which may be said to be connatural ib. 

3. Some ideas are simple, and some complex 2 

4. The ideas produced by the qualities of an object 
enter the mind simple and unmixed ib. 

5. The mind cannot form new simple ideas at pleasure S 

6. On the different ways in which simple ideas enter 

the mind ib* 

7. Distinction of qualities into primary and secondary 4 

8. Solidity ib. 

9. On the manner in which our knowledge of primary 
and secondary qualities is gained . . . , ............ . 5 

10. Perception r ,...., 6 

11. Difference between perception and sensation ....... 7 



ART. Pagt 

12. Our perception of secondary qualities is relative . . 8 

13. Perception is sometimes fallacious ib. 

14* In particular, perception by the sight is wholly 

determined by experience . . , * . . 9 

15. The manner in which impressions are made on the 
mind is unknown ^ 10 

16. Memory .. ... 11 

17« Discerning 14 

1 8. Abstraction *. ib. 



19. Complex ideas of substances, modes, relations : 
and first of substances 18 

20. Distinction of modes into simple and mixed 20 

21. Modes of space * ib. 

22. On the place of bodies 21 

23. Duration 23 

24. On the means of measuring duration ib. 

25. Number 24 

26. Infinity , 27 

27. Many modes are not distinguished by separate 
names 28 

28. Some ideas of mixed modes are acquired by 06- 
servation ; some by invention ; some by definition 29 



Ill 

ART. , Pag« 

29. Relations 31 

30. The association of ideas . . /. 34 

31. On the importance of giving a right direction to 

the thoughts 39 

35. On the prejudices and antipathies which arise from 

a wrong association of ideas * . » ib. 

S3. Other instances of evil arising from the same cause 41 



34. Words are the arbitrary signs of ideas 42 

35. Words are, for the most part, general terms, so that 
one name comprehends a great number of individual 
objects . . . . P 44 

36. The meaning of words may be explained in four 
mays . . ib. 

37. On the imperfections and abuses of language ...... 45 

38. On the evil arising from the abuses of language ... 47 

39* Knowledge is of two kinds, actual and habitual; 
and, considered with respect to its evidence, it is 
intuitive, demonstrative, or sensitive ib. 

40. On the extent of human knowledge. .50 

41. The causes of the narrow extent of human know* 
ledge appear to be chiefly three ; the want of ideas; 
the want of a discoverable connection between 
the ideas we have ; and the want of examining 
our ideas, to see whether they agree or not 51 



IV 
ART. Page 

42. On the reality of our knowledge 54 

43. On the existence of God 55 

44. Truth, whether necessary or contingent, cannot be 
established without assuming some self-evident 
principles 5& 

45. Difference between demonstrative and probable 
evidence 60 

46* On the degrees of probable evidence •- 6i 

47« On the grounds of probability in civil affairs, ..... 62 

4S. On the probability arising from human testimony . . 63 

49. In traditional testimony, each transmission weakens 

the proof 64 

50. On the probability which is derived from analogy ib. 

51. In what cases error is unavoidable , , 65 

52. Causes of error assigned by Lord Bacon. Some 
arise from general principles of the human con* 
stitution 66 

53. Others, from something peculiar to individuals .... 68 

54. Others, from the imperfections and the abuse of 
language * 69 

55* Lastly, some are owing to the tendency which men 

have to frame groundless hypotheses 70 



56. Dialectics : definitions of simple apprehension, 
judgment, and reasoning 72 



57. Explanation of the terms subject, predicate, and 
copula • 72 

58. Propositions are affirmative or negative; universal 

or particular . 73 

5Q. Division of propositions into absolute and con- 
ditional 74 

60. Some propositions are simple ; others compound 75 

61 . On copulative and disjunctive propositions ib. 

62. On reasoning ...... 76 

63. The manner of determining whether man is 
accountable for his actions . , * 77 

64. Definition of the premises and conclusion of a 
syllogism ; the major and minor terms ; the major 
and minor propositions. . ........ ib. 

65. Example of a conditional syllogism : definition of 

the antecedent and consequent * 78 

66. Example of a disjunctive syllogism. 80 

67. Enthymemes. ... „ , . ib. 

68. Sorites 81 

69. Dilemma $% 

70. Argument by induction. . , SB 

71. Direct and indirect arguments : arguments a priori 
and a posteriori 85 



VI 
ARf. Pare 

72 « Sophisms: the sophism of inferring the falsity 
of a conclusion from the falsity of certain premises ; 
and, reversely, of inferring the truth of certain 
premises from the truth of the conclusion 86 

73. The sophism called ignoratio elenchi 87 

74. The sophisms, petitio principii, and reasoning in a 
circle 88 

75 The sophism, non causa pro causa ......... ib. 

76. Sophisms arising from ambiguity of language . . . . . 89 

77* Other inconclusive modes of argument ...*..... 91 

78. Methods of reasoning by synthesis and analysis* . . 92 



THE ELEMENTS 



OF 



LOGIC. 



Art. 1. The term Logic is here used to denote the 
science which treats of the operations of the mind in ac- 
quiring ideas, and of the exercise of it by proper methods 
of reasoning. 

The mind acquires ideas, first, by Sensation. Our 
senses, being acted upon by external objects, convey ideas 
of those objects to the mind. Thus by sensation we ac- 
quire the ideas of colours, sounds, and of all those which 
are usually called the sensible qualities of matter. 

Secondly, the mind acquires ideas by Reflection. 
Reflection is the notice which the mind takes of' its own 
operations, such as thinking, doubting, believing, reason- 
ing, knowing, willing. The mind, being conscious of 
these operations and reflecting on them, is furnished by 
them with ideas which could not be obtained from exter- 
nal objects. 

2. Although the mind has no innate ideas, i. e. none 
which are coeval with the mind and perceived by it before 
the senses begin to operate, yet it has ideas which may be 
said to be connatural : i. e. the constitution of man is such 
that when he is grown up to the possession and exercise of 
his reasoning powers, certain ideas will inevitably and ne- 
cessarily spring up in him. Such are those of existence, 
personal identity, time, number. The mind is endowed 

A 



with faculties, the exercise of which is necessarily accom- 
panied by such ideas, and also by the acknowledgement of 
certain moral truths and practical principled of conduct. 
These ideas are not the immediate objects of sensation and 
reflection, though the senses may furnish the^r^ occasions 
on which they occur to the mind. For example, the mo- 
ment that a sensation is excited, we learn two facts at 
once; — the existence of the sensation, and our own existence 
as sentient beings : thus, the first exercise of consciousness 
necessarily implies a belief of the present existence not 
only of that which is felt, but also of that which feels and 
thinks. But it is the belief of the former alone that can 
properly be said to be obtained by sensation. The latter 
is obtained by a suggestion of the understanding conse- 
quent on the sensation, but so intimately connected with 
it that the belief of both is generally referred to the 
same origin. a 

3. Some ideas are simple, and some complex. A 
simple idea, (as of light, of heat, of hardness,) exists in 
the mind under one uniform appearance, and is not 
distinguishable into more than one idea. A complex idea 
is made up of several simple ones : thus the idea of man 
is complex, in which are united several simple ideas, such 
as of figure, extension, solidity, thinking, life. 

4. By the quality of an object is meant whatever in 
that object is the cause of ideas. The qualities that affect 
our senses are in the things themselves united and 
blended, yet the ideas they produce in the mind enter by 
the senses simple and unmixed. Thus the qualities of the 
same piece of wax may cause, by the touch, the ideas both 



* Stewart, Elem. of Phil. ch. i. §. 4. and Phil. Es. I. ch. i. Sup. 
Encyc. Brit. Diss. vol. V. p. 30. 



of softness and of warmth : yet the simple ideas, thus 
caused by the same object and conveyed to the mind by 
the same organ of sense, are as distinct as those that come 
in by different senses, as distinct as the smell and whiteness 
of a rose, or as the smell of a rose and the taste of sugar. 

5. When the mind is stored with simple ideas, it has 
the power to repeat, compare, and unite them so as to 
make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it cannot 
acquire one new simple idea except by the ways above- 
mentioned: (Art. 1. 2.) nor can it destroy those which it 
has already acquired, though it may lose them by forget- 
fulness. As in the visible material world, the power of 
man reaches no farther than to compound and divide the 
materials that are made to his hand, but cannot make the 
least particle of new matter, or destroy an atom of what 
is already in being; so in the mind new simple ideas 
cannot be formed at pleasure ; as any one may learn, who 
will endeavour to acquire the idea of a taste which has 
never affected his palate, or of a colour which he has 
never seen. A person born destitute of any one sense, is 
destitute of all the ideas which belong to that sense : if he 
be born deaf, he has no idea of sound ; if blind, he has no 
idea of light and colours. Also, though he may possess 
any sense in its utmost perfection, yet he cannot, except 
by actual experience, have any particular idea belonging 
to that sense. A person shut up all his life in a dark 
room could have no idea of light ; if allowed to see no 
other colours than black or white, he could have no ideas 
of scarlet or green : he who has never tasted a pine-apple, 
can have no idea of its peculiar flavour. 

6. Some simple ideas enter the mind by one sense 
only ; as those of colour by the eye, and of sound by the 
ear. 



Other simple ideas are acquired by more senses than 
one ; as those of extension, Jigure, rest, motion, both by 
the sight and touch. 

Others are acquired by reflection only; as those of 
thinking, knowing, willing. 

Others are acquired by all the ways of sensation and 
reflection ; such as the ideas of pleasure or pain, which are 
excited by almost every affection of our senses from 
without, and every thought of our mind within. 

7- The qualities that are in bodies are of two sorts : 
(1) Primary qualities, such as solidity, figure, hardness, 
softness, fluidity ; these exist in bodies, whether we per- 
ceive them or not. (2) Secondary qualities. These are 
of two kinds; first, the powers that bodies have, by 
operating immediately on our senses, to produce in us 
such ideas as those of colour, sound, taste, smell, heat, 
cold ; secondly, the powers that are in any body to cause 
such a change in the primary qualities of another body, as 
to make it affect our senses differently from what it did 
before. Thus fire, acting immediately upon us, gives us 
the idea of heat; — acting on lead, it so changes it as to 
make it fluid. 

8. Solidity is that quality of a body by which it ex- 
cludes all other bodies from occupying the same place 
with it at the same time. Of the primary qualities of 
bodies, none affects our senses more frequently than solid- 
ity. Whether we move or rest, we feel something under 
us that supports us and hinders our farther sinking down- 
wards ; and the bodies which we daily handle, make us 
perceive that while they remain between our hands, they 
prevent by an insurmountable force the approach of those 
parts of our hands that press them. Solidity differs from 
hardness in this respect, that hardness consists in a firm 



Cohesion of the parts of a body, so as to make it difficult 
to change the place of those parts as they respect one 
another ; whereas solidity respects the whole mass, and is 
as essential a quality of water or air as of adamant. A 
drop of water, indeed, placed between two plane surfaces 
of marble> will not, like adamant, prevent their contact; 
because the parts of a drop of water, cohering loosely to 
one another, give way to the pressure, and escape in a 
lateral direction. But if this be prevented, and a drop 
of water be confined on all sides, as in a globe of gold, it 
is known by experiment that no force will bring the sides 
of the globe together without forcing the water through 
the pores of the metal. 

Our idea of solidity is also distinguished from that 
of pure space^ which is capable neither of resistance nor 
motion. We may conceive two bodies approach one an- 
other, without touching or displacing any solid thing, till 
their surfaces meet ; and hence we obtain a clear idea of 
space without solidity. Whether there be such a thing as 
pure space is a different question ; but that we are able to 
form an idea of it, cannot be doubted. For since the idea 
of motion in one body does not include the idea of motion 
in another; — if we suppose one body to move while 
others remain at rest, then the place deserted by that 
body gives us the idea of pure space, into which another 
body may enter, without meeting with resistance from 
any thing. 

9. When it is said that Jire is hot, that snow is cold 
a?id white, these expressions, strictly understood, must 
mean that there is in fire and snow such a configuration 
of their insensible particles as to have the power of pro- 
ducing in us the ideas of heat, and of cold and whiteness. 
But as bodies exist which are not capable, as lead is, of 

a 3 



b* 

being made fluid by the action of fire, in like manner 
there is need of a certain formation of our organs of sense, 
and a certain texture of the insensible particles of our 
bodies conformable in some unknown manner to the in- 
sensible particles of fire and snow, in order that the ideas 
of heat, cold, and whiteness, may be produced in us. 

Our knowledge therefore of secondary qualities is gained 
solely by observing the effects of one body on another ; 
whereas primary qualities are inherent in bodies, inde- 
pendently of our sensation, or of any relation to other 
bodies. Of primary qualities, we have by our senses a 
distinct notion ; but secondary qualities are conceived only 
as the unknown causes of certain sensations and of certain 
known effects. 10 

If we had senses acute enough to discern the minute 
particles of bodies and the real constitution on which 
their secondary qualities depend, they would produce 
quite different ideas in us; and that which is now the 
yellow colour of gold would disappear, and instead of it 
we should see the texture of the minute parts, of a certain 
size and figure. But our present organs of sense are 
adapted to the nature of things around us ; and if they 
were altered, while external things remained the same, it 
cannot be doubted that our well-being would be affected 
by the change, greatly to our disadvantage. 

10. Perception is that act of the mind by which it 
acquires ideas of the qualities of bodies. In sensation, 
there is no object distinct from that act of the mind by 
which the sensation is felt ; as, in smelling a rose, the 
mind is affected by the sensation in a certain way, and 



b Reid, Es. II. ch, xvii. 



this affection of the mind may be conceived without think- 
ing of the rose or of any other object. But perception has 
always an external object ; and the object of perception, 
in the case here stated, is that quality in the rose which is 
discerned by the sense of smell. Observing that the 
sensation is excited when the rose is near, and ceases 
when it is removed, We are led to conclude that there is 
some quality in the rose which is the cause of this sensa- 
tion. This quality in the rose is the object perceived ; 
and that act of the mind by which we acquire the idea of 
this quality, is called perception. 

11. The senses therefore have a double province ; to 
make us feel, and to make us perceive. They furnish us 
with a variety of sensations, and at the same time they 
give us a conception of the objects by which those 
sensations are caused. As the perception and its cor- 
responding sensation are produced at the same time, 
and are never found disjoined in our experience, we 
are led improperly to consider them as one thing, 
and, through the imperfection of language, to give them 
the same name. If the sensation be such as to cause 
neither pleasure nor pain, and therefore, being indifferent, 
draw no attention ;— -of which kind are the sensations 
caused by all primary qualities ; — in speaking of those 
qualities, it is usual to say that they are perceived, not 
that they are felt. On the other hand, taste, and smell, 
heat, and cold, have sensations that are often agreeable 
or disagreeable in such a degree as to draw our attention ; 
they are therefore commonly said to be felt, not to be 
perceived: and when disorders of the body cause acute 
pain, so that the painful sensation engrosses the atten- 
tion, they are always said to be felt, not to be per- 
ceived. 



8 

12. The secondary qualities of bodies, not less than 
the primary, are objects of perception: observing their 
effects, the mind is led to form a conception of some 
unknown cause that has produced them. The effect is 
obvious to our senses ; but the quality or power is latent. 
And in such cases, i. e. where the cause is not observed by 
the senses, it is common to express in language, by active 
verbs, effects on bodies wherein they are merely passive. 
Thus we say that a ship sails ; though it is certain that a 
ship has no inherent power of motion, but is impelled by 
external force. In like manner, when it is said that 
planets gravitate towards the sun, no more is meant than 
that by some unknown power they are impelled in that 
direction. This gravitation is not a power inherent in 
bodies,, which they exert of themselves ; it is a force im- 
pressed upon them to which they must necessarily yield. 
The effect may be observed, but the nature of the force 
which has caused the effect is unknown. And the same is 
true of all the powers of matter : our perception of them 
is relative ; relative, i. e. to the effects which the powers 
are known to produce. 

13. Perception is often fallacious, and requires cor^ 
rection by experience and judgment. A man who has had 
a limb cut off, many years after feels pain apparently 
affecting the limb which he no longer possesses. The 
sensation is real ; but he is misled, by his perception, as to 
the locality of the disorder. Our perception of external 
objects is connected with certain sensations. If the sen- 
sation is produced, the corresponding perception follows 
even when there is no object, and in that case deceives Us. 
In like manner, our sensations are connected with certain 
impressions made upon the nerves and brain : and when 
the impression is made, from whatever cause, — the corres* 



9 

ponding sensation and perception immediately follow. 
Thus, in the case above supposed, a part of the nerve that 
went to the limb was cut off along with it, and upon the 
remaining part the same impression is made, which, 
according to his experience in the natural state of his 
body, was caused by a disorder of the limb : and this 
impression continues to be followed by the sensation and 
perception which had been previously connected with it. 
It is probable that repeated convictions, impressed by a 
new experience, might correct the erroneous perception. 

14. In particular, perception, by the eye, of the size, 
distance and figure of bodies, is wholly determined by 
experience. A man born blind, who should suddenly be 
made to see, would not at first have any idea of distance 
by sight, but would think all bodies equally near to him. 
When, however, by the aid of the touch and by constant 
experience it is found that different sensations, occasioned 
by different degrees of liveliness in the colours or by dif- 
ferent dispositions of the pupils of the eyes, correspond 
to different degrees of distance in the object, an habitual 
connection is formed in the mind between those sensations 
and the notions of greater or less distance. 

Our perception of Jigure is acquired in the same 
manner. Having experienced by the sense of touch that 
one surface is a square and another a circle, that one body 
is a cube and another a sphere ; and finding our sense 
of sight differently affected by the square and the circle, 
by the cube and the sphere; these different affections 
become so closely connected in our minds with the figures 
of the respective bodies, that when the affection is felt the 



c Reid, Es. II. ch. xviii. 



10 

idea of the corresponding figure is suggested to us at the 
same moment. d Nor need we be surprised that this is 
done with so little notice, if we consider how quick the 
actions of the mind are, and how the facility of doing 
things, which is acquired by habit, comes at length to 
produce actions in us that escape our observation. 

15. Impressions are made on the organs of sense, 
either by the immediate application of the object itself, or 
by some medium which passes between the object and the 
organ. In two of our senses, viz. touch and taste, there 
must be an immediate application of the object to the 
organ. In the other three the impression is made by 
means of a medium ; as, in vision, by the rays of light ; 
in smelling, by the effluvia proceeding from the object; 
and in hearing, by the vibrations of the air. The impres- 
sion made on the organ of sense, being communicated to 
the nerves and brain, rouses the mind ; and the united 
action of the mind and of the object produces sensation. 
And since we know by experience that the mind alone 
cannot, by any effort of its own, produce sensation, and are 
intuitively certain that nothing can begin to exist without 
a cause, we infer from the existence of any new sensation, 
the existence of some external cause from which that sen- 
sation proceeds, and thus we are led by experience to a 
perception of the external object. 

But while we are thus taught by experience that cer- 
tain impressions, produced on our organs of sense by 
external objects, are followed by sensations, and these 
again by corresponding perceptions, yet the manner in 
which these effects are accomplished is unknown ; and 



d Encyc. Brit. Art. Metaphysics. 



11 

must remain so, unless we can discover what the mind is, 
and by what laws it is united to matter, so that they are 
qualified to act on one another. In the mean time we are 
ignorant of the essence both of mind and of matter, and are 
merely acquainted with a few of their properties ; on which 
account, in observing their operations, we must often 
remain satisfied with knowing that certain things are con- 
nected with one another, without being able to discover 
the chain that goes between them. It is to such connect- 
ions that we give the name of the laws of nature ; and 
when it is said that one thing produces another by a law 
of nature, no more is meant than that one thing, which in 
popular language is termed the cause, is invariably followed 
by another which is termed the effect ; but how they are 
connected is unknown . e 

16. Memory is that faculty of the mind which 
enables us to retain ideas already acquired, and to recall 
them to our contemplation without the aid of the objects 
by which they were originally excited. Sometimes ideas 
recur to us spontaneously ; in other cases they are recalled 
by some incident, or by an effort of the will. In the last 
case, i. e. when the mind makes an effort in search of any 
idea and after some labour recalls it, the operation is com- 
monly distinguished by the term recollection. 

Memory is of so great moment, that where it is defect- 
ive, the rest of our faculties are in a great measure useless. 
If an idea be wholly lost, so far there is perfect ignorance ; 
nor is the evil much less, if the memory retrieve ideas 
slowly, so that they are not at hand when occasion calls for 
them. 



e Stewart, Elem. of Phil. ch. i. ^. 3. 



12 

How the mind possesses this faculty, cannot be explain- 
ed, any more than we can explain the causes of sensation 
and perception. If it be supposed, according to the 
ancient theory of ideas, that they are imprinted on the 
brain by means of the organs of sense, and that, when 
they are so imprinted as not to be destroyed by time, the 
preservation of them is called memory ; it may be ob- 
jected, first, that there is no evidence that the impressions 
made upon the brain remain after the object is removed ; 
secondly, that, supposing them to remain, all that can be 
inferred is, that by the laws of nature there is a connection 
established between these impressions and the remem- 
brance of the object : but how the impressions contribute 
to this remembrance is unknown ; it being impossible to 
discover how thought of any kind can be produced by im- 
pressions made upon the brain or upon any part of the 
body. 

When the memory is described as a repository in which 
ideas are stored ; or when ideas are said to be engraven on 
the memory, such expressions are not rightly used, unless 
they be understood in a figurative sense; since they do not 
afford any real explanation of the operations to which they 
refer. 

It is probable, however^ that the memory is dependent 
in some manner on the temperament of the brain, since it 
is observed that diseases of the brain impair or destroy it, 
and that its vigour returns with the return of health. But 
if it should ever be discovered what temperament is favour- 
able to the memory, and by what remedies the disorders 
of it may be removed, though the advantage of such a 
discovery would be great, it would not in any degree ena- 
ble us to understand why one state of the brain is favour- 
able to the memory more than another. 



13 

The powers of this faculty are different in different 
persons; and in the same person they may be greatly 
improved by exercise; by attention; and by a proper 
arrangement of the subjects which he wishes to remember. 
The effects of exercise in strengthening all the faculties 
are known by every one's experience. It is equally known 
that those ideas are easily remembered on which the atten- 
tion of the mind was at first strongly fixed, either from its 
natural vigour or from some casual association with the 
passions. Hence, those who are able to connect feelings of 
pleasure with the pursuit of knowledge, have little difficul- 
ty in retaining what they have acquired ; while many who 
complain of the weakness of memory ought rather to 
ascribe the evil to a defect either of apprehension or of 
curiosity. 

The great advantage that may be derived from a pro- 
per arrangement of the subjects of knowledge, is worthy 
of particular notice. A number of ideas may be con- 
nected by some mutual relation, and referred to one 
general principle. The mind therefore is relieved from 
the necessity of dwelling on detached facts, and by means 
of a small number of general principles, it can recall, as 
occasions may require, a great variety of particulars asso- 
ciated with them ; each of which, considered separately, 
would have been as burdensome to the memory as the 
principle on which they are all dependent. In the 
common business of life, in what confusion would the 
merchant be involved if he were to deposit 'promiscuously, 
in his cabinet, the various documents which pass through 
his hands ! whereas, by a proper distribution of them, and 
by referring them to a few general titles, an ordinary 
memory is able to effect what the most retentive would 
fail in, if unassisted by method. The advantages of 
arrangement in treasuring up our ideas in the mind, are 

B 



14 

perfectly similar to the good effects of it in the instance 
which has been stated. 

But since, with every aid, the powers of the memory 
must be limited, we shall do well to discriminate the 
subjects of knowledge according to their importance, and 
confine our aim to the acquisition of useful and connected 
truths; instead of grasping at every thing by desultory 
efforts, and distracting our attention by many detached 
and insignificant objects/ 

17. The mind, having gained ideas, has the faculty 
of discerning ; i. e. of distinguishing one from another. 
If in having our ideas in the memory ready at hand, 
consists quickness of parts; in having them unconfused 
and being able to distinguish one thing from another 
where there is the least difference, consists the exactness 
of judgment. And hence there appears to be some 
ground for the common remark, that men of great wit and 
prompt memory have seldom the clearest judgment, or 
deepest reason. For wit consists in assembling ideas, and 
putting together with quickness and variety those wherein 
can be found any resemblance or congruity, so as to make 
up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy; 
in doing which, no regard is paid to truth and right 
reason, by whose severe rules, therefore, it will not bear 
to be examined: judgment, on the contrary, consists in 
separating ideas wherein can be found the least difference, 
so that no confusion may arise from their apparent simili- 
tude. 

18. Every object which affects our senses is an indi- 
vidual object ; but we perceive that two or more objects 
which affect some of our senses differently, affect others of 
them in precisely the same way. Thus paper, snow, and 

f Reid, Es. III. Stewart, El. Phil. c. vi. 



15 

milk, affect the senses of touch and taste differently, but 
they present the same appearance to the eye. The differ- 
ence we believe to proceed from different qualities in the 
several objects; and their sameness of appearance we ascribe 
to the possession of some similar qualities. To the similar 
qualities one common name is given ; and every thing 
which presents the same appearance to the eye that snow 
does, is called white ; where the word white is the sign of a 
quality inherent in each of numerous objects. 

If it were necessary to give a distinct name to each 
individual object, it is manifest that a complete language 
could never be formed, adequate to the vast variety of 
objects. The mind, therefore, comparing several indi- 
viduals with each other, and discovering in them many 
qualities in which they agree, combines them into one 
class or species, and includes them all under a common 
name. Thus, observing that many individuals agree in 
having an erect form, and in being endowed with reason, 
(omitting all those properties in which they disagree, 
such as size, height, or complexion), we combine them 
into one species, to which we give the name of man. 
Again, observing that other objects have certain qualities 
which belong to man, — laying aside the ideas of reason, 
speech, and other differences, and retaining only the ideas 
of organized body, sensation, and spontaneous motion, we 
comprise all these, along with man, under the common 
name of animal. By a similar process we comprehend 
animals, plants, and other objects under the name of body, 
and lastly of substance ; having omitted, successively, the 
peculiar qualities by which the several classes of objects 
are distinguished from one another. 

This power of considering certain qualities of an 
object apart from the rest is called Abstraction, and it 
is of so great importance as to have been considered by 



1 6 

some philosophers the charactenstical attribute of a 
rational nature. 

It was long disputed whether the mind is able to form 
abstract ideas; whether, for example, it can form the 
abstract idea of man, without attaching to the conceived 
object some particular size, height, complexion; — which 
particulars are not necessary attributes of man, but dis- 
tinguish one man from another. It is now generally 
admitted that the mind has no such power ; that it cannot 
form the idea of any thing, without ascribing to it some 
particular modification. In what manner then is it able, 
from the consideration of these particular ideas, to make 
its conclusions general ? By considering the particular 
ideas to be signs or representatives of all other ideas of the 
•same class. If the subject of our thoughts be man, and 
we attempt to form the idea of an object corresponding to 
this word, that idea must be particular ; but our reason- 
ings will not on that account be the less correct, if they do 
not in the least involve or depend upon those particular 
qualities which distinguish individuals from each other, and 
are not common to the species. When Euclid is proving 
the method of dividing a line into two equal parts, he 
draws a line, we may suppose, of an inch in length : this, 
which in itself is a particular line, is nevertheless, with 
regard to its signification, general ; since it is a sign or 
representative of all particular lines, so that what is proved 
of it is proved of all. And as that particular line becomes 
general by being made a sign, so the name line, and the 
idea of a line, either of which taken absolutely is particu- 
lar, by being signs are made general likewise. 

When it is affirmed that the whole is equal to the sum of 
all its parts, if, in order to comprehend this, we recur to 
ideas, all that we can do is to form a notion of some indi- 
vidual whole, divided into a certain number of parts of 



17 

which it is constituted; as of the year, divided into the four 
seasons. From this instance we can discern nothing more 
than the relation of equality between this particular whole 
and its component parts. If we take another example, 
we only perceive another particular truth. The same 
holds of a third and of a fourth. But the perception of 
ten thousand instances would not give us a knowledge of 
the universal truth, if the mind had not the power of 
considering things as signs, and particular ideas as repre- 
senting an infinity of others, resembling one another in 
those circumstances which are the subject of consideration, 
though dissimilar in every other. And hence it is that 
some ideas are particular in their nature, but general in 
their representation. 

It may be observed also that the attention of the mind 
is frequently extended no farther than to words ; which 
are the arbitrary signs of ideas. Our habits of thinking 
and speaking have gradually established in the mind such 
relations among the words we employ, as to enable us to 
carry on processes of reasoning by means of them, without 
attending in every instance to their particular signification. 
In talking, for example, of government, church, negotiation, 
conquest, we seldom present to our minds all the simple 
ideas of which these complex ones are composed : but all 
the common applications of these terms having become 
familiar to us, any unusual application of them is immedi- 
ately detected ; this detection induces doubt, and the mind 
is thereby led to have recourse to the ideas themselves, 
and to its knowledge of the things which the words signi- 
fy. Thus if, instead of saying that in war the weaker have 
always recourse to negotiation, we should say that they have 
always recourse to conquest, our familiarity with these words 
and with the relation of the ideas signified by them, makes 
us immediately perceive the absurdity of that proposition. 

b 3 



18 

But in matters that are not familiar to us, or are treated in 
an uncommon manner, and in such as are of an abstruse 
nature, the case is different; and we shall be continually 
liable to be imposed upon by words, unless we fully 
apprehend their meaning, and attend to the ideas which 
they are employed to represent. 5 



19* The objects of Complex ideas may be classed 
under three heads ; substances, modes, and relations. 

The ideas of substances are such combinations of sim- 
ple ideas as represent things that subsist by themselves ; 
in which combination, the idea of substance, such as we 
are able to form of it, is always the first and chief. Thus, 
if to the idea of substance be joined that of a certain 
colour, with certain degrees of weight, hardness, ductility, 
and fusibility, we gain the idea of lead; and the ideas of 
spontaneous motion, thought, and of a certain figure, 
joined to substance, form the idea of man. 

Our knowledge of bodies is acquired solely by our per- 
ception of their qualities ; but since we cannot conceive 
how these qualities should subsist alone, we suppose them 
to exist in, and be supported by some common subject ; 
which support we denote by the name substance, though it 
is certain that of the nature of it we have in reality no 
distinct conception. And the same is true of the opera- 
tions of the mind, such as thinking, knowing, doubting: 
since we are not able to apprehend how they can subsist 



s Encyc. Brit. Art. Metaph. Campbell's Phil, of Rhet. vol. II. 
ch. vii. Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, Part I. §. vii. 



19 

of themselves or be produced by mere matter, we conclude 
that they are the actions of some other substance, which we 
call mind or spirit. So that, as we have no other idea of 
matter than as being something wherein the qualities which 
affect our senses subsist, if we suppose a substance wherein 
thinking, knowing, doubting and other powers subsist, we 
have as clear an idea of the substance of spirit, as we have 
of matter ; the one being supposed to be (without knowing 
what it is) the substratum to those simple ideas we have 
from without, and the other supposed (with a like igno- 
rance of what it is) to be the substratum to those operations 
which we experience in ourselves within. It appears 
then that our idea of material substance is not more dis- 
tinct than that of the substance of spirit ; and therefore 
from our not having a distinct knowledge of the substance 
of spirit, we can no more conclude its non-existence than 
we can, for the same reason, deny the existence of matter. 
Some of the qualities or properties of both are known to us 
from observation and experience ; but all attempts to ex- 
plain the manner in which these qualities exist together, 
and what is the cause, ground, or reason of their union, 
have hitherto, with regard both to matter and spirit, been 
made equally in vain. 

The things then immediately perceived by us and of 
which we have an adequate idea, are only qualities, which 
must belong to a subject ; and all that we know about this 
subject is, that it is that to which such qualities belong. 
In this the philosopher has no advantage above the 
vulgar : for as they perceive colour, figure, and motion by 
their senses, as well as he does ; and as both are equally 
certain that these qualities must have a subject in which 
they inhere, so the notions which both have of this subject 
are equally obscure. When the philosopher calls it a sub- 
stance, a substratum, or a subject of inhesion, these words 



20 

convey no further meaning than what is understood and 
expressed by saying, in common language, that it is a 
thing extended, solid, and moveable. It is therefore about 
qualities alone that we can reason with certainty, and it is 
sufficient for the purposes of life that we have of them an 
adequate knowledge. For as the substratum of all bodies 
seems to be the same, though we know not what it is ; 
and as one body is distinguished from another only by 
its qualities or powers, a knowledge of these is all that can 
be necessary to direct us in our use of the objects with 
which we are surrounded. h 

20. Modes do not subsist by themselves, but are the 
adjuncts or affections of things to which they are referred: 
Thus inches and feet are modes of Space ; hours and days 
of Duration; units of Number. Also beauty, grati- 
tude, theft, murder are modes ; being the adjuncts of bodies 
or substances, on which they are dependent. There are 
two kinds of modes : (l) simple modes, our ideas of which 
are merely combinations of the same simple idea, as 'of a 
dozen, a score, which are only so many units added to- 
gether : (2) mixed modes, such as beauty, theft ; our ideas 
of which are formed by the combination of simple ideas of 
several hinds. 

21. Space is conceived as having three dimensions, 
length, breadth, and thickness, which are generally called 
the three simple modes of space. In this respect it agrees 
with body : but the agreement proceeds no farther ; for 
space is destitute of solidity, without which the existence 
of body is inconceivable. Our idea of space is gained by 
the sight and touch ; and it is so closely associated with 
every visible and tangible object, that we cannot see nor 
feel, without conceiving that the objects seen or felt 

h Reid, Es. II. ch. xix. 



21 

occupy so much of space. Had we never possessed the 
senses of sight and touch, we could not have supposed 
the existence of space to be necessary to the existence of 
every thing. Our other senses as well as our internal 
powers of thought would have given us a knowledge of 
our own existence and of the existence of other things, but 
no object of those senses or of thought would have been 
conceived as occupying space. 

Space may properly be called the privation of body ; 
since it has itself no positive or actual existence. We have 
indeed a positive idea of it, as we have of silence, darkness, 
and other privations ; but it cannot be inferred from our 
having such an idea of space, that space itself is something 
real, any more than it can be inferred that darkness, 
silence, absence are real things, and have as positive an 
existence as light, sound, and body. 

Each different distance is a different mode of space. 
Men fix in their minds, for the use of measuring, the ideas 
of certain lengths, such as an inch, a yard, a mile ; and 
when these stated lengths are become familiar to their 
thoughts, they can without difficulty repeat them, and by 
adding them together enlarge their idea of space as much 
as they please. This power of repeating the idea of any 
distance and adding it to the former, without being ever 
able to come to a limit, gives us the idea of infinity. 

22. Our idea of the place of a body is gained by ob- 
serving the relation of its distance from any two or more 
points, which, being considered as at rest, keep the same 
distance one from another. Thus, when we observe a 
thing to be at the same distance now, at which it was yes- 
terday, from two or more points with which it was then 
compared, and which have not, since the comparison was 
made, changed their position with respect to each other, 
the thing is said to be in the same place ; and to have 



22 

changed its place, if it have altered its distance from those 
points. The place of any thing is therefore determined by 
reference to the objects with which it is compared; and 
on that account a thing may have remained in the same 
place with regard to some objects, and at the same time 
have changed its place with regard to others. Thus in 
the cabin of a ship, different articles may have continued 
in the same place with regard to each other, while all of 
them, by the motion of the ship, may have changed their 
place with regard to the neighbouring land. But this 
modification of distance which is called place, being made 
by men for their common use, in order that they may de- 
signate the particular position of objects where they have 
occasion for such designation, they determine the place of 
an object by reference to such adjacent things as best serve 
their present purpose, without regarding other things 
which, for a different purpose, might better determine the 
place of the same object. Thus in a chess-board, the use 
of the designation of the place of each chessman being de- 
termined only within that checquered piece of wood, to 
designate it by reference to any thing else, would be use- 
less ; but if these chessmen were put up in a box, and it 
were asked where any particular chessman is, it would be 
proper to determine its place by reference to something 
else than the chess-board, such as the part of the room 
or closet which contains the box. 

That place is nothing but the relative position of things, 
will be readily admitted, when it is considered that we 
can have no idea of the place of the universe. Every part 
of the universe has place ; because it can be referred to 
other parts which we may suppose to be fixed. Thus 
every planet of our system has a place, which may be 
determined by ascertaining its distance from the Sun and 
from the orbits of the other planets ; and the place of the 



23 

system itself may be ascertained by referring it to two or 
more fixed stars: but all the systems taken as one whole can 
have no place ; because there is nothing else to which the 
position of that whole can be referred. It is true that the 
word place is sometimes used to denote that portion of 
space which any particular body occupies; and the 
universe has place in this sense, but not in the other and 
proper sense of the word. 

23. Hours, days, years, time, eternity, are modes of 
duration. Our idea of duration, as. well as our belief of 
it, is acquired by the faculty of memory. It is essential to 
every thing remembered that it be something which is 
past ; and we cannot conceive a thing to be past, without 
conceiving some duration between it and the present. As 
soon therefore as we remember any thing, we acquire both 
an idea and belief of duration. 1 

Having gained the idea of duration, the next thing to 
be done is to get some measure of it, whereby we may 
judge of its different lengths, and consider the distinct 
order wherein things exist; without which our knowledge 
would be confused, and History in particular would be 
rendered useless. This consideration of duration, as 
marked out by certain measures or periods, gives us the 
idea of time. 

In measuring extension, nothing more is required than 
the application of some standard or measure to the thing 
whose extension we wish to ascertain ; but in measuring 
duration this cannot be done, because no two different 
parts of duration can be put together to measure one 
another, and therefore no standard of it can be kept 
at hand, ready to be applied. Nothing then could 
serve properly for a measure of time, but what has 

1 Reid, Es. III. ch. iii. 



24 

divided the whole length of its duration into equal 
portions by constantly repeated periods. On which 
account, the diurnal and annual revolutions of the Sun, as 
having been from the beginning of nature equal, regular, 
and observable by all mankind, have been with reason 
made use of for the measure of duration. But the distinc- 
tion of days and years having depended on the motion of 
the Sun, men are apt to suppose that without motion there 
could be no measure of time ; as if there were some 
necessary connection between them : whereas any period- 
ical appearance, if universally observable, would have 
distinguished the intervals of time as well as those that 
have been made use of. If the Sun, for instance, had been 
lighted up as a fire, after the same intervals of time which 
now pass between its successive arrivals at the same 
meridian, and had been extinguished twelve hours after ; 
—and if in the time of an annual revolution it had sensibly 
increased in brightness and heat, and so decreased again ; 
such regular appearances would have served to measure 
the periods of duration as well without motion, as with it. 

The idea of time is preparatory to that of eternity : for 
having got the ideas of certain lengths of duration, we can 
in our thoughts add them to one another as often as we 
please, and apply them, so added, to duration past or fu- 
ture; and this we can continue to do without limit, and 
suppose a duration exceeding the periods we can reckon, 
add as many as we will. 

25. The idea of number is originally acquired by 
observing the union of similar qualities in two or more 
objects, and referring those objects, by abstraction, to the 
same class, and giving them a common name. Thus ob- 
serving a cow, a sheep, and a horse, we say that there are 
three animals ; but if the cow, sheep, and horse had no 
common properties, so that we could not reduce them to 



25 

some common species, we should never gain from them 
the idea of number. It is necessary to have observed that 
two objects are in some respects of the same kind, before 
we can number them, or make such a comparison of one 
with the other as to gain a knowledge of the relations of 
one and two. If a child saw a cow, a sheep, and a horse, 
his senses would no doubt enable him to distinguish them 
from one another ; and if he were asked the number of 
them, he might probably, from having learnt the names of 
number as signs, without affixing to them any idea of the 
things signified, readily answer: three ; but if he were 
further asked three what ? his answer would not be so 
ready. They are not three cows, three sheep, or three 
horses. When he has learnt that, from having some com- 
mon properties, they may be classed under the same 
species, then, and not before, he will be able to answer 
that they are three animals. 

In arithmetic, figures, which are combinations of units, 
are used merely as symbols ; and it is not necessary that 
the mind should concern itself with the things signified ; 
and it is observable that, whatever difficulty we may have 
had originally in acquiring the idea of number, the sim- 
ple modes of it are of all others the most distinct. Every 
the least variation makes each combination as clearly 
different from that which approaches nearest to it, as from 
the most remote ; two being as distinct from one as from a 
hundred, and the idea of two as distinct from that of one, 
as the idea of the magnitude of the earth is from that of 
one of its particles. This is not the case in other simple 
modes ; in which it is not easy to distinguish between 
two modes that approach one another and yet are really 
different. For who will undertake to discern accurately 
the various shades of colour, or form distinct ideas of every 
the least difference in extension ? 

C 



2G 

Since numeration consists in adding units together,, 
and these combinations of units have no variety or differ- 
ence except as being more or less ; names or marks for 
each distinct combination are more necessary than in any 
other sort of ideas. For without such names, we could 
not make use of numbers in reckoning ; especially where 
the combination is made up of a great multitude of units, 
which, if put together without a name to distinguish each 
precise sum, would form only a heap in confusion. 
Hence, it has been observed that uncivilized tribes cannot 
reckon far, on account of the scantiness of their language, 
and when they wish to express greater numbers, they 
point to the hairs of the head, to denote a great multitude 
which they cannot number : — and also that children, for 
want of names to mark the several progressions of num- 
bers, and from not having yet the faculty to arrange them 
in regular order and retain them in their memories, do not 
begin to number very early, or proceed in it far, till after 
they are well furnished with a stock of other ideas ; and 
they are often known to reason well, and have clear con- 
ceptions of other things, before they can reckon twenty. 
For before they can have a clear idea of that number, they 
must know the distinct names of all the preceding numbers 
as they stand in order ; and wherever this fails, the chain is 
broken, and the progress in numbering can go no farther. 
So that to reckon right, it is required that the mind dis- 
tinguish ideas which differ only by an unit, and also that it 
remember in their exact order the names of the several 
combinations from an unit to the number which is to be 
reckoned: in either of which if it fails, the process of 
numbering will be disturbed, and there will remain only 
the confused idea of multitude ; but the ideas necessary to 
distinct numeration will not be attained. 



27 

£6» By means of number we are furnished with the 
most distinct idea of infinity that we are capable of ac- 
quiring. For even in space and duration, when the mind 
pursues the idea of infinity, it makes use of the repetitions 
of number ; — as of millions of miles or years ; which are 
so many distinct terms, kept best by number from running 
into confusion; and when we have added together as 
many millions as we please of known lengths of space or 
duration, the clearest idea we can get of infinity is given 
us by the incomprehensible remainder of numbers that 
may still be added, affording no prospect of termination* 
Hence, our idea of infinity is in a great measure negative. 
For when we endeavour to form an idea of infinite space 
or duration, we usually at first take some large idea as, 
perhaps, of millions of miles or years, which possibly we 
multiply several times. All that we thus amass in our 
thoughts is positive, and is the assemblage of a great 
number of positive ideas of space or duration. But of 
what remains beyond this, we have no more a distinct 
positive notion than a mariner has of the depth of the sea, 
who having let down a large portion of his line reaches no 
bottom: whereby he knows the depth to be so many 
fathoms and more; but how many more, remains un- 
known. And if he could always supply new line, and 
find the plummet sink without ever stopping, he would 
be in a situation similar to ours when we are endeavouring 
to gain a complete and positive idea of infinity. So much 
as the mind comprehends of any space or duration, it has 
a positive idea of; but in endeavouring to make it infinite, 
it being always enlarging, always advancing, the idea is 
still imperfect and incomplete. For which reason it is not 
an unmeaning subtlety to say that we ought to distinguish 
between the idea of the infinity of space, and the idea of a 
space infinite ; the first being nothing but the idea of a 



28 

supposed endless progression of lengths of space repeated 
as often as we please ; but to have in the mind the idea of 
a space infinite,, is to suppose that the mind has already 
passed over, and actually has in view the complete series 
of the repeated lengths of space; which series must 
therefore be terminated, in the mind's conception ; but to 
be infinite, and at the same time terminated, involves a 
manifest contradiction. 

If our idea of infinity be gained from the power we have 
of repeating without end our own ideas, it may be asked, 
why we do not attribute infinity to other ideas as well as 
to those of space and duration; since they may be as 
easily repeated as the other, and yet no one ever thinks of 
infinite sweetness or infinite whiteness, though he can 
repeat the ideas of sweet or white, as frequently as those of 
a yard, or a day. The answer is, that an idea of infinity 
cannot be gained by the repetition of any ideas except 
those which may be considered as having parts, and as 
capable of increase by the addition of other parts ; because 
by the repetition of such ideas alone, there is a continued 
enlargement without end. To the largest idea of exten- 
sion or duration that we at present have, the addition of 
any the least part makes an increase ; but if to our idea 
of whiteness we add another of equal whiteness, they 
become as it were embodied, and the idea is not at all 
increased. Those ideas therefore that consist not of parts, 
cannot be augmented : but space, duration, and number, 
being capable of increase by repetition and of progression 
without end, lead our minds to the thought of infinity. 

27. There is no limit to the variety of ideas which 
may be classed under the head of modes : and few of 
them, comparatively, have distinct names. Walking, run- 
ning, leaping, and many others are modes of motion ; and 
in like manner, of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, there is an 



98 

endless variety of modes, a few of which are distinguished 
by names, to serve the purposes of language ; and under 
each name a large class of modes is comprehended, not 
distinguished from one another by separate names. Thus 
the term whiteness is applied to many shades of colour ; 
and bitterness comprehends modes of taste affecting the 
palate with many gradations of unpleasantness. Also of 
pleasure and pain there are various modes, such as joy, 
hope, fear, envy, shame. Reverie, attention, study, are 
modes of thinking, corresponding to the degrees of remis- 
sion or intention with which the powers of the mind are 
exerted ; the term reverie being applied, when ideas float 
in the mind without reflection or regard ; attention, when 
the ideas that offer themselves are taken notice of, and, as 
it were, registered in the memory ; and study, when the 
mind with great earnestness fixes its view on any subject, 
considers it on all sides, and will not be called off by the 
ordinary solicitation of other ideas. Which different 
degrees of intention and remission, of which the mind is 
capable, lead us to conclude that thinking is the action, not 
the essence of the soul, since the operations of agents easily 
admit of intention and remission; but the essences of 
things are not conceived capable of such variation. 

28. Mixed modes are combinations of simple ideas of 
several kinds ; and they are made for convenience, and 
dispatch in language. Thus we express the whole cere- 
mony of crowning a king by the word coronation, without 
making an enumeration of every particular belonging to 
it. Thus also the use of such words as revenge, reprieve, 
appeal, facilitates our communication with one another, by 
rendering unnecessary the mention of all the passions and 
forms which are included in the complex ideas severally 
expressed by those words. Mixed modes are therefore 
made by the arbitrary combination of several ideas, 

c3 



30 

whenever it becomes convenient to comprehend them 
under one name; although, naturally, those ideas may- 
have no more connection with one another, than others 
have, which have not been formed into similar combi- 
nations. Thus parricide is used to denote the killing of 
a father ; but no word is in use to denote the killing of a 
son or a neighbour; though the idea of killing has no 
more connection in nature with the idea of the former 
relation, than it has with that of the other relations. It is 
the having a name therefore that gives unity to a mixed 
mode ; no combination of ideas being generally considered 
as one complex idea, unless it have an appropriate word to 
express it. Hence the act of killing a son or neighbour, 
having no name affixed to it, is not taken for a particular 
complex idea, nor as a distinct species of action from that 
of killing any other person. 

Our ideas of mixed modes are acquired 1. by observa- 
tion of things themselves : — as by seeing men wrestle and 
fence, we gain the idea of wrestling and fencing ; by see- 
ing a king crowned, we gain the idea of coronation. 2. By 
invention, or the voluntary combination of several simple 
ideas in our own minds: — thus he that invented print- 
ing or etching, had formed the complex idea of it in his 
own mind, before it existed. 3. By explanation or defini- 
tion, that is, by enumerating the several ideas of which 
the mixed mode is composed; whereby clear ideas of 
modes such as sacrilege or murder may be conveyed to the 
minds of men who never saw those acts committed. 

Since mixed modes are made by men for the purpose of 
readily communicating their thoughts to one another, they 
usually make such collections of ideas into complex 
modes, and affix names to them, as they have frequent 
use of in their business and conversation ; leaving others, 
which they have seldom occasion to mention, uncombined' 



31 ' . 

and without names. And if we examine which of our 
simple ideas have had most mixed modes made out of 
them and distinguished by names, we shall find that they 
are those of thinking, motion, and power ; for these com- 
prehend all actions both of body and mind, and as our 
conversation and laws principally respect human actions, 
it is necessary we should have modes relative to them, 
that we may be able to express our thoughts concerning 
them with convenience and expedition. 

The purpose for which such modes are formed affords 
a reason also why in every language many particular 
words are in use, to which there are none that exactly 
correspond in other languages. ' For peculiar customs 
exist in every country and give rise to peculiar modes, 
with names annexed to them; but in other countries, 
where the same customs do not prevail, those peculiar 
modes have not been made, and consequently they have 
no words to express them. Thus oGTpaKKT^o^ being a 
punishment peculiar to the Greeks, there is not in any 
other language a word corresponding to it : and it is 
manifest that such terms as jury, artillery, and the names 
of all modern inventions, cannot be expressed in transla- 
tion by any single words of Greek or Latin. Moreover, 
customs are continually changing, so that while some 
combinations of ideas fall into disuse, others are formed, 
and new names are introduced to express them ; by which 
means a continual and gradual change takes place in the 
vocabulary of every language. 

29. Under the term Relations those ideas are com- 
prehended which arise from observing the relation or 
comparison of things, one with another. Thus the idea 
of Nobility is relative; since no one can be Noble, except 
by comparison with others. When two terms as father 
and child correspond to each other, so that the idea of one 



32 

naturally introduces that of the other,, they are called 
correlative terms : and where a correlative term is not in 
use, the relation, though equally real, is often not per- 
ceived. Thus the idea of a Dictator is relative, since the 
word denotes a person exercising authority over others ; 
but this relation is not so obvious as that implied in the 
word King, which has the term subject correlative to it, 
Also there are many words which seem to be absolute and 
to stand for positive ideas, and yet imply a tacit relation, 
Old, young, great, little, strong, weak, are of this sort; 
which appear to denote positive ideas, and yet in reality 
imply a tacit reference to certain standards settled in the 
mind. Thus some animals are called old, at an age at 
which others are young, and a horse, which in one country 
would be called large, might be thought small in other 
countries ; because reference is made to different ideas of 
duration and size settled in the mind as belonging in the 
course of nature to the several sorts of animals. 

In order to have an adequate idea of the relation of 
two things, it is not necessary that we know all the 
qualities that belong to the things related, but such of 
them only as form the grounds of the relation. These 
may consist in a few simple ideas ; whereas to have a per- 
fect knowledge of the substances related, we must know 
all the qualities belonging to them. Thus, in comparing 
two men in reference to a common parent, it is easy to 
form the idea of brothers, without having a perfect idea of 
man, in which are united the ideas of substance, figure, 
thinking, willing, and others ; an accurate perception of 
which is not necessary to an adequate idea of this relation. 
And hence, persons may agree as to the grounds of 
relation, who disagree in their ideas of the things related. 

The ideas which may be classed under the head of 
Relations are of almost infinite variety, since there is no 



33 

simple idea which is not capable of a great number of 
considerations in reference to other ideas; for example, 
in the same person may be included the relations of 
father, son, brother, friend, enemy, master, subject, and 
many others ; on account of which variety, it is difficult 
to comprehend them all under a few general classes. 
Many have reference to time or place, and are expressed by 
such words as old, young, above, below, near, distant. 
The relations of cause and effect are also numerous ; as when 
we observe that fluidity, which did not exist in lead, is 
produced in it by the application of heat, we call heat the 
cause, and fluidity the effect ; and in like manner the idea 
of this relation is always presented to the mind, whenever 
we consider one thing operating so as to produce another 
which did not previously exist. 

Other relations may be called proportional, which arise 
from observing different degrees of the same simple idea, 
and are expressed by such words as whiter, sweeter, less, 
equal, more : others are natural relations, such as those of 
father, brothers, countrymen, founded upon the considera«< 
tion of their consanguinity or origin, and which being 
unalterable, make the relations depending upon them as 
lasting as the subjects to which they belong : others are 
instituted relations, as those of a subject, a general, a patron; 
which differ from natural relations by being alterable, and 
separable from the persons to whom they have belonged, 
though the persons themselves, between whom the relation 
has ceased, may still exist ; as a general may resign the 
command of an army, or a subject withdraw from his 
country and pay allegiance to another king. — Lastly, 
moral relations have reference to the conduct of men, and 
arise from observing whether that conduct is conformable 
or not to certain Rules or Laws by which our judgment is 
formed of it. The Laws by which we thus judge of the 



34 

rectitude of human conduct, are (1) the Divine Law ; 
(2) the Civil Law ; (3) the Law of opinion or reputation ; 
all of which are accompanied with necessary enforcements 
of rewards and punishments. Of these the Divine Law is 
the most perfect and comprehensive, and is the only true 
test by which men ought to judge of their own actions, 
whether they be morally good or evil ; that is, whether as 
duties, or sins, they are likely to be followed by happiness 
or misery, awarded to them by the Almighty. But since 
it is not the object of this Law to prescribe minute regula- 
tions respecting many transactions of men among one 
another which are subjects not for moral precept but 
conventional agreement, and, still more, since the penalties 
annexed to the breach of God's Laws are reserved for a 
future state, and it is often found that men disregard con- 
sequences which are not immediate; — on both these ac- 
counts the Civil Law is necessary, that the commonwealth 
may be able to protect the lives, liberties, and possessions, 
of those who live according to it, and may visit violations 
of it with ready punishment. — Thirdly, the Law of opinion 
ox reputation is that which greatly influences men, not 
only as it pertains to many things of which the other Laws 
do not take cognizance, but in more important cases in 
which it is at variance with them. And though many are 
able to banish reflection as to the consequences which will 
follow the violation of the Divine Law, and flatter them- 
selves with the hope of escaping punishments due from 
the Civil Law, yet of those who offend against the Law pf 
fashion and opinion, few are so insensible as to disregard 
public censure, or be happy while they are the objects of 
dislike with their own particular society. 

SO. The Association of ideas is that connection of 
them in the mind, by means of which the presence of one 
naturally introduces others, which have been joined with it 



35 

by some kind of relation. The principles on which the 
association of ideas depends appear to be chiefly resem* 
blance, contrast, contiguity of time or place, cause and effect, 
and habit : but as there is no possible relation among the 
objects of our knowledge which may not serve to connect 
them together in the mind, every enumeration of the 
principles of this association must be incomplete. It may 
also be remarked that the association of ideas is an 
expression which has been applied in a sense much more 
extensive than the words themselves strictly justify ; 
being made to comprehend not ideas only, but every 
passion and affection of which the mind is susceptible : — \ 
the memory also, the judgment, in a word every internal 
operation of the mind is regulated in some degree by the 
influence of this principle. 

The effect of resemblance in directing the train of our 
ideas is brought to our notice by instances of continual 
occurrence. When we read of any event, we are 
naturally led to think of other events which have occurred 
similar to it : if we meet a stranger who resembles one of 
our friends, the conception of that friend is immediately 
suggested: the view of a landscape recalls the idea of 
similar scenes which are familiar to us. To this principle 
we must ascribe the use of similies, metaphors, and all the 
figurative language of poetry. When the zephyrs laugh, 
or the forest frowns, it is to the suggestion of objects by 
analogous objects, that figurative expressions of this sort 
owe their origin. Words also suggest other words of 
similar sound ; and hence, from the accidental agreement 
of their verbal signs, ideas are excited and trains of 
thought, which otherwise would not have arisen. On 
this account, our thoughts which usually govern our lan- 
guage, are themselves in some measure governed by that 
very language over which they seem to exercise unlimited 



36 

command. In rhyme, one sound suggests another, and to 
this recurrence of sounds it is evident that the train of 
thought in the poet must be in a great degree subservient. 
Alliteration also, or a similarity in the initial sounds of 
words, has an influence on the succession of our thoughts 
similar to that which is exercised by the concluding 
syllables of verse. 

The effects of contrast, as an associating principle, are 
equally obvious. Intense cold makes us think of heat, 
and wish for it ; the thoughts of a traveller in the desert, 
suffering from hunger and thirst, naturally recur to the 
abundance which he has formerly enjoyed, but which is 
now beyond his reach. The palace and the cottage, the 
cradle and the grave, poverty and wealth, severally suggest 
one another in ready succession. Of moral reflections, 
none are so common as those which are founded on the 
instability of mortal greatness, the frailty of beauty, the 
precariousness of life ; — all which reflections are evidently 
the result of that principle of suggestion by contrast, 
which we are considering. The Roman, who saw the 
imperial victor move along in the splendour of conquest, 
must have thought of disaster, before he was led to 
moralize on the briefness of earthly triumph. And if a 
feeling of melancholy has ever arisen at the sight of youth 
and health, it can only have been suggested by the oppo- 
site ideas of age and sickness which are destined to follow. 
This transition, in our trains of thought, from one extreme 
to its opposite, has the happy effect of tempering our 
emotions ; so that while salutary reflections are excited in 
some men, others are supplied, from the very excess of 
misery, with internal sources of hope. 

Contiguity of time or place is, of all the principles of 
association, the most frequent and extensive in its opera- 
tion. Contiguity of time forms the whole calendar of the 



3? 

great multitude of mankind, who pay little attention to 
aeras of chronology, but date events by each other, and 
speak of what happened in the time of some rebellion, or 
great Election, or frost, ov famine. Even with those who 
are more accustomed to use, on great occasions, the stricter 
dates of months and years, this association of events, as 
near to each other, forms the bond for uniting in the 
memory a multitude of scattered facts, which it would 
have been impossible to remember by the separate relation 
of each to an insulated point of time. — It is the same with 
contiguity of place* To think of one part of a familiar 
landscape, is to recall the rest in immediate succession. 
On this species of relation have been founded systems of 
artificial memory, which prove, by the facilities of remem- 
brance which they afford, the influence that is exercised 
on the train of our thoughts by local association. From 
the same cause arises the pleasure we enjoy in visiting 
classical ground ; in beholding the scenes of great events, 
or places which have been dignified by the residence of 
men whom we are accustomed to revere. "I know not" 
(says Cicero, speaking of his visit to the academy at 
Athens) " whether it be a natural feeling, or an illusion 
of the imagination founded on habit, that we are more 
powerfully affected by the sight of those places which 
have been much frequented by illustrious men, than when 
we either listen to the recital, or read the detail, of their 
great actions. At this moment, I feel strongly that 
emotion which I speak of. I see before me the form of 
Plato, who was wont to dispute in this place : these 
gardens not only recall him to my memory, but seem to 
present his very person to my senses. I fancy to myself, 
that here stood Speusippus ; there Xenocrates, and here, 
on this bench, sat his disciple Polemo. To me, our 
antient Senate-House seems peopled with the like visionary 

D 



38 

forms ; for, often, when I enter it, the shades of Scipio, o£ 
Cato, and of Laelius, rise to my imagination/* — In Sparta, 
an oration was every year pronounced at the tomb of 
Leonidas. In such a scene, and with such an object 
before them, we cannot doubt that deeper emotions were 
felt by the orator and by the assembled nation who 
listened to him, than would have been felt, if the same 
language had been addressed from any other place, un- 
connected with so sacred a remembrance. 

The connection between cause and effect is so intimate 
that it is scarcely possible to direct our thoughts to either 
of them singly. When we hear of extraordinary conduct 
in any person, we naturally conjecture the reasons of it, 
and the probable consequences : when we see a wound, 
we think of the accident that caused it, and of the pain 
that follows; — when we hear of a battle, our thoughts are 
turned to the causes which have preceded, and to its pro- 
bable effects. 

Lastly, ideas that have been often joined together in 
the mind, though they have no natural connection, become 
so associated that one of them will naturally introduce the 
others, from the influence of habit. In language spoken 
or w ? ritten, the mind passes imperceptibly from the words 
heard or the characters seen to the things signified. Habit 
gives to those who have long been practised in extem- 
porary elocution the command not of words merely, but 
of thoughts and judgments which appear like the calcula- 
tions of long reflection. All the divisions of a subject 
present themselves to the orator at once ; image after 
image arises to illustrate it ; and proper words in proper 
places embody his sentiments, without any apparent effort 






k De Finibus, Lib. V. ad init. 



39 

of his own. Other proofs of the power of habit may be 
observed in the feats of the circus, and in playing upon 
instruments of music. The musician must direct innu- 
merable motions of the fingers in one particular succession. 
There is only one arrangement of those motions that is 
right, while there are thousands that are wrong and 
would spoil the music. Yet the arrangement of those 
motions gives him no trouble of thought : having a dis- 
tinct idea of the tune, and a will to play it, the motions of 
the fingers appear to arrange themselves, so as to answer 
his intention. 

31. Since the moral characters of men as well as their 
intellectual attainments depend greatly on the trains of 
thought which are allowed to occupy the mind, it is of the 
highest importance to give them a right direction, as far 
as the direction of them is in our power. For though 
ideas are connected with one another by the laws of asso- 
ciation, and often take their own course without check or 
direction, yet by an active effort of the mind the connection 
may be broken, and particular objects be fixed upon for 
its attention in preference to others. Those whose minds 
are occupied with a train of low and base thoughts, or with 
visionary speculations, are not likely to become qualified 
for any noble or active employment ; while others gain the 
command over their thoughts, regulate them in the pursuit 
of right objects, and arrive at excellence in morality and 
knowledge. 

32. When any ideas occur in connection with one an- 
other, it is important to inquire whether there be any real 
ground for the connection, in reason or nature. If there 
be, it is the office of our reason to keep them united ; for 
such associations constitute the greatest part of useful 
truths, and the mind possesses them ever ready for applica- 
tion. But other connections, formed by caprice or custom. 



40 

are often the sources of error, superstition and misery ; and 
if such associations have been long formed, they become too 
strong to be broken. Thus, if children be frightened with 
stories of ghosts appearing in the dark, the idea of ghosts 
becomes in time so associated with the idea of darkness, 
that it is often not in their power to separate them after they 
have become men ; and it is difficult for them to retain per- 
fect composure when they are alone in darkness, though 
they are fully convinced in their judgments of the absurdity 
of the tales which originally frightened them. In like man- 
ner, many remarkable antipathies may be observed in men, 
some of which appear to be natural, and to depend on 
original constitution, but the greater part of them may be 
traced to some accidental association : and it is probable 
that of those which are accounted natural, many have 
arisen from early impressions which would have been 
acknowledged to be the causes of them, if they had been 
noticed and remembered. A grown person, surfeited 
with honey, cannot think of it afterwards without dislike 
and sickness ; had this happened to him when a child, 
the same effects would have followed, but the cause would 
have been mistaken, and the antipathy accounted natural. 

A person who has been injured, or fancies that he has 
been injured, by another, sometimes ruminates upon it so 
much that the idea of the aggressor never afterwards 
occurs without being accompanied by an idea of the 
injury, even though it has been repaired, and its effects, 
otherwise, have long ceased to be felt. Hence hatreds 
exist, and quarrels are propagated and continued, often 
from slight occasions. 

When a painful combination of ideas is settled in the 
mind, it is frequently beyond the power of reason to 
relieve us from the effects of it. The Mother, who has 
lost her child, receives no consolation from intimations of 



41 

the uselessness of sorrow : reason cannot prevail over it, 
however apt she may be to hearken to it in other cases ; 
time alone can wear away by disuse the sense of former 
enjoyment of the child's presence, and at length separate 
in her memory the idea of pain for its loss from the idea 
of the child. 

33. The effects of a wrong and groundless association 
of ideas are perceived in matters even more important 
than those which have been mentioned. What evils have 
accrued to mankind from the idea of infallibility having 
become annexed to persons or societies ! — whose doctrines, 
through the influence of that idea, demanded assent with- 
out inquiry, and held the world for many centuries in 
ignorance and bondage. 

In the schools, no philosophy was tolerated in op- 
position to that of Aristotle ; insomuch that decrees were 
issued, prohibiting all persons, under pain of death, 
from teaching any maxim contrary to Aristotle, and other 
ancient authors received and approved. A similar dread 
of inquiry, with worse effects, prevailed with respect to 
religion. Hence, in a long period of darkness, Christianity 
was corrupted by the mixture of human opinions claiming 
equal authority with the word of God. And the evil of 
such debasement of truth is far from being confined to the 
mischief of the error while it continues : if ever, by any 
means, that part which is erroneous be detected, those 
who have weakly and passively derived their most im- 
portant opinions from habit or authority, are apt to lose 
their reverence for the truth itself on which the error has 
been grafted, and rashly fall a prey to that sceptical philo- 
sophy, which teaches that all opinions and all principles 
of action rest on authority alone, and owe their influence 
to education and example. 

d3 



42 

Again, in political controversies, what effect is fre- 
quently produced by a name, which, without any just or 
ascertained grounds, has become associated with particular 
opinions ! — a name originally affixed by the invention of 
enemies, or perhaps from accident. Many, who are 
unable to understand the distinctions which may have 
given rise to opposite names, and though the dispute be 
on subjects which neither they nor their opponents com- 
prehend, yet are impelled to mutual dislike; — many, who, 
but for the invention of the names, would scarcely have 
known that their opinions differed. That which thus 
captivates the reasons of men is the association of ideas 
which have no real or natural alliance to one another, but 
which, by education, custom, and the clamour of party, 
have become so united in their minds that they appear to 
be one idea, and have the force of an established and cer- 
tain truth. This wrong association, whilst they are under 
the influence of it, makes them incapable of conviction, 
and they applaud themselves as champions for truth, while 
they are contending for error ; their reasonings are per- 
verted by it, and their minds disturbed by groundless 
animosities. 1 



34>. Words are the arbitrary signs of ideas. Since the 
communication of thought can only be made by external 
signs, and men are furnished with organs fitted to frame 
articulate sounds, these are used by them as the means of 

1 On the subject of the association of ideas , see Professor Brown's 
Lectures, vol. II. p. 196 .... 456. Reid on the train of thought in the 
mind, Es. iv., ch. iv. Stewart's Elem. Phil. ch. v. 



43 

communication, and are the best that could be used for 
that purpose, on account of their quickness and variety. 
There is therefore no natural connection between words 
and ideas, for, in that case, all nations would speak the 
same language : the connection is arbitrary, and arises from 
the people of a country agreeing to express, as nearly as 
possible, the same idea by the same word, which by con- 
stant use become so linked together that the word in- 
stantly brings the idea to the mind. 

Words are properly the signs of ideas in the mind of 
the speaker. The purpose of language requires that they 
should be so ; for when a man speaks to another, it is 
with the intention of communicating his own ideas, and 
not other ideas of which he has no knowledge. Hence 
the same word is sometimes used by different persons with 
different ideas annexed to it. A child, having noticed 
nothing in gold but a yellow colour, applies the word gold 
to the colour only, and therefore applies it to all objects 
which have that colour : another observes great weight in 
gold, and understands, by the word, a heavy, yellow 
substance : a third adds fusibility and malleability to 
these qualities, and understands, by the word, a heavy, 
yellow, fusible, and malleable substance. Each of these 
uses the word to express the exact idea which he has 
applied to it, and no other. 

But though words can properly signify nothing but 
ideas that are in the mind of the speaker, yet in their 
thoughts men give them a tacit reference to two other 
things. First, they suppose their words to be marks of 
the same ideas in the minds of those with whom they com- 
municate, otherwise the purpose of language would be 
defeated; and, in truth, many disputes have arisen in con- 
sequence of the hearer and speaker attaching different 
ideas to the same word. Secondly, they suppose that the 



44 

ideas, expressed by their words, correspond to the reality 
of things ; as, when the word sun is used, they suppose 
that a real object exists, which has excited the idea 
denoted by that word. 

35. It is evident that the purpose of language cannot 
be gained, unless the same word stand for the same 
idea in the minds of the speaker and hearer. To effect 
this, it is necessary that words, for the most part, be 
general terms, so that one name may comprehend a great 
number of individual objects. If every object had a dis- 
tinct name applied to it, it would not only be impossible 
for the human mind to retain the innumerable names that 
must be framed, but, if it were possible, it would be use- 
less ; for no two persons would have the same idea in their 
minds, with the same name annexed, of any particular 
thing which was known only to one of them; so that a 
great part of their knowledge would not be communicable 
to each other. Particular things are therefore not distin- 
guished by names, except where convenience requires it ; 
as, in their own species, men make use of proper names, 
because they have perpetual occasion to distinguish one per- 
son from another: countries also, cities, rivers, and other the 
like distinctions of place have usually, for the same reason, 
peculiar names; they being things which men have often 
occasion to mark particularly, in their discourses with one 
another. 

36. Since there is no natural connection between 
words and ideas, it is often necessary to have the 
meaning of words explained. This may be done in four 
ways, which are severally taken according to the nature of 
the word, or as the occasion requires. 1. A word may be 
explained by another word synonimous with it ; thus, if a 
person wished to learn the meaning of the word albus, he 
might be told that it meant white. 2. By naming the ob- 



45 

ject, to the idea of which the word is annexed ; thus he 
might be told that albus denoted the colour of snow or 
milk. 3. By presenting to his senses the object itself; as 
by shewing him snow or milk, and saying that albus 
denoted their colour. 4. By definition, that is, explaining 
the meaning of one word by the use of several other words 
not synonimous with it. The word albus, being the sign 
of a simple idea, cannot be explained by this method, 
because the several terms of a definition signify distinct 
ideas, and therefore cannot represent together an idea 
which has no composition. 

Words denoting complex ideas may be defined, by 
enumerating the simple ideas of which they are composed. 
Thus the idea of a rainbow may be communicated to a 
person who has never seen one, by describing its figure 
and the arrangement of its colours ; but this cannot be 
done, unless he be able to conceive the several simple ideas 
corresponding to the particular parts of the description. 
If, being born blind, he has never gained the idea of 
colour, it is evident that no description could communicate 
to him a complex idea of which the idea of colour is ne- 
cessarily a component part. 

37. Though language furnishes the best means that 
we possess for the communication of our thoughts, its re- 
presentation of them is in many respects imperfect ; and 
besides the unavoidable imperfections attached to it, men 
are guilty of several faults and neglects, by which words 
are rendered less clear in their meaning than naturally they 
need be. 

One fault is the use of words without any distinct 
meaning at all, though perhaps, properly, very important 
meanings belong to them. Such words as liberty, glory, en- 
thusiasm, are in frequent use ; but if many of those who use 
them were asked what they mean by them, they would be 



46 

at a loss for an answer. This insignificancy in their words 
makes the discourse of men often unintelligible, especially 
in moral matters, where the words for the most part stand 
for arbitrary collections of ideas not regularly and per- 
manently united in nature, and are therefore frequently 
used without any thought of their meaning, or at least 
with very obscure and uncertain ideas annexed to them. 
Hence, in disputation with men who use words without a 
fixed meaning, it is impossible ever to convince them that 
they are in the wrong ; it being as difficult to draw those 
men out of their mistakes, who have no settled notions, as 
it would be to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation, who 
has no settled abode. 

Another fault is inconstancy in the use of words. In 
many books, especially of controversy, we may observe 
the same words used sometimes for one collection of ideas, 
and sometimes for another ; the effect of which is a per- 
plexity similar to that which would take place if men, in 
their accompts with one another, made the characters of 
numbers stand sometimes for one, and sometimes for an- 
other collection of units. 

A third abuse of language is an affected obscurity, by 
either applying old words to new and unusual significa- 
tions, or introducing new terms without need, or, where 
there is need, introducing them without explanation. 
Since words are no man's private possession, but are de- 
signed to be the means of common intercourse, it is not 
for any one, at his pleasure, to change their meaning ; or 
at least, if there be a necessity of using any word in a new 
sense, he is bound to give notice of it. Propriety of 
speech chiefly consists in adherence to the common use of 
words ; it is that which makes our thoughts communicable 
with the greatest ease and advantage, and therefore de- 
serves some part of our attention and study. 



if 

The use of figurative language in subjects which 
require to be treated with accuracy and plainness, is a 
great cause of obscurity. If the aim of a speaker or writer 
be to give delight rather than information and improve- 
ment, such ornaments can scarcely be condemned : but 
where truth is concerned, and in all discourses which 
profess to convey accurate knowledge, figurative ex- 
pressions tend to mislead the judgment, and ought to be 
avoided, as being unsuitable to such subjects. 

38. A knowledge of these and other abuses of lan- 
guage implies a knowledge also of the remedies which 
may be applied to them ; and a powerful motive will not 
be wanting to apply the obvious remedies, if we consider 
what evils have arisen from such abuses, what bitter and 
frivolous contests owe their origin to them, and how the 
prevalence of real knowledge and truth has been thereby 
impeded. Most disputes are merely verbal. If the terms 
used in them were defined, and the same meaning affixed 
to them by both parties, disputes would generally end of 
themselves, and the way to knowledge as well as peace be 
more open than it is. In the mean time, where shall we 
find any, either controversial debate, or familiar discourse, 
concerning government, liberty, faith, justice, and the like, 
without observing the different ideas which the disputants 
have annexed to these words ? Hence in the interpreta- 
tion of laws, human or divine, there is no conclusion ; 
comments have furnished matter for other comments: 
and this evil is chiefly owing to caprice or negligence in 
limiting, distinguishing, and varying the signification of 
words. 

39- Knowledge consists chiefly in the perception of 
the agreement or disagreement of our ideas. When we 
know that white is not black, we perceive that these two 
ideas do not agree : when we know that the three angles 



48 

of a triangle are equal to two right angles, we perceive 
that equality to two right angles has a necessary agree- 
ment with the three angles of a triangle. 

Knowledge is of two kinds, actual and habitual. Ac- 
tual knowledge is the perception which the mind has of 
the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, from its pre- 
sent view of them, without the assistance of memory. 
Habitual knowledge is that which is lodged in the 
memory, and is such that whenever it is recalled, the 
mind apprehends and assents to it without hesitation. 
Thus a man may be said to know all those truths which 
are lodged in his memory; having been acquired by a 
foregoing clear perception, and of which the mind is fully 
assured, as often as it has occasion to reflect on them. 
For our finite understandings being able to think distinctly 
but on one thing at a time, if men had no more knowledge 
than what actually occupied their thoughts, they would 
all be very ignorant, since he that knew most would know 
but one truth. 

Habitual knowledge is of two kinds : the first is of 
such truths laid up in the memory as the mind actually 
and fully perceives, whenever they occur to it ; and this is 
the case with all truths of which we have an immediate 
knowledge, such as that the whole is greater than its part, 
where a view of the ideas immediately discovers their 
agreement. The other kind of knowledge is, when hav- 
ing once been convinced of the agreement or disagreement 
of any ideas, we retain the memory of the conviction, 
without the proofs. Thus a man, to whom it has once 
been proved that the three angles of a triangle are equal 
to two right angles, still knows this to be true, though he 
may have forgotten the proof. And, if reliance can be 
placed upon the memory, this kind of knowledge is as 
certain as the other. For the immutability of the same 






4.9 

relations between the same immutable things, makes it 
certain that what was once known to be true must always 
be true. 

39* Knowledge, considered with respect to its evidence, 
is intuitive, demonstrative, or sensitive. Intuitive knowledge 
is when the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement 
of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the 
intervention of any other. Thus we have an intuitive 
knowledge that two straight lines cannot inclose a space, 
and that the whole is greater than any of its parts. Such 
truths the mind perceives at first sight, and this kind of 
knowledge is the clearest and most certain of which we 
are capable. 

Demonstrative knowledge is that perception of the 
agreement or disagreement of two ideas, which is acquired 
by the help of intermediate ideas. Thus, we cannot im- 
mediately perceive that the three angles of a triangle are 
equal to two right angles, because they cannot be brought 
to an immediate comparison by the application of one to 
another, or juxta-position ; but finding some other angles 
which are equal to the three angles of a triangle and at the 
same time to two right angles, we thus gain a proof of the 
proposition that the three angles of a triangle are equal to 
two right angles. 

Demonstrative knowledge is dependent on intuitive ; 
for in the above process it is necessary that the perception 
of the agreement between the three angles of a triangle 
and the other angles, and of these with two right angles> 
should be gained by several successive steps, the know- 
ledge of each of which is intuitive. Hence demonstra- 
tive knowledge is not so easily gained as intuitive; for 
there are often many steps in a demonstration; all of 
which it is necessary to remember, that we may at last 
perceive the agreement or disagreement of the ideas in 

E 



50 

question : whereas intuitive knowledge contains only one 
self-evident step. And for this reason also, demonstrative 
knowledge is not always so clear as intuitive ; for since the 
intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement of 
the intermediate ideas, in every step of the demonstration, 
must be carried exactly in the mind, and we must be careful 
that no part is left out, which, in long deductions and the 
use of many proofs, we cannot be certain that the memory 
•will' always exactly accomplish, therefore it comes to pass 
that this is not so clear as intuitive knowledge, and men 
sometimes embrace error for demonstration. 

Lastly, sensitive knowledge is derived from the percep- 
tion of external objects, which correspond to ideas formed 
of them in the mind. Since perception by the senses is 
sometimes fallacious, and misleads men to think that 
objects affect their senses when no such objects exist, this 
kind of knowledge is, in particular cases, less certain than 
the former. But when the evidence of one sense is con- 
firmed by other senses, and when we have the accumulated 
evidence of all men, agreeing that their senses are affected 
in the same manner by particular objects, our knowledge 
of the existence of such objects amounts to certainty, if 
we are capable of arriving at certainty in any thing. 

40. If knowledge consists in the perception of the 
agreement or disagreement of our ideas, it follows that our 
knowledge may be less extensive than our ideas, since the 
perception of their agreement or disagreement is also 
necessary. Our intuitive knowledge is evidently very 
limited, there being few things whose agreement or dis- 
agreement we can see without the help of intermediate 
ideas. Nor does our demonstrative knowledge reach to the 
whole extent of our ideas ; because the intermediate ideas, 
necessary to form the connection between any two ideas 
which we wish to compare, cannot always be found. We 



54? 

cannot, for example, find intermediate ideas to prove why 
thought in the mind should produce bodily motion; of 
which therefore we should have no knowledge, were it not 
proved by experience. Sensitive knowledge, reaching no 
farther than to the actual existence of things present to the 
senses, is more limited than either of the former. 

41. The causes therefore of the narrow extent of our 
knowledge appear to be chiefly three; the want of ideas; 
the want of a discoverable connection between the ideas we 
have; and the want of tracing and examining our ideas, 
to see whether they agree or not. 

First, we are ignorant of many things from the want of 
ideas. Our senses, which are the chief inlets of know- 
ledge, are disproportionate to the vast extent of things; 
some of which are hid from us by being too remote, and 
others by being too minute. When we consider the dis- 
tance of the known visible parts of the world, and the rea- 
sons we have to think that what lies within our view is but 
a small part of the universe, we become sensible to what 
a point, in comparison with the rest, our knowledge of 
external objects is limited. Even if we confine our con- 
templation to this system of our Sun and the bodies that 
move around it, what innumerable vegetables, animals, and 
intellectual beings, different from tliGse of our earth, pro- 
bably exist in other planets, from the knowledge of which 
we are who ly excluded ! And if numerous objects in the 
universe are so remote as to escape our notice, others are 
no less concealed from us by being minute. Our want of 
precise and distinct ideas of the primary qualities of bodies, 
keeps us in ignorance of their powers and operations. If 
we could discover the figure, size, texture, and motion of 
the constituent particles of bodies, we should know, with- 
out trial, their operations upon one another as well as we 
know the properties of a watch or a steam-engine. Thus, 



52 

if we knew the mechanical affections of the particles of 
hemlock and opium, we should be able to say beforehand 
that hemlock will kill, and opium cause sleep, as well as a 
watchmaker can say that, if certain parts of a watch be 
filed off, it will lose its motion and be useless, or that if 
any thing be laid on the balance, it will prevent the 
watch from going, as long as it remains there. It 
would then also be no more difficult to understand why 
silver and gold are dissolved by particular fluids, than 
it is for a smith to understand why the turning of one 
key, and not the turning of another, will open a lock. 
But while we are destitute of senses acute enough to 
discover the minute particles of bodies, and to give us 
ideas of their mechanical affections, we can have no 
knowledge of their properties and ways of operation 
beyond that which is acquired by slow and limited 
experience. 

And if our knowledge is thus imperfect with regard to 
material things, it is still more so with regard to the exist- 
ence and nature of spirits. By reflecting on the operations 
of our own minds, we are able to form a few superficial 
ideas of spirit, and thence, the best we can collect, of God 
the eternal author of all Spirits ; but we have no certain 
information even of the existence of other Spirits, except 
by Revelation ; much less have we distinct ideas of their 
several powers and conditions, wherein they differ from 
one another and from us. 

Secondly, another cause of ignorance is the want of a 
discoverable connection between the ideas we have. In some 
of our ideas, there are certain relations and connections 
so implied in the nature of the ideas themselves, that we 
cannot conceive them separable by any power whatever. 
Thus the equality of the angles of a triangle to two right 
angles is known to be an immutable relation, not depend* 



53 

ent on any arbitrary power which of choice made it so, or 
could make it otherwise. But the case is different with 
respect to many of our ideas. We have ideas of the bulk, 
figure, and motion of several objects around us, and we 
have also, by sensation, the ideas of colours, sounds, tastes, 
smells^ pleasure and pain, excited by those objects ; but 
we cannot discover any affinity between these mechanical 
affections of bodies and the ideas which they produce in 
us ; there being no conceivable connection between any 
impulse of a body and the perception in our minds corres- 
ponding to it. And the action of thought on- matter is to 
us equally inexplicable. We are so far therefore from 
being able to comprehend the whole nature of the uni- 
verse, that we cannot attain a perfect knowledge of the 
bodies that are about us and make a part of us : concern- 
ing their secondary qualities and operations we have no 
universal certainty. For though several effects produced 
by them are daily presented to our notice, and by analogy 
we conjecture what effects similar bodies are, upon other 
trials, likely to produce, yet the causes, manner, and cer- 
tainty of their production cannot be ascertained. We 
observe many things proceed regularly, as if by certain 
laws ; we observe causes act, and effects constantly flow 
from them; but the nature of these connections not 
being discoverable by human faculties, we have only an 
experimental, and therefore very limited knowledge even 
of bodies with which we are most acquainted. 

Thirdly, where we have adequate ideas, and where 
there is a certain and discoverable connection between 
them, yet we are often ignorant, for want of tracing those 
ideas which we have, or may have, and for want of search- 
ing out those intermediate ideas which may shew us what 
agreement or disagreement they have w T ith one another. 
Thus many are ignorant of mathematical truths, not from 

e 3 



54 

any imperfection of their faculties, but from disinclination, 
and other causes. 

42. Since our knowledge is gained by the interven- 
tion of ideas, and is therefore real only so far as there is a 
conformity between our ideas and the reality of things, it 
may be asked, what shall be the criterion ? How shall the 
mind know, that its ideas agree with things themselves ? 
The answer is, first, that all knowledge must ultimately 
rest on some self-evident principles ; one of which is, that 
when ideas of external objects are received by the senses, 
and the testimony of one sense is confirmed by the other 
senses with innumerable repetitions, those ideas must be 
the product of objects which exist, operating on our minds, 
and producing therein those perceptions which the will of 
our Maker has ordained and adapted them to produce. It 
follows that our simple ideas, gained by the senses, are not 
fictions of the fancy, but are the natural productions of 
things without us, and have therefore all the conformity 
which our state requires ; for they represent things to us 
under those appearances which they are fitted to produce, 
whereby we are enabled to distinguish the particular sorts 
of substances; to discern their qualities, and so apply them 
to our use. 

Secondly, all our complex ideas, except those of sub- 
stances, being made by the mind itself and not intended 
to be the copies of any thing, nor referred to the existence 
of any thing as their original, cannot but have all the con-> 
formity that is necessary to real knowledge. They are 
combinations of ideas which the mind puts together by its 
free choice, without requiring that they have any connec- 
tion in nature. Hence such ideas are not referred to 
things ; but things are referred to them, and their con- 
formity is thence admitted or denied. Thus if a man have 
formed in his mind a certain idea of justice, he includes no 



55 

acts under that name, except those that agree with the idea 
which he has previously affixed to it. 

Thirdly, our complex ideas of substances, consisting of 
simple ideas that are supposed to be taken from objects 
actually existing, may, it is true, vary from them, by hav- 
ing more or different ideas united in them than are united 
in the things themselves : and so, our knowledge may, and 
often does fail of being exactly conformable to things them* 
selves. The reality of our knowledge of substances re- 
quires that our complex ideas of them be such and such 
only as are made up of simple ideas which have been dis- 
covered to co-exist in nature. And if our ideas be thus 
true, though not perfect copies, they are the subjects of 
knowledge; which, in comparison with the extent of 
things, is very limited, but so far as it does reach, it is real 
knowledge. 

43. Every man has an intuitive knowledge of his 
own existence, and he is convinced of the existence of 
external objects by a species of evidence equally certain. 

These things being admitted, a knowledge of the ex- 
istence of God may be acquired by demonstration. 

If any thing exists now, something must have always 
existed; otherwise that thing which now exists must 
either have been created by nothing, or it must have 
created itself, acting before it existed; both which suppo- 
sitions are absurd. We must therefore admit, either jthat 
there is some independent being which now exists, and 
always has existed, or that the things which we know to 
exist at present were produced by something which had its 
existence from something else, and so on in an infinite 
series of successive beings. But this last supposition is as 
absurd as the two former. For of this infinite series, either 
some one part has not been successive to any other, or else 
all the several parts of it have been successive. If some 



58 

pne part of it was not successive, then that was the^r^ 
part ; which is contrary to the supposition of the infinity 
of the series. If all the several parts of it have been suc- 
cessive, then have they all once been future ; and if so, a 
time may be conceived when none of them had existence, 
from which it would follow that all the parts, and conse- 
quently the whole of this infinite series must have arisen 
from nothing; which is absurd. From the impossibility 
therefore of such an infinite series of successive beings, we 
conclude that there must have existed from eternity some 
independent Being ; independent, because that which never 
had a beginning of existence cannot possibly have any 
cause of that existence, or in any manner depend upon 
any other being, but must be independent and self -existent. 
This Being must also be omnipotent. That such a 
Being has power in some degree, is proved by the same 
means that we prove his existence ; and since he depends 
upon no cause for his existence or his power, he cannot 
depend upon any for the exertion of that power, and 
therefore no limits can be applied to it. Limitation is an 
effect of some superior cause, which in the present case 
there cannot be : consequently to suppose limits where 
there can be no limiter, is to suppose an effect without a 
cause. For a Being to be limited or deficient in any 
respect is to be dependent in that respect on some other 
Being, which gave it just so much and no more : therefore 
that Being which in no respect depends upon any other is 
in no respect limited or deficient. In a Being naturally 
capable of perfection or infinity, all imperfection, or finite* 
ness, as it cannot flow from the nature of that Being, 
seems to require some ground or reason ; which reason, as 
it is foreign from the Being itself, must be the effect of 
some other external cause, and consequently cannot have 
place in the first cause. That the self-existent Being is 



57 

Capable of perfection or infinity must be granted ; since he 
is evidently the subject of one infinite attribute, viz. 
eternity. His other attributes must therefore also be infi- 
nite ; for to suppose them finite, when they are capable of 
infinity, would involve the forementioned absurdity of 
positive limitation without a cause. As therefore it is 
evident that a Being which is the fountain of all power, 
must itself have power in some degree ; we conclude far- 
ther, from the argument above stated, that this power 
must be unlimited or infinite. 01 

The omniscience of the Deity may be proved in the 
same manner. We know that we possess thought and in* 
telligence, and we also know that we have not had them 
from eternity. They must therefore have had a beginning 
and consequently some cause, for the same reason that a 
Being beginning to exist must have a cause. This cause, 
as it is necessarily superior to its effect, must have superior 
thought and intelligence ; and if it be the first cause, it 
must have them in an unlimited degree, since limitation 
without a limiter, would, as was shewn before, be an 
effect without a cause. 

It is indeed manifest that, as all things depend upon the 
Supreme Being, and have received their existence and all 
their powers and faculties from him, he must know not 
only all things that are, but all the possibilities of things, 
that is, all effects that can be. For having given to all 
things all their powers and faculties, he must know per- 
fectly what those powers and faculties, derived wholly from 
himself, can produce. And seeing at one view all the 
possible changes, circumstances, and dependencies of 
things, all their possible relations one to another, and their 
fitnesses to certain ends, he must know what is best in 

ra King's Origin of Evil : remarks^ ed. 1731, p. 6% 



5ft 

every possible method of disposing things, and understand 
perfectly how to order means, so as to effect what he 
knows to be, on the whole, the best and fittest end. This 
is what is meant by infinite wisdom or omniscience ; and it 
is the attribute of the eternal Being, the creator and ruler 
of all things, 11 

Thus, from the consideration of the existence of our- 
selves and of other things, Reason leads us to the know- 
ledge of this certain truth, that there is a God ; an eternal, 
omnipotent, and omniscient Being. That such a Being 
must be incomprehensible by us, is self-evident; for if we 
do not understand the operations of our own finite minds, 
we must be much less able to comprehend the operations 
of that infinite mind on which, as their Author and 
Preserver, all other existences, material and spiritual, 
depend. 

44. The truths that fall within human knowledge 
may be reduced to two classes. They arc either necessary 
and immutable truths, whose contrary is impossible; or 
they are contingent and mutable, being the effect of some 
will and power, which caused them to have a beginning, 
and may cause them to have an end. The axioms in 
Euclid, and all the conclusions drawn from them, are ne- 
cessary truths. They are immutably true, and depend not 
upon the will and power of any being. That the Sun is 
the centre about which the Earth revolves, is a contingent 
truth; for it depends upon the power and will of the 
Being, who has so ordained it. 

It is impossible to establish any either contingent 
or necessary truth without assuming some self-evident 
principles as the foundation of our reasoning. If doubt 

■ n Encyc. Brit. Met. Part III, ch. vi. Clarke on the Being and At- 
tributes of God, Prop. 11, 



59 

arise with regard to any principle, whether it is self- 
evident or not; — still more, if one or two sceptical 
persons deny that a principle is self-evident which the 
rest of mankind have always thought to be so, it be- 
hoves them to take care that the principles which they 
assume as the foundation of their own reasoning be at least 
equally evident, 

As one of many principles which are generally allowed 
to be self-evident, the following is selected, both as an 
instance, and also because the remarks upon it may serve 
as an illustration of the argument stated in the preceding 
article. This principle is, That design and intelligence in 
the cause, may be inferred, with certainty, from marks of 
them in the effect. Intelligence is not an object of the 
senses ; it can only be discerned by the effects which it 
produces. A man's wisdom is known only by the marks 
of it in his conduct ; his courage, and all his virtues and 
talents are estimated in the same manner. From the con- 
duct of one person, we are sure of his folly and ignorance ; 
from that of another, we are sure that he possesses great 
attainments and understanding. It is no less a part of the 
human constitution to judge of men's characters, and of 
their intellectual powers, from the marks of them in their 
actions and discourse, than it is to judge of external 
objects by our senses. Such judgments are absolutely 
necessary in the conduct of life ; and every judgment so 
made is only a particular application of the general prin- 
ciple, that intelligence in the cause may be inferred from 
marks of it in the effect. As this inference is unavoidable, 
and is made with perfect security by all men, it has there- 
fore the strongest marks of being a self-evident principle. 
And, agreeably to it, the evidence of wisdom and power in 
the constitution of the world as an argument for the being 
and providence of the Deity, is that which has in all ages 



6o 

made a stronger impression than any other, and been 
allowed by most men to be conclusive. The notices which 
God has given us of himself, — in the order, beauty, and 
harmony of the several parts of the world ; in the struc- 
ture of our own bodies, and in the powers of our 
minds, — are so forcible and obvious, that an acknow- 
ledgment of Him appears to be unavoidable. Meta- 
physical demonstrations of the Being and Attributes 
of God must fail in impressing conviction on the 
minds of those who are unable to comprehend them; 
but, for the same reason, men are bound not to 
suffer themselves to be unsettled by the sophistries of 
sceptical men, which they cannot perhaps answer, because 
they cannot understand : they are bound to adhere to 
those plain evidences and reasons of which they are able 
to form a judgment ; and these are sufficient to guide the 
opinions and practice of considerate men. 

45. In demonstrative reasoning, the inference is 
necessary, and we perceive it to be impossible that 
it should not follow from the premises. Hence this 
kind of reasoning has no degrees; nor can one de- 
monstration be stronger than another, though, in relation 
to our faculties, one may be more easily comprehended 
than another. On the other hand, 'probable evidence has 
all degrees, from the highest moral certainty to the very 
lowest presumption. In common language, this is often 
considered as an inferior degree of evidence, and is op- 
posed to certainty ; but, properly, it is a species of evi- 
dence opposed, not to certainty, but to another species of 
evidence called demonstration. 

Demonstrative reasoning can be applied only to neces- 
sary truths ; these are sometimes capable also of probable 

° Reid, Es. VI. ch. vi. Clarke ; conclusion of the Demonstration. 



61 

evidence ; and contingent truths are capable of probable 
evidence alone. 

Probable reasoning, for the most part, depends not 
upon any one argument, but upon many, which unite 
their force, and lead to the same conclusion. Any one of 
them by itself might be insufficient to convince ; but the 
whole taken together may have a force that is irresistible, 
so that to desire more evidence would be absurd. Some- 
times the judgment may be in suspense between two con- 
tradictory opinions, when there is no evidence for either, or 
equal evidence for both. The least preponderance on one 
side inclines the judgment in proportion. Belief is mixed 
with doubt, more or less, until we come to the highest 
degree of evidence, when all doubt vanishes, and the 
belief is immoveable. This degree of evidence, the high- 
est the human faculties can attain, amounts to certainty. 

46. Since in many speculations, and in all the con- 
cerns of life, men cannot arrive at demonstrative know- 
ledge, it is necessary for them to be guided by probability; 
and the ground of probability is experience. If the ques* 
tion relate to a matter of fact, the first thing to be con- 
sidered is the previous probability of the fact, which will 
vary according to our experience of the like having, more 
or less frequently, taken place under the like circum- 
stances. For in order to establish the same probability, it 
is manifest that stronger evidence is necessary for one kind 
of fact, than for another. When ihejprevious probability 
has been determined, we proceed to estimate the testi- 
mony which is given respecting the fact in question ; and 
the probability, thence arising, will vary according to our 
experience of the like testimony having, more or less fre- 
quently, been found accurate in other cases. 

First, therefore, if the previous probability be very 
great, and the testimony also unimpeachable, the resulting 

F 



62 

probability is the highest possible. Thus if a number of 
credible persons testify that there was frost in England 
last winter, our belief so grounded arises to certainty. 
Secondly, if the fact be indifferent, that is, if in the 
nature of the thing there be nothing either for or against 
it, yet when it is vouched by the concurrent testimony of 
unsuspected witnesses, our assent is unavoidable. Thus, 
that there is such a city as Rome ; that there once lived in 
it a man called Julius Caesar ; that he was a General, and 
conquered Pompey ; these or the like facts being related by 
many Historians, and never contradicted, our belief of 
them, as in the first case, amounts to certainty. Thirdly, if 
the fact agree with our general experience, and it be attest- 
ed by many undoubted witnesses, the probability is ex- 
tremely great. Thus, if experience has taught us that the 
authors of civil commotions are generally profligate and 
wicked men, and if all Historians, who write of Catiline, 
say that he and his associates were of that character, our 
assent arises to a high degree of confidence. 

In these cases, probability carries so much evidence 
with it, that there is little or no room for doubt. The 
difficulty is, when testimonies contradict common experi- 
ence, and the reports of history and witnesses clash with 
the ordinary course of nature, or with one another ; these 
are the cases in which diligence and exactness are required 
to form a right judgment, and to proportion the assent to 
the probability of the thing, which rises or falls according 
as common observation in like cases, and particular testi- 
monies in that particular instance, favour or contradict it. 

47. In estimating the previous probability of a fact 
which has reference to the conduct of men, we are guided 
by our experience of the general principles of human 
action, or by our knowledge of the individuals. If men be 
of sound mind, we depend upon a certain degree of regu- 



63 

larity in their conduct; and could imagine a thousand 
different cases,, wherein we should feel the utmost confi- 
dence that they will act in a particular way, and not in the 
contrary. If men had no confidence in one another that 
they will act such a part in such circumstances, it would 
be impossible for them to live in society : for that which 
makes men capable of living in society, and uniting in a 
political body under government, is the assurance that 
their actions will always be regulated in a great measure 
by the common principles of human nature. It may 
always be expected that they will regard their own inter- 
est and reputation, and that of their families and friends ; 
that they will repel injuries, and have some sense of good 
offices ; and that they will have some regard to truth and 
justice, so far at least as not to swerve from them without 
temptation. It is upon such principles as these, that all 
political reasoning is grounded. Such reasoning is never 
demonstrative; but it may have a very high degree of 
probability, especially when applied to great bodies of intel- 
ligent men? 

48. Probability, so far as it rests on uncontradicted 
human testimony, varies according to the number of the 
witnesses, their known integrity, their apparent motives, 
their power of judging, and the consistency of the parts 
of their narration. 

As a reason for distinguishing between the general in- 
tegrity of witnesses and their apparent motives in any par- 
ticular case, it may be observed that the belief we give to 
testimony in many cases is not solely grounded upon the 
general veracity of the testifier. In a particular testimony, 



p See Reid's Essays on the first principles of truths, and on probable 
reasoning. 



64 

we consider the motives a man might have to falsify. If 
there be no appearance of any such motive, much more if 
there be motives on the other side, his testimony has 
weight independent of his moral character. 

If the testimony be circumstantial, we consider how far 
the circumstances agree with each other, and with things 
that are known. It is so difficult to fabricate a story 
which cannot be detected by a careful comparison of the 
circumstances, that it acquires probability, by being able 
to bear such a trial. And when there is an agreement of 
many witnesses, in a great variety of circumstances, with- 
out the possibility of previous concert, the evidence is 
equal to that of demonstration. 

49' In traditional testimony, each transmission 
weakens the force of the proof. It is evident that no pro- 
bability grounded on testimony can rise higher than its 
first original. What has no other evidence than the testi- 
mony of one witness, must stand or fall by his testimony 
alone ; and though cited afterwards by a multitude of 
others, it is so far from receiving strength that it is only 
the weaker. Passion, interest, inadvertency, and a num- 
ber of other supposeable reasons may make one man mis- 
quote the words of another. Hence, what in one age 
was affirmed upon slight grounds, instead of becoming 
more valid in future ages by being often repeated, becomes 
Jess so, the farther it is removed from the original source. 
And this shews the great value of numerous, independent, 
and early documents in which important events are 
recorded. 

50. If the question relate to a matter of speculative 
opinion, which is not capable of human testimony, our 
belief is directed by analogy. Thus, knowing that the 
whole earth abounds with animated beings, we think it 
probable that other bodies in the universe are similarly 



65 

inhabited. Also, if all nature, from a plant to a man, is 
filled with diverse kinds of creatures rising one above 
another by so easy an ascent that the transitions from one 
to another are almost insensible, if the scale of beings rises 
by such a regular progress as high as man, we may, by 
analogy, suppose that it still proceeds gradually through 
beings of a superior nature to him ; since there is an infi- 
nitely greater space for different degrees of perfection 
between the Supreme Being and man, than between man 
and the lowest insect. In these and similar cases it is not 
likely that men will ever arrive at certain knowledge, and 
therefore our inferences from analogy are limited to con- 
jecture ; but in subjects also which are proper for experi- 
ment, and in which certain knowledge may at length be 
attained, analogy is the best guide ; and cautious reasoning 
from it has led to the discovery of many truths which 
would otherwise have lain concealed.* 1 

51. Error is sometimes unavoidable, because it is 
often necessary to form opinions on uncertain grounds. In 
many cases the probabilities on opposite sides are so nearly 
balanced, that the preponderance either way is not easily 
determined, and the danger of deciding wrong must be 
greatly increased if the judgment be biassed by any previ- 
ous inclination. Error does not therefore necessarily im- 
ply a defect of the understanding, since the means of form- 
ing a right decision may be beyond the reach even of those 
who have both the will and leisure to seek, and the ability 
to apply them* Errors are unavoidable where proof no 
where exists, and therefore cannot be procured ; they are 
also unavoidable, where men, bound to the necessity of 
gaining their subsistence by manual labour, have not the 
opportunity of observation, nor leisure to search for the 

«J Addison, Spec. N°. 519, 

f3 



66 

proofs which are necessary to establish right opinions. 
But, when every allowance has been made for unavoidable 
errors, many will remain to be otherwise accounted for, 
and which must be imputed to some disorder of the un- 
derstanding. 

52. To every bias of the mind by which it may be 
drawn into error, Lord Bacon gives the name of an idol. 
The mind, in its sound and best state, pays homage to 
truth only. The causes of error are therefore considered 
by him as so many false deities, who receive the homage 
which is due only to truth. Without attempting to give 
an enumeration of errors, which would be impossible from 
their almost infinite diversity, he refers them all to four 
classes, to which he gives the names of idola tribus, idola 
specus, idola fori, idola theatri. 

The first are such as beset the whole human species ; 
so that every man is in danger from them. They arise 
from principles of the human constitution which are useful 
and necessary in our present state ; but by their excess or 
defect, or wrong direction, may lead us into error. As 
instances of this we may take the following: 

1. Men are prone to fix their opinions too much by 
authority. In the early part of life we have no other 
guide; and without a disposition to receive what we 
are taught, we should be incapable of instruction. Also, 
when the faculties are matured, there are many things in 
which we must be incompetent to judge. In such cases, 
it is reasonable to rely upon the judgment of others whom 
we believe to be competent and disinterested. 

Authority ought to have more or less weight in any 
case, according to the evidence on which our own judg- 
ment rests, and the opinion we have previously formed, on 
good grounds, of the judgment and integrity of those who 
differ from us, or agree with us. Those who have a 



67 

strong sense of their own fallibility in judging, are in 
danger of yielding too much to authority; others more 
arrogant are in danger of yielding too little. As therefore 
our regard to authority may be either too great or too 
small, the bias of human nature seems to incline to the 
first of these extremes ; and it is certainly good for men 
that it has that inclination rather than the other. Much 
respect is due to authority in matters of opinion : but there 
is a tendency to pay it in excess. Of a great part of man- 
kind it can hardly be said that they form any judgment of 
their own, except in things which concern their immediate 
temporal interest; in other important matters, we may 
conjecture, with a near approach to certainty, what their 
opinions are, when we know where they were born, how 
they have been educated, and in what society they have 
lived. 

2. Men are too much disposed to estimate things 
less known and less familiar, by those that are better 
known and more familiar. In this instance as in 
the former, the principle is correct to a certain de- 
gree, but there is a tendency to excess in the application of 
it. As it forms the foundation of all analogical reasoning, 
to which we owe a great part of our knowledge, it 
would be absurd to lay it aside altogether ; the difficulty 
is in determining how far we may venture upon it. The 
bias of our nature seems to lead us to trust too much to it, 
and to decide from too slight analogies. For example, the 
objects of sense having engrossed our thoughts in the first 
part of life and been most familiar through the whole of 
it, men in all ages have been prone to attribute the human 
Jlgure to superior intelligences, and even to the Supreme 
Being. Again, for the same reason, there is a disposition 
in men to materialize every thing ; that is, to apply the 
notions we have of material objects to things of a different 



68 

nature. Hence thought is considered as analogous to 
motion in a body ; and as bodies are put in motion by 
impulses, we are apt to conclude that the mind is made to 
think in the same manner. 

The mistakes in common life, which arise from the 
erroneous application of this principle, are innumerable. 
Men judge too hastily of others by themselves, or by the 
small circle of their acquaintance. The selfish man 
ascribes all professions of benevolence and public spirit to 
hypocrisy or self-deceit. The generous and honest be- 
lieve plausible pretences too readily, and are apt to think 
men better than they really are. The profligate can hardly 
be persuaded that there is any such thing as real virtue. 
The rustic forms his notions of the characters of men from 
those of his own village, and is easily deceived on his first 
arrival in a great city. 

3. In avoiding one extreme, men are apt to rush 
into the opposite. Thus, in rude ages, they ascribe every 
uncommon appearance to the immediate interposition of 
invisible beings; but when philosophy has discovered 
natural causes of many events which, in the days of 
ignorance, were ascribed to the immediate operation of 
gods or daemons, they are apt to think that all the pheno- 
mena of nature may be accounted for in the same way, 
and that there is no need of an invisible Maker and 
Governor of the world. In this manner, by an immediate 
transition they pass from the extreme of superstition to 
that of atheism. And in general, when men abandon 
opinions which they have held on weak grounds, they are 
seldom seen to take a moderate course, but hasten to 
maintain, with equal earnestness, and on grounds perhaps 
equally insufficient, opinions directly opposite to those 
which they held before. 

53. By the idola speeds are meant causes of error not 



69 

arising from the constitution of human nature, but from 
something peculiar to the individual. As in a cave, ob- 
jects vary in their appearance according to the form of the 
cave and the manner in which it receives the light, and, 
from these circumstances, often assume a delusive appear- 
ance ; so, in the mind, errors arise from the particular way 
in which a man has been trained, or from his particular 
profession, or from something singular in the turn of his 
mind. One whose thoughts have been confined to a cer- 
tain track, is apt to judge wrong when he ventures out of 
that track. He is apt to refer every thing to the maxims 
of his own profession, and to judge, by them, of things 
that have no relation to it. It is a common remark that 
those who have been much accustomed to demonstrative 
reasoning, often require it in subjects to which it is not 
applicable. And, from a like reason, men who are 
warmly devoted to a particular pursuit, are apt to hold all 
other pursuits in undue contempt. 

Some men have a great admiration of antiquity, and 
contempt of whatever is modern ; others go into the con- 
trary extreme. Some are afraid to venture a step out of 
the beaten track, and think it safest to go with the multi- 
tude; others are fond of singularities and paradox. Some 
are changeable in their opinions ; others obstinate. These 
things shew how important it is for every man to examine 
the tendencies of his own mind, and not cherish pecu- 
liarities which must vitiate his judgment. 

54. The idolafori are fallacies which arise from the 
imperfections and the abuse of language. On this sub- ■ 
ject, little need be added to the remarks which have been 
already made. 

As language was not made by philosophers, but was 
gradually formed by popular use, it has some imperfec- 
tions which might be avoided if it were possible to bring 



70 

it to a new beginning ; but to others no remedy could be 
.applied, while our knowledge itself is imperfect. In the 
mean time these imperfections are the manifest cause of 
many errors. For language is an instrument of thought 
. as well as of the communication of our thoughts, and we 
find it impossible to pursue a train of thought without the 
use of it : the bad effects therefore of ambiguous and inde- 
finite language are not confined to our communications 
with others, but extend to our private speculations. The 
signs are so associated with the things signified, that the 
last can hardly present themselves to the mind without 
drawing the other along with them. Hence, that which 
was intended to assist and minister to the understanding 
frequently assumes the mastery : we cannot shake it off, 
and therefore must direct our course, in some degree, as it 
permits. 

55. The last class of idols in Lord Bacon's division 
are the idola theatri, by which he meant hypothetical sys- 
tems, in which we have been trained, or which we have 
adopted. Before his time, the slow method of induction 
from observation and experiment was little understood, 
and men of genius had long been occupied, to little pur- 
pose, in framing hypotheses to account for the phsenomena 
of nature. These were considered by Bacon as worthy of 
no more regard than fictitious representations produced in 
a theatre. The world had been so long deceived by hypo- 
theses in all parts of philosophy, that he renounced them 
as the fictions of fanciful men, who thought themselves 
able to unfold the mysteries of nature by the mere force 
of their genius. When men first began to inquire into 
the causes of things, it was natural for them to indulge 
conjecture ; and accordingly, the most ancient systems of 
philosophy were nothing but the conjectures of men 
famous for their wisdom, whose name gave authority to 



71 

their opinions. Some conjectured that this Earth is a vast 
plain, surrounded by a boundless ocean ; — that from this 
ocean, the Sun, Moon, and stars emerge at their rising, 
and plunge into it again at their setting. Others in more 
recent times have conjectured that the heavenly bodies 
are carried round by a vortex of subtle matter, as straws 
are carried round in a vessel of water. Thus, the experi- 
ence of all ages has shewn how prone men are to invent 
hypotheses founded on slight probabilities, and how eager 
they are, by a kind of anticipation, to discover the secrets 
of nature. This tendency, it is true, has been at length 
checked by perpetual failures. The rule laid down by 
Newton is acknowledged and followed, that no causes of 
natural things ought to be assigned but such as can be proved 
to have a real existence ; and that the proper method of 
philosophy is, to collect the laws of nature by just in- 
duction from ascertained facts, and to apply the laws so 
discovered to the explanation of phenomena. It may be 
expected that men will persevere in this course, in which 
happy progress has been already made ; — that in all in- 
quiries into the constitution of nature, they will be content 
to act a subordinate part; to combine, not to fabricate; to 
collect evidence, and not to supply the want of it by con- 
jecture. 

Lord Bacon, having explained the nature of these 
idols, and shewn what delusions are caused by the respect 
which is paid to them, exhorts men, resolutely to abandon 
them; to free their minds from prejudice; and to seek 
truth with the docility of children. 1 

— * ' ' i ... 1. 1 n - 1 1 .1 i ... 

r Bacon de augmentis scientiarum, lib. 5, cap. iv. Novum Or- 
ganum, Aph. xxxix. Reid on Hypotheses, Es. II. ch. iii. and on Pre- 
judices, Es. VI. ch. viii. See also Stewart. Elem. Phil. vol. II. ch. iv. 
§. 1. on the difference between gratuitous and legitimate hypotheses. 



72 

£>6. That part of Logic which treats of the exer- 
cise of the mind according to practical rules, and by pro- 
per methods of reasoning, is called Dialectics. 

In explaining this Art, the operations of the mind are 
commonly classed under three divisions, simple apprehen- 
sion, judgment, and reasoning. 

The simple apprehension of an object means the same 
as having a notion, an idea, or a conception of it. It is ex- 
pressed by a word, or by a part of a proposition, not mak- 
ing a complete sentence ; as a king, the king of a faithful 
people. Such words, taken alone, denote simple apprehen- 
sions : they neither affirm nor deny ; they imply no 
opinion of the thing signified by them, and therefore can- 
not be said to be either true or false. 

By the operation of judgment the mind compares any 
two objects of thought, and determines their agreement 
or disagreement. This operation is expressed by a propo- 
sition, in which the agreement of the things compared is 
affirmed or denied : as when we say, God is omnipotent ; 
man is not perfect 

The third operation is reasoning ; in which, from two 
or more judgments, which are called premises, we deduce a 
new and distinct judgment, which is called the conclusion. 
Reasoning may consist of many steps ; the first conclusion 
being a premise to a second, that to a third, and so on. 
Hence, separate judgments may be compared to separate 
stones prepared for the purposes of the builder; upon 
each of which, while lying on the ground, a person may 
raise himself to a small elevation. The same judgments, 
when combined into a train of reasoning, resemble the 
formerly unconnected stones when converted into the 
steps of a staircase, leading to a summit which would be 
otherwise inaccessible. 

57. Since a judgment includes two ideas, the propo- 
sition which expresses a judgment must have terms cor- 



73 

responding to them. The term expressing the idea of 
which we affirm or deny, is called the subject of the pro- 
position. The term expressing the idea affirmed or denied, 
is called the predicate. Thus in the proposition, God is 
omnipotent ; God is the subject, it being of Him that we 
affirm omnipotence ; and omnipotent is the predicate, be- 
cause we affirm that the idea, expressed by that word, 
belongs to God. 

That word in a proposition which connects two ideas 
together, is called the copula; and if a negative particle 
be annexed, we thereby understand that the ideas are dis- 
joined. The substantive verb is made use of for the copula ; 
as in the proposition, God is omnipotent ; where is repre- 
sents the copula, and signifies the agreement of the ideas 
of God and omnipotence. In the proposition, man is not 
perfect, the negative particle is inserted after the copula, to 
signify the disagreement between the ideas expressed by 
the subject and predicate. In popular language, proposi- 
tions do not always appear in the logical form above stated, 
but they may be reduced to it by the substitution of 
equivalent terms. The copula and predicate are often in- 
cluded in the same word ; as he comes, which is the same 
as he is coming : and in Latin, one word, as venit, some- 
times includes the whole proposition. For whenever two 
ideas are joined or disjoined, though the expression be 
only a single word, it may be resolved into an equivalent 
expression containing a subject, predicate, and copula, 
according to the logical form of a proposition. 8 

58. A proposition is called affirmative, when the ideas 
expressed by the subject and predicate are affirmed to 
agree ; and negative, when they are affirmed to disagree. 

s The substance of this and of some of the following articles is taken 
from Duncan's Elements of Logic. 

G 



/4 

Thus of the propositions, God is omnipotent, and, man is 
not perfect, the first is affirmative y the second negative. 

A proposition is universal, when the subject is a 
general term without any limitation, and the predicate 
agrees or disagrees with each of the things comprehended 
under the subject. Thus, men are mortal, is an universal 
proposition; for mortality is affirmed of every individual 
of the species man. 

A proposition is particular, when the subject is a 
general term, but with a mark of limitation added, to 
denote that the predicate agrees only with some of the 
things comprehended under the subject, Thus, some men 
are virtuous, is a particular proposition ; for the idea ex- 
pressed by the predicate agrees with only a part of the 
general idea of the subject. 

A proposition is singular, when the subject signifies 
one thing only; as when we say Aristides was just. 
Some logicians have classed these among universal^ and 
others among particular propositions. They may be 
reckoned universal, when the predicate agrees with the 
?vhole of the subject in its fullest extent ; as when we say, 
Ccesar was a Homan : but if some qualifying word be in- 
serted, to denote that we are not speaking of the whole of 
the subject, as when we say, Ccesar was not wholly a 
tyrant, the proposition may be reckoned particular. Since 
therefore every proposition must be either affirmative or 
negative; universal or particular; hence has arisen the 
fourfold division of them into universal affirmative, and 
universal negative; particular affirmative, and particular 
negative ; which includes all their varieties. 

59. Some qualities in bodies are essential, that is, in- 
separable from them ; others are accidental. Thus weight 
is an essential quality of a stone, as it is of all matter ; but 
heat is accidental. From this distinction arises the divi 






75 

sion of propositions into absolute and conditional. A pro- 
position is absolute, when the predicate is affirmed to agree 
always with the subject, as being essential to it; and con- 
ditional, when the agreement of the predicate with the 
subject is not essential, but depends on some condition. 
Thus, a stone has weight, is an absolute proposition ; if a 
stone be exposed to the rays of the Sun, it will contract heat, 
is conditional. 

60. A simple proposition is that which has only one 
subject and one predicate. A compound proposition has 
more than one subject, or more than one predicate, or 
more than one of both. Thus in the proposition, God is 
infinitely wise and infinitely powerful, there are two predi- 
cates, both affirmed of the same subject ; and the proposi- 
tion may be resolved into two others, affirming these 
predicates severally. In like manner in the proposition, 
neither kings nor people are exempt from death, the pre- 
dicate is denied of both subjects, and may be denied of 
them separately, in distinct propositions. If we say, 
riches and honours are apt to elate the mind, and increase 
the number of our desires, as there are two subjects and two 
predicates, the proposition may be resolved into four: 
riches are apt to elate the mind : riches are apt to increase 
the number of our desires. And so of honours, 

61. Some compound propositions are called copula- 
tive, others disjunctive. A proposition is copulative,, when 
the subjects and predicates are so linked together that they 
may be all severally affirmed or denied one of another. 
Of this nature are the examples given above. Riches and 
honours are apt to elate the mind, and increase the number 
of our desires. Neither kings nor people are exempt from 
death. In the first of these, the two predicates may be 
affirmed severally of each subject ; in the other, the same 



76 

predicate being denied of two subjects may be also denied 
of them in separate propositions. 

A proposition is disjunctive, when, comparing several 
predicates with the same subject, we affirm that one of 
them necessarily belongs to it, but leave the particular 
predicate undetermined. Thus if we say, the world is 
either self -existent, or is the work of some wise and power- 
ful cause, the proposition is disjunctive. In all propositions 
of this sort, if we determine the particular predicate, the 
rest are of course removed ; or if we remove all the predi- 
cates except one, that one is necessarily established. As 
in the example just given, if we allow that the world is the 
work of some wise and powerful cause, we of course deny 
•it to be self-existent ; or if we deny it to be self- existent, 
we must necessarily allow that it is the work of some wise 
and powerful cause. These propositions take their name 
from the disjunctive particles which it is necessary to use 
in stating them. 

62. Reasoning has been defined above to be that 
operation of the mind by which, from two or more judg- 
ments, a new and distinct judgment is deduced. 

In comparing ideas together, it often happens that 
their agreement or disagreement cannot be discerned at 
the first view. When, for instance, we wish to determine 
the equality or inequality of two figures of a different 
form, it is evident that by merely considering the figures 
themselves we cannot arrive at an exact determination, 
because it is impossible to apply them to one another so 
that their several parts shall coincide. But as all right- 
lined figures are reducible to squares, we may, by means of 
them, measure the areas of such figures, and compare them 
exactly in respect to magnitude. Thus if we find that one 
figure is exactly equal to some square, and that another is 



77 

less than the same square by a square-inch, we conclude 
that the area of the first figure is a square-inch greater 
than that of the second. 

Every act of reasoning necessarily includes three dis- 
tinct judgments ; two, wherein the ideas, whose relation 
we want to discover, are severally compared with the 
middle idea, and a third, wherein they are themselves 
joined or disjoined according to the result of that compa- 
rison. And as our judgments, when expressed in words, 
are called propositions, so the expressions of our reason- 
ings are called syllogisms, 

63. If the question be proposed whether man is ac~ 
countable for Ms actions, since the relation between the 
ideas of man and accountableness comes not within the 
immediate view of the mind, it is necessary to find some 
third idea that will enable us to discover the relation. 
First, therefore, on considering what hind of beings are 
accountable for their actions, we determine that all are 
accountable who possess reason to distinguish right from 
wrong, and liberty to pursue the one and avoid the other. 
Secondly, we know from experience that reason and liberty 
belong to man. Having thus formed two judgments, viz. 
that man is possessed of reason and liberty, and that reason 
and liberty imply accountableness, a third necessarily follows, 
viz. that man is accountable for his actions. And these 
propositions, placed in due order, form the following syllo- 
gism : 

Every creature possessed of reason and liberty is 
accountable for his actions : 

Ma?i is a creature possessed of reason and liberty : 
Therefore man is accountable for his actions. 

64. The two first propositions in a syllogism are 
called the premises, and the third proposition is called the 
conclusion. Also, the two terms expressing the two ideas 

g 3 



78 

whose relation we are tracing (as, in the above syllogism, 
man and accountableness) are called the extremes : and that 
which expresses the intermediate idea (viz, the possession 
of reason and liberty) is called the middle term. That ex- 
treme which is the predicate of the conclusion, is called 
the major term : the other extreme, which is the subject 
of the conclusion, is called the minor term. And from 
this distinction of the extremes, arises a distinction be- 
tween the premises in which the extremes are severally 
compared with the middle term. That proposition which 
compares the major extreme, or predicate of the conclu- 
sion, with the middle term, is called the major proposition : 
the other, wherein the minor extreme, or subject of the 
conclusion, is compared with the middle term, is called 
the minor proposition. When a syllogism is proposed in 
due form, the major proposition is placed first, the minor 
next, and the conclusion last. 

65. A syllogism is called conditional, when the major 
proposition is conditional : thus 

If God is infinitely wise and powerful, he does nothing 
but what is best : 

But God is infinitely wise and powerful : 

Therefore he does nothing but what is best. 

In every conditional proposition there are two parts, viz. 
the antecedent and consequent, the first being that in which 
the condition is stated, and the other making a consequent 
assertion. As in the instance above given ; if God is infi- 
nitely wise and powerful, is the antecedent ; and, he does 
nothing but what is best, is the consequent. In syllogisms 
of this kind, it is evident that if we admit the antecedent 
we must admit the consequent, and if we reject the con- 
sequent we must reject the antecedent. But the reverse 
process of reasoning is not legitimate ; that is, we cannot 
argue from the rejection of the antecedent to the rejection 



79 

of the consequent, or from the admission of the consequent 
to the admission of the antecedent. For although the 
antecedent always expresses some cause or condition 
which, if admitted, necessarily implies the consequent, yet 
it does not follow that there is no other cause or condi- 
tion ; and if there be, then after rejecting the antecedent, 
the consequent may still remain. Thus when we say : if 
a stone is exposed to the rays of the Sun, it will contract heat ; 
the proposition is true, and admitting the antecedent, we 
must also admit the consequent. But as there are other 
ways by which a stone may contract heat, it will not 
follow, from the removal of the above-mentioned condi- 
tion, that therefore the consequent cannot take place : we 
cannot argue, but the stone has not been exposed to the rays 
of the Sun ; therefore neither has it any degree of heat ; 
inasmuch as there are many other ways in which heat 
may have been communicated to it. 

And if we cannot argue from the removal of the 
antecedent to the removal of the consequent, no more can 
we from the admission of the consequent to the admission 
of the antecedent. For the consequent may arise from 
any one of a great variety of causes, and therefore the ad- 
mission of it does not determine the precise cause, but 
only that some one of them must take place. Thus in the 
foregoing proposition, admitting the consequent, viz. that 
the stone has contracted heat, we are not therefore bound 
to admit the antecedent, that it has been exposed to the 
rays of the Sun; because there are many other causes 
whence that heat may have proceeded. 

These two modes of arguing therefore are not correct, 
unless the antecedent expresses the only condition on which 
the consequent can take place; in which particular in- 
stance, they may be applied without error. 



80 

66. A syllogism is called disjunctive, when the 
major proposition is disjunctive,, as in the following 
example : 

The world is either self-existent, or the work of some 
finite, or of some infinite Being : 

But it is not self -existent, nor the work of a finite 
Being : 

Therefore it is the work of an infinite Being. 

In a disjunctive proposition, we affirm that one of 
several predicates necessarily belongs to the subject, to 
the exclusion of all the rest. Hence, as soon as the par- 
ticular predicate is determined, all the rest are of course 
to be rejected; or if we reject all the predicates except 
one, that one necessarily takes place. When therefore, in 
a disjunctive syllogism, the several predicates are enumer- 
ated in the major proposition, if in the minor any one 
of these predicates is established, the conclusion ought to 
reject all the rest ; or if in the minor all the predicates, 
except one, are rejected, the conclusion must necessarily 
establish that one. Thus in the syllogism given above, 
the major affirms that one of three predicates belongs to 
the earth, viz. self-existence, or that it is the work of a 
finite, or that it is the work of an infinite Being. Two of 
these predicates are rejected in the minor, viz. self-exist^ 
ence, and the work of a finite Being. Hence the conclusion 
necessarily ascribes to it the third predicate, and affirms 
that it is the work of an infinite Being. If the minor had 
established one of the predicates, by affirming the Earth to 
be the work of an infinite Being, then the conclusion must 
have rejected the other two, by affirming it to be neither 
self-existent, nor the work of a finite Being, 

67. It often happens that one of the premises of a 
syllogism contains an evident and familiar truth ; in which 



81 

case it is sometimes omitted, and the syllogism, having 
only two propositions, is, in respect to its form, incom- 
plete. Thus if we say: all tyrants deserve death; there- 
fore Ne?*o deserved death: the minor (Nero was a tyrant) is 
omitted, as being a truth so well known that it need not be 
expressed. Syllogisms of this abridged form are called 
enthymemes, 

68, The sorites is a compendious mode of reasoning, 
in which a number of propositions are so linked together 
that the predicate of one becomes continually the subject 
of the next following, until at last a conclusion is formed 
by bringing together the subject of the first proposition 
and the predicate of the last. Of this kind is the follow- 
ing argument : The son of Themistocles governs his 
mother; his mother governs Themistocles; Themistocles 
governs Greece ; Greece governs the world ; therefore the 
son of Themistocles governs the world. 

This sorites may be resolved into three syllogisms ; 
and in general, a sorites may be resolved into as many 
syllogisms as there are middle terms in it ; and if such re- 
solution be made, it will always be found that the conclu- 
sion of the last syllogism is the same as the conclusion of 
the sorites. This kind of argument therefore stands on 
the same foundation with the syllogisms of which it con- 
sists, and may be continued to any length, without weak- 
ening the ground on which the conclusion rests. 

A series of conditional syllogisms may be condensed in 
the same manner. If a number of conditional propositions 
be joined together so that the consequent of one becomes 
continually the antecedent of the next following ; — by 
establishing the antecedent of the first proposition we shall 
establish the consequent of the last, or by rejecting the 
last consequent, we shall reject also the first antecedent. 
The following is an example of this kind of argument : 



82 



If the dead rise not, then is Christ not raised; if Christ is 
not raised, our faith is vain ; if our faith is vain, our hope is 
confined to the present life ; if our hope is confined to the 
present life, we are of all men most miserable : therefore, if 
the dead rise not, we are of all men most miserable. It is 
evident that this sorites, as well as the former, may be 
resolved into a series of distinct syllogisms, and that the 
conclusion of the last syllogism in the series will be the 
same as the conclusion of the sorites. 

69' A dilemma is a conditional syllogism, by which 
we prove the absurdity of some assertion. In order to this, 
we assume a conditional proposition, the antecedent of 
which involves the assertion which we wish to disprove, 
and the consequent is a disjunctive proposition enumera- 
ting all the possible suppositions upon which the assertion 
can take place. If then it appears that all these supposi- 
tions ought to be rejected, it is evident that the antecedent, 
or the assertion itself, must also be rejected. Euclid fur- 
nishes many examples of this kind of argument. When 
he is about to show that two figures are equal, or, which is 
the same thing, to prove the absurdity of asserting them to 
be unequal, it is very common with him to assume, that if 
the one is not equal to the other, it must be either greater or 
less ; and having destroyed both these suppositions, upon 
which alone the assertion of their inequality can stand, he 
concludes that the assertion itself is false. The following 
is a dilemma, in syllogistic form : 

If the world be not the work of an infinite Being, it must 
be either self existent, or the work of a finite Being. 

But it is not self existent, nor the work of a finite Being. 

Therefore it is the work of an infinite Being. 

Here, the major is a conditional proposition, whose con- 
sequent contains all the suppositions upon which the ante- 
cedent can take place ; and as all these suppositions are 






83 

rejected in the minor, it is evident that the antecedent 
must be rejected in the conclusion. 

By comparing this example of the dilemma with that 
given above of the disjunctive syllogism, it appears that 
they may easily be reduced to the same form. 

70. Argument by induction is the derivation of a 
general proposition from a number of particular instances. 
It is evident that this kind of argument will amount to 
demonstration, if it be founded on an enumeration of all 
the instances which the general proposition comprehends : 
but it is also evident that in this case the value of the 
induction would cease, considered as a means of gaining 
knowledge beyond that which is intuitive or demonstrative. 
For to predicate of the whole what has been already pre- 
dicated of all the parts conveys no additional information. 
Thus, if we suppose the whole tribe of animals to be di- 
vided into men, birds, beasts, fishes and insects, and then 
argue in this manner: all men have the power of motion ; 
all birds, beasts, fishes and insects, have the power of motion ; 
therefore all animals have the power of motion : the argu- 
ment is just, but it adds nothing to our knowledge. In- 
duction therefore is generally and properly understood to 
be a process of reasoning by which, from observation of cer- 
tain known instances, we draw an inference with respect to 
others that are unknown. By means of this, we are enabled 
to supply in some degree, by probability, the defects of our 
certain knowledge, and to conjecture truths, which have 
not been certified, and perhaps cannot be certified by 
actual experiment. 

An induction in which every individual case is enu- 
merated, is a perfect demonstration. And in general, the 
more nearly we approach to the entire enumeration, the 
higher is the degree of probability attained by the induc- 
tion. 



84 

The common error is, too great haste in drawing a con- 
clusion, without having premised a sufficient number of 
individual cases. Thus, many are apt too hastily to form 
an opinion of a whole nation, from the characters of a few 
who have fallen within their imperfect observation. Thus 
also, the medicine of an empiric becomes popular, by in- 
duction drawn from a few cures ; which, even if the report 
of them were true, ought not to have much weight, espe- 
cially if it be considered how many cases, in which trial 
has been made of it, are not published ; the majority of 
which, it is reasonable to suppose, were failures. On the 
contrary, where experiment is the only test that can be ap- 
plied of the utility of any art, it ought to be established by 
a great number of instances of success, proper account also 
being taken of instances of failure. And when the pro- 
portion of failures to the successful cases has been ascer- 
tained with the utmost care, and found to be small, the 
beneficial effects of the art are far more undeniably estab- 
lished, than they could be by vague assertions of its 
universal and unerring efficacy. 

Argument by induction is the same as a syllogism in 
which the major proposition is suppressed. And in all 
arguments by induction, the suppressed proposition is sub- 
stantially the same, viz. that what belongs to the individuals 
we have examined, belongs to the whole class to which they 
are referred. The argument therefore, placed in the form 
of a complete syllogism would be this : 

What belongs to the individuals we have examined 
belongs to the whole class : 

But a certain quality belongs to the individuals we 
have examined : 

Therefore the same quality belongs to the whole class. 

Induction therefore, so far as it is an argument, may 
be stated syllogistically ; but so far as it is a process of 



85 

inquiry with a view to obtain the premises of an argument, 
it comes not within the province of syllogistic reasoning. 
The difficulty consists in determining whether the major 
proposition is duly established. Whether the induction 
has been drawn from a sufficient number of individual 
cases,, — whether the character of those cases has been cor- 
rectly ascertained, — and how far the individuals we have 
examined are likely to resemble the rest of the class, are 
points that require judgment ; but this judgment cannot 
be assisted by syllogistic rules, because it is employed in 
deciding whether or not it is allowable to lay down certain 
premises ; and syllogistic rules have no concern with the 
truth or falsity of the premises, but merely teach us to 
determine whether from given premises the conclusion is 
rightly inferred.* 

71. Some arguments are called direct, others indirect. 
A direct argument is, when, setting out from self-evident 
truths and definitions, we proceed till we arrive at the 
proposition which we wish to prove. The argument is 
indirect, when we assume a proposition contrary to that 
which is to be proved, and proceed till we arrive at a con* 
elusion from which we are able to infer that the assumed 
proposition is false, and the contrary true. Of this kind 
is the argument \ab impossibili, or reductio ad absurdum. 
This mode of arguing depends on two principles; first, 
that we never can arrive at an absurdity by reasoning 
justly from true principles ; secondly, that when two 
propositions are directly contrary to one another, and one 
of them is proved to be false, the other must be true. 

One mode of argument is said to be a priori ; another 
a posteriori. The former is, when we argue from causes 

1 Encyc. Metr. Art. Logic. Artis Logicae Rudimenta. Oxford ed. 
1823, p. 175. 

H 



86 

to effects ; as from a man's disposition to his actions ; from 
a writer's known style and ability, that he is, or is not, the 
author of a certain book : from the existence of a God 
with certain attributes, some have argued that the world 
would be formed in this or that manner. The argument 
a posteriori is directly the reverse : by it, we argue from 
effects to causes; from a man's actions to his motives; 
from the existence of the world and, marks of power 
and wisdom in it, to the existence and attributes of 
God. 

This mode of argument necessarily precedes the other* 
For, in arguing from cause to effect, as from a man's dis- 
position to his actions, the question occurs, how is a man's 
disposition to be known ? It can only be known from some 
previous actions ; but when these have furnished sufficient 
ground for determining his disposition, we are then able 
to draw an inference from it as to his future actions, 
and the argument a priori becomes both legitimate and 
useful. 

72. Sophisms are fallacious arguments, disguised under 
the appearance of truth. Some of them may be re- 
futed by the application of syllogistic rules ; others arise 
from the ambiguity of language, and cannot be detected 
except by definition, and careful regard to the meaning of 
words. 

One common error in argument is, to infer the falsity 
of a conclusion from the falsity of certain premises ; and, 
reversely, to infer the truth of certain premises from the 
truth of the conclusion. 

This is the same as to argue from the removal of the 
antecedent to the removal of the consequent, or from the 
admission of the consequent to the admission of the ante- 
cedent : both which modes of argument have been already 
shewn to be fallacious. If we attempt to establish any 



87 

conclusion by arguments which are proved to be falla- 
cious, nothing farther ought to be inferred than that this 
conclusion cannot be established by those particular argu- 
ments : the detection of the fallacy of one argument ought 
not to invalidate other better arguments which may be 
fully sufficient to warrant the conclusion. Yet it may be 
observed that this is generally the effect of such detection. 
The guilty often escape by having too much laid to their 
charge, or by the production of a witness against them 
who is discovered to be unworthy of credit; though 
perhaps if that part of the evidence had been omitted, 
the rest would have been sufficient for conviction. 

73. That sophism which is called ignoratio elenchi, or 
-mistake of the question, is also of frequent occurrence. It 
consists in advancing arguments which, even if admitted 
to be just, are not applicable to the matter in dispute. 
This sophism is often practised in cases in which the ques- 
tion relates to the choice between two evils, or to the com- 
parison of two plans either of which is likely to produce 
some good effects. The sophist dwells on the magnitude 
of one of the evils, or the excellence of one of the plans, 
and takes little or no notice of the comparison, which forms 
the essential part of the question. Hence, when any plan 
is proposed, he brings into exercise this fallacy, which may 
be called the fallacy of objections ; that is, he shews that 
there are objections against the plan, and thence infers 
that it ought to be rejected ; when the proper question 
is, whether there are more and stronger objections against 
the adoption of the plan than against the rejection 
of it. This fallacy is commonly resorted to by the 
enemies of Revelation; a belief in which, they say, is 
attended with great difficulties. But even if this be ad- 
mitted to be true, the inference is fallacious ; for the pro- 
per question is, which is attended with greater difficulties, 



88 

the supposition of the truth of Revelation, or the supposi- 
tion of its falsehood ? — The same fallacy is adopted by 
two other classes of men, very opposite to one another ; 
one composed of those who are for overthrowing what- 
ever is established, as soon as they can prove an objec- 
tion against it, without considering whether more and 
weightier objections may not lie against their own 
schemes : the other composed of men who oppose all 
alterations indiscriminately ; not reflecting that their state- 
ment even of real objections ought not to be conclusive, 
since it is scarcely possible to propose any plan, however 
excellent, against which strong and even unanswerable ob- 
jections may not be urged ; so that unless the opposite 
objections be allowed their due weight, no improvement 
could ever be made. 

74. The sophisms called petitio principii and reason- 
ing in a circle are, for the most part, easily detected. The 
first consists in taking for granted the proposition which 
we undertake to prove, disguised perhaps under some 
different form of words : as when, in order to prove that 
the soul always thinks, we assume that thinking is essen- 
tial to the soul ; which is the same in reality as the original 
proposition, and equally difficult to be proved. The other 
sophism is nearly similar, and consists in making two pro- 
positions serve mutually as proofs of each other. Men 
are most likely to be misled into these sophisms when 
they attempt to prove things which are scarcely capable 
of proof; such as their own existence, the existence of 
matter, and other like truths which are generally allowed 
to be self-evident. 

75. The sophism called non causa pro causa consists 
in assigning a false cause ; that is, in referring any effect 
to a cause which either does not exist at all, or does not 
exist as a cause in the case in question. To this class 



89 

belong the false theories that have been formed respecting 
the constitution of mind and matter ; such, for instance, 
as the ancient method of explaining the operations of the 
mind by supposing the existence of substantial forms, and 
the modern theory of vibrations, and many others which 
have been assumed without sufficient ground for the prin- 
ciples on which they are founded. The same fallacy is 
often introduced also into moral reasonings, and misleads 
men to consider as a cause what is merely accidental and 
adventitious. Through this error, Christianity has some- 
times been decried as the cause of persecutions and other 
great evils ; whereas it ought to have been called the pre- 
text ; and the same or greater evils would probably have 
been wrought on some other pretext. For the real cause 
of such calamities is the wickedness of the authors of them, 
and wickedness will seldom be at a loss for some pretext, 
more or less plausible, to disguise its operations. In like 
manner the opponents of the Reformation assumed that it 
was the cause of the troubles which took place at that 
period, and thence inferred that it was an evil. But the 
reply was twofold : first, the fact was denied, that the 
Reformation was at all the cause of those troubles ; and 
secondly, that even if it were the cause, the evil was less 
than that which the Reformation had removed. 

In determining therefore the causes of events, it is a 
very necessary caution not to assume too hastily that one 
thing is the cause of another, when perhaps it is only an 

accidental concomitants 

■ 

76. The ambiguity of language furnishes numerous 
opportunities for sophistical reasoning. Many fallacies of 



w Butler's Analogy, Part IL ch. i. Encyc. Metr. Art. Logic, ch. y, 
H S 



90 

this class are founded on the supposition that words 
derived from the same root have a precisely correspondent 
meaning : which is by no means universally the case, as 
will appear from observing the meanings which custom 
has annexed to such words as project and projectors, pre- 
sume and presumption, design and designing, art and artful. 
The sophist proceeds on the supposition that he who forms 
a project must be a projector, and argues thus : projectors 
are unfit to be trusted : this man has formed a project ; 
therefore he is unfit to be trusted : whereas the bad sense 
of one of these words is not at all implied in the other. 
Again he argues : to be acquainted with the guilty is a 
presumption of guilt ; this man is so acquainted ; there- 
fore we may presume that he is guilty. This argument 
proceeds on the supposition of an exact correspondence 
between presume and presumption, which however does 
not exist ; for presumption is commonly used to express a 
slight supicion ; whereas to presume amounts to absolute 
belief. In this manner, the sophist will often be able to 
misinterpret the propositions w T hich his opponent admits 
or maintains, and employ theni, so misinterpreted, against 
him. 

Nearly allied to this fallacy is another, which arises 
from supposing that the meaning of every word ought to 
be determined by its etymological derivation. Thus the 
sophist, assuming that the right meaning of the noun, re- 
presentative, must correspond exactly with the original 
sense of the verb, represent, argues that a representative 
ought to be guided in all points by the opinion of his con- 
stituents, and to be merely their deputy ; whereas law and 
custom, which in this case ought to be considered as 
fixing the meaning of the term, require no such thing, but 
enjoin the representative to act according to his own judg- 



91 

ment, and on his own responsibility. Custom, which is 
generally the arbiter of language, is variable ; and there- 
fore there can be no authority competent to pronounce 
that the meaning of a word, now and for ever, must be 
that which it originally bore. 

77- There are some other modes of argument, which 
often have effect in disputation, but are not conclusive for 
the determination of truth. One of these is to appeal to 
common opinion, or allege the decisions of men whose 
learning has gained a name, and invested them with a 
kind of authority. When opinions are recommended by 
such high sanction, it is thought presumptuous to question 
them ; and the disputant, who is able to support his tenets 
by such authorities, is inclined to charge with a breach of 
modesty the adversary who refuses to yield to them. 
This is called argumentum ad verecundiam. All that can 
be said against it is, that it is not conclusive : it must be 
allowed that there is a strong presumption in favour of any 
opinion which has received the consent of learned men for 
many ages ; but this presumption may be overcome by 
stronger reasons on the contrary side. 

Another mode of argument, by which men endeavour 
to gain assent to their opinions, is to require the adversary 
either to assent to them, or to assign others more satisfac- 
tory. This is called argumentum ad ignorantiam ; and is 
of little value ; for the ignorance of one person affords 
no presumption in favour of the accuracy of another 
person's knowledge. 

A third way is to press a man with consequences 
drawn from his own principles or concessions. This is 
called argumentum ad hominem ; and is sometimes an 
allowable expedient for silencing those who will not yield 
to fair argument. 



92 

That which is called argumentum ad judicium is differ- 
ent from all these ; being derived from the proper founda- 
tions of knowledge or probability. This alone brings 
true instruction with it, and advances us in our way to 
knowledge. It argues not that one man's opinion is right, 
because others, from respect, or from any other considera- 
tion, will not contradict him. Nor does it prove that one 
man is in the right way, because others know not a better, 
or have been shewn to be in the wrong. But it appeals to 
just proofs and arguments, and to evidence derived from 
the nature of things themselves; not to the modesty, 
ignorance, or errors of those to whom it is addressed. 

78. Method is the arrangement of the thoughts, so 
that their mutual relation and dependence may be most 
easily seen. The chief objects of method are, the inves- 
tigation of truth, and the communication of it. There are 
accordingly two species of method, the analytic and the 
synthetic, respectively adapted to these two objects : the 
analytic being usually the method of invention, and the 
synthetic the method of instruction. 

- In Geometry, every proposition consists of two parts ; 
one, in which certain suppositions are made ; and another, 
in which a certain consequence is affirmed to follow from 
those suppositions. If the particulars stated in the hypo- 
thetical part of the enunciation be assumed as the princi- 
ples of our reasoning, and from these principles a series of 
consequences be deduced, till we at last arrive at the con- 
clusion which the proposition affirmed, the demonstration 
is called synthetic. If the steps of this reasoning be ar- 
ranged in the reverse order, we assume hypothetically the 
truth of the proposition which we wish to demonstrate, 
and proceed to deduce from this assumption the conse- 
quences to which it leads. If, in this deduction, we arrive 



93 

at a consequence which we already know to be true, we 
conclude that the principle from which it was deduced is 
also true. But if, on the other hand, we arrive at a conse- 
quence which we know to be false, we conclude that the 
assumption on which the reasoning has proceeded is false 
also. — Such a demonstration of the truth or falsity of a 
proposition is called analytic. 

The meaning of the terms analysis and synthesis, when 
applied to Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics, has little 
resemblance to that in which they are are applied to 
Geometryj except that in those sciences, as in Geometry, 
analysis is usually the method of discovery, and synthesis 
the method of instruction. In them, the analytic method 
begins with those things which are most known ; ex- 
amines their properties and relations ; proceeds from effects 
to causes ; and from particular causes to the most general. 
The synthetic method proceeds from general to particular 
truths, from causes to effects. In acquiring the know- 
ledge of any physical science, we may adopt either of 
these methods : we may either examine all the particular 
things to which the science relates ; ascertain their various 
properties; classify them by placing together those in 
which there exists a striking similarity; review the 
classes, and re-arrange them according to more compre- 
hensive similarities ; and so on repeatedly, until we have 
formed classes of the most general nature: — or, we may 
begin by learning the most general classes, with their di- 
visions and subdivisions, and the distinguishing proper- 
ties of each, till we descend to the lowest species, and 
thence to individuals. This is the synthetic, the former 
is the analytic process. The original discoverer of the 
science must proceed by analysis. But in communi- 
cating the science to others, the synthetic mode is 



94 

generally adopted, as it displays the whole science 
at one view; and the general arrangement, seen from 
the beginning, greatly assists the mind in apprehending 
and remembering the several parts.* 



* Artis Logicae Rudimenta. de methodo, Stewart's Elements of Phi* 
josophy, vol. II. ch. iv. §. 3. 



NOTES. 



Art. 1. There are two meanings of the word idea, a popular and 
philosophical. In popular language, an idea is the same as a thought, 
or a notion. But according to the meaning of the word, as it was 
formerly used by philosophical writers, an idea is some object of 
thought. 

Aristotle taught that all the objects of thought enter at first by 
the senses; and since the sense cannot receive external material 
objects themselves, it receives their images or forms without the 
matter ; as wax receives the form of a seal without any of the 
matter of it. In like manner, many modern philosophers conceived 
that, since external objects cannot be the immediate objects of thought, 
there must be some image of them in the mind itself, in which, as in a 
mirror, they are seen. And the name idea, in the philosophical sense 
of it, is given to those internal and immediate objects of our thoughts. 
The external thing is the remote or mediate object; but the idea, or 
image of that object in the mind, is the immediate object, without 
which we could have no perception of the other. 

This opinion seems to have been held by Locke ; but it was con- 
futed by Reid, and is now generally abandoned. Reid expresses his 
belief that no man is able to explain how we perceive external 
objects, any more than how we are conscious of those that are 
internal. For this reason, after having shewn that the theories of 
former philosophers on this subject are ill-grounded and insufficient, 
he does not attempt to substitute any other theory in their place. 
(See Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1, 2.) 

Some writers have made a distinction between ideas and notions ; 
and, as a reason for it, they appeal to the derivation of the words ; 
the root of one being etZta to see, and the other yivcia-KO) to knowov 
understand. In their primary sense, therefore, notion is more com- 

I 



96 

prehensive than idea, because we know many things which cannot 
be seen. It is probable that, at first, the word idea was used to denote 
only those images of external objects which are received through the 
sense of sight. Its signification was afterwards extended to im- 
pressions produced through the other senses; and, finally, it was con- 
I founded with notion, which denotes the apprehension of whatever 
may be known. We are told that Dr. Johnson was indignant at the 
use of the word idea in this last sense, when, properly, it can only 
signify something of which an image may be formed in the mind. 
" We may have an idea or image of a mountain, a tree, or a building; 
but not of an argument or proposition." (Encyc. Brit. Art. Metaph. 
and Boswell's Life of Johnson, vol. III. p. 406.) There is however 
little probability that this distinction will ever be generally attended 
to, in popular use. 

The term Logic also is used by some writers in a sense much 
more extensive than by others. It is by some defined to be an art, 
which treats of practical rules for the exercise of the mind in reason- 
ing. In this sense, it is called an art, not a science, because it relates 
to something which is to be done, not to any thing which is merely to 
be known; to practice, not to theory* By others it is made to con- 
tain a description of the mental faculties, as well as the rules above- 
mentioned. Others extend it so far as to comprehend all that relates 
to the philosophy of the mind. When there exists such a variance in 
the meaning of a word, it is proper for every writer who uses it, to 
explain the meaning which he himself intends to annex to it. 

Art. 2. Though Locke has written at great length against the 
doctrine of innate ideas, it is not easy to determine in what sense the 
word innate was understood by him. If by innate be meant coeval 
with our birth, it can hardly be supposed that any person ever held 
the doctrine which he controverts ; but if, in denying that man has 
innate ideas, he meant that the mind is not so framed as that certain 
ideas will necessarily accompany the exercise of its faculties, and 
certain principles be approved by it in preference to others, he is not 
only opposed to almost all other philosophers, but is inconsistent with 
himself. "The First Book (says Dr. Beattie) of the Essay on the 
Human Understanding tends to establish this dangerous doctrine, that 
the human mind, previous to education and habit, is as susceptible of 
any one impression as of any other : — a doctrine which, if true, would 
go near to prove, that truth and virtue are no better than human con- 
trivances; or, at least, that they have nothing permanent in their 
nature ; but may be as changeable as the inclinations and capacities of 
men. Surely this is not the doctrine that Locke meant to establish ; 
but his zeal against innate ideas and innate principles, put him off his 



97 

guard, and made him allow too little for instinct, for fear of allowing 
too much." 

The word connatural, as proper to denote certain of our ideas, is 
given by Lord Shaftesbury. " Innate (he observes) is a word which 
Locke poorly plays upon : the right word, though less used, is connatural. 
For what has birth to do in this case ? — the question is not about the 
time the ideas entered ; but whether the constitution of man be such, 
that, being adult and grown up, at such a time, sooner or later (no 
matter when) the idea and sense of order, administration, and a God, 
will not infallibly, inevitably, necessarily spring up in him." 

That Locke was far from holding such opinions as his language 
respecting innate ideas might lead us to attribute to him, appears 
from his distinct disavowal of them in different parts of his Essay. 
" There is a great deal of difference (he says) between an innate law, 
and a law of nature ; between something imprinted on our minds in 
their very original, and something that we, being ignorant of, may 
attain to the knowledge of, by the use and due application of our 
natural faculties." (Book I. ch. iii. §. 13.) Again (Book IV. ch, iii. 
§. 20.) he speaks " of the candle of the Lord being set up by himself 
in men's minds, which it is impossible for the breath or power of man 
wholly to extinguish." (For an account of Locke's opinions on this 
subject and the discussions which they have excited, see Stewart's 
First Dissertation prefixed to the Supplement of the Encyclopedia 
Britannica, vol. V. p. 30.) 

Locke refers the origin of all our ideas to two sources, sensation 
and reflection : some writers have referred them to sensation alone. 
Nihil est in intellectu quod nonfuerit in sensu, was the maxim of these 
writers; and many of them have so far misinterpreted Locke as to 
ascribe to him the credit of having established it. This maxim, ex- 
tended by Leibnitz, became: nihilest in intellectu quod non fueritin 
sensu, nisi ipse intellectus ; which conveys, in a concise form, the sub- 
stance of Locke's doctrine. 

But, taken in its most extensive sense, this account of the origin of 
our ideas falls short of the truth. There are many ideas which cannot 
be directly referred either to sensation or reflection ; and all that can 
be said of them is, that the exercise of some particular faculty furnishes 
the occasion on which, by the laws of our constitution, they are present- 
ed to the mind ; nor does it seem possible for us to trace the origin of 
them any farther than to ascertain what the nature of the occasion was, 
which, in the first instance, introduced them to our notice. The feel- 
ings of pleasure and pain, of desire and passion, are born with us, and 
necessarily exist in a percipient mind. Thus, we are not only fur- 



98 

nished by the constitution of our nature with capabilities of knowledge, 
and proper organs for the attainment of it, but the principles which 
impel us to the acquisition of knowledge, viz. the desire of pleasure and 
the consciousness of enjoyment, are implanted in us, and exist in the 
mind before it is excited by external objects. (See Stewart's Ele« 
ments of Philosophy, vol. I. ch. i. §. 4. and Philosophical Essays, I. 
ch. ii. also the Edinburgh Encyclopedia, Art. Logic.) 

Art. 7. Extension and figure are classed by Locke, along with 
hardness, softness, roughness, and other similar qualities, under the 
general title of the primary qualities of matter. The propriety of 
making some distinction between them has been pointed out by Pro- 
fessor Stewart, who gives to extension and figure the title of the 
mathematical affections of matter; restricting the phrase -primary 
qualities to hardness, softness, and other properties of the same 
description. "And (he adds) the line which I would draw between 
these primary qualities and secondary is this ; that the former neces- 
sarily involve the notion of extension, and consequently of externality 
or outness; whereas the latter are only conceived as the unknown 
causes of known sensations, and, when first apprehended by the mind, 
do not imply the existence of any thing locally distinct from the sub- 
jects of its own consciousness." (Philosophical Essays, IT. ch. ii.) 

Art. 9. The name of every secondary quality signifies two things, 
a sensation in the mind, and the unknown quality which excites that 
sensation. When therefore a question is made whether fire is hot, or 
grass green, the answer is given by explaining the meaning of the 
words heat and colour. If we understand by them some unknown dis- 
position or motion of the insensible particles of bodies, by which the 
perception of heat or colour is caused in us, then fire is hot, and grass 
green. But if we understand by those words, what we feel by fire, or 
what we see in grass, — in that sense, fire is not hot, nor grass green ; 
for the heat we feel, and the colours we see, are only in the soul. 

Art. 10. It is remarked by Professor Stewart, that there is an 
inseparable connection in every person's mind between the notions of 
colour and of extension. The former of these words expresses a sensa- 
tion in the mind ; the latter denotes a quality of an external object ; 
so that there is no more natural connection betw T een the two notions, 
than between pain and solidity ; and yet, in consequence of our always 
perceiving extension at the same time at which the sensation of colour 
is excited in the mind, we find it impossible to think of that sensation, 
without conceiving extension along with it. 

Similar to this misconception, by which we refer the sensation of 
colour to an external object, is the reference which we always make of 



99 

the sensations of touch to those parts of the body, where the exciting 
causes of the sensations exist. If the hand be struck against a hard 
object, we naturally say that we feel pain in the hand; though the 
truth is, that we merely perceive the cause of the pain to be applied to 
that part of the body. The sensation itself cannot be referred in point 
of place to the hand, unless it be supposed that the soul is spread over 
the body by diffusion. The misconception is still more remarkable, 
when sensations of touch are referred to a place beyond the limits of 
the body ; as in the case of pain which seems to be felt in an ampu- 
tated limb. (Elements of Philosophy, Part II. ch. v. §.1. and Note P. 
Professor Brown's Lectures, 25.) 

The difference between perception and sensation (briefly stated in 
Articles 10, 11.) is explained at great length by Dr. Reid ; whose 
opinions on this subject, as on every other of which he treats, have the 
recommendation, not only of their great intrinsic worth, but also of 
being expressed in a plain and direct manner, and the most perspicu- 
ous language. 

Art. 16. Since it is impossible for us to understand how the mind 
acquires the first perception of ideas, it must be equally impossible to 
understand how it retains them. What Locke's opinions were on this 
subject cannot be ascertained with certainty, for he expresses them in 
metaphorical language, and he has not clearly explained whether he 
intended the metaphors which he uses to be understood as merely 
illustrative, or as representing literally the mental operations to which 
they are referred. He speaks of ideas as pictures drawn in our minds, 
and laid in fading colours ; and of the brain retaining the characters 
drawn on it, in some cases like marble, in others like freestone, and m 
others little better than sand; — which expressions are sufficiently 
accordant with the opinion held by him and by many other philoso- 
phers, that we perceive external objects by means of images of them 
conveyed to the brain. 

It has always been the common opinion that sensation, perception, 
and all the other operations of the mind are produced by impressions 
made on it by external objects. This opinion could only take its rise 
from observing the constant connection which exists between certain 
impressions made upon our senses, and our perception of the objects 
by which the impression is made ; from which it is inferred, that 
those impressions were the proper efficient causes of the corres- 
ponding sensation. But because two things are always conjoined, 
it is by no means a necessary consequence that one must be the cause 
of the other. Day and night are joined in constant succession, but we 
do not conclude from this, that day is the cause of night, or night the 

12 



100 

cause of day. Therefore it is not only impossible to conceive, but also 
there is no real ground for supposing, that matter, by any motion or 
modification, produces thought. 

And if the nature of perception be thus inexplicable, we have equal 
reason to make the same acknowledgement with respect to memory. 
It is an original faculty given us by the Author of our being, of which 
we can give no account but that we are so made. We are told by 
Locke " that laying up our ideas in the repository of the memory sig- 
nifies no more than this, that the mind has a power to revive percep- 
tions which it once had, with this additional perception annexed to 
them, that it has had them before ; and in this sense it is, that our ideas 
are said to be in our memories, when indeed they are actually nowhere." 
But when a thing is nowhere, the same thing cannot be again pro- 
duced ; though another thing similar to it may. Hence, an ability to 
revive our ideas, after they have ceased to be, can signify no more but 
an ability to create new ideas similar to those we had before. Again, 
he says, "that the mind, as it were, paints the ideas anew upon itself. " 
This expression must imply that the mind, which paints the things 
that have ceased to exist, has the memory of what they were ; as a 
painter must have a copy, either before his eye or in his imagination 
and memory. On the whole, Locke's chapter on memory, though con- 
taining some fine remarks on the importance and the varieties of this 
faculty, does not, in the least degree, enable us to understand how 
we retain ideas by it. (See Reid, Essay II. ch. iv. and Essay III. 
ch. vii.) 

Art. 18. Since it was the prevailing opinion among ancient phi- 
losophers that the qualities of external objects are perceived by means 
of images transmitted to the mind by the organs of sense, and that these 
images are the objects about which our thoughts are employed, it 
naturally became a question, what is the nature of the idea or image 
corresponding to a general term. When we think of any particular 
object such as a particular man, tree, or mountain, we can understand 
what is meant by an image of such objects. But what account can we 
give, upon the principles of this theory, of the objects of our thoughts, 
when we use the words, man, tree, mountain, as general terms ? For 
all the things we have ever perceived are individuals ; and therefore the 
ideas denoted by general words, cannot be copied from any originals that 
have fallen under our observation. In answer to this question, it was 
taught for many ages, by the followers of Plato and Aristotle, that, 
although these general ideas are not copied from any objects perceiv- 
able by sense, yet, as all the individuals which compose a genus must 
possess something in common, this common thing forms the essence of 



101 

each, and is the object of thought, when we reason concerning the 
genus. Plato held that of every species of things there is one idea or 
form, which existed from eternity, before any individual of the species 
was formed : that this idea is the exemplar or pattern, according to 
which the Deity formed the individuals of the species : that every indi- 
vidual of the species partakes of this idea, which constitutes its essence; 
and that this idea is an object of thought, when, by due abstraction, we 
discern it to be one in all the individuals of the species. In this man- 
ner, according to Plato, we form universal or abstract ideas. 

In the eleventh century a new doctrine was introduced, that these 
abstract ideas have no existence ; that words or names are universal 
signs, but that every idea must be particular. The advocates of this 
new opinion were called Nominalists, to distinguish them from the 
Realists, who adhered to the ancient opinion that universal ideas exist, 
corresponding to the universal words which are used to denote them. 
A few formed themselves into a third sect called conceptualists, who 
seem to have agreed with the Nominalists in denying the existence of 
universal things, but to have thought in opposition to them, that, by 
means of its conceptions, the mind has the power of reasoning con- 
cerning genera, without the use of words, as signs of those concept 
tions. The dispute among these sects was carried on with the 
greatest animosity,' not by arguments only, but by bloody affrays, until 
the Reformation turned the attention of men to more important sub- 
jects. 

Dr. Reid has classed Locke among the conceptualists; as having 
maintained, not that there are things universal, but that we have 
general or universal ideas, which we form by abstraction. In speaking 
of these abstract ideas, Locke says that it is not so easy to form them, 
as it is to form particular ideas. " For example, does it not require 
some skill to form the general idea of a triangle ? For it must be nei- 
ther oblique, nor right-angled, neither equilateral, nor scalene ; but 
all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect 
that cannot exist, an idea wherein some parts of several different and 
inconsistent ideas are put together." Surely (to use the words of 
Campbell) the bare mention of this hypothesis is equivalent to a con- 
futation of it. (CampbelFs Philosophy of Rhetoric, vol. II. p. 110. 
Locke, Book IV. ch. vii. Reid, Essay V. ch. vi. Stewart. Elem. 
of Phil. vol. I. ch. iv.) 

Art. 39. It is stated in this Article that our knowledge chiefly 
-consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our 
ideas : and perhaps it would have been proper to make even a stronger 
modification of Locke's doctrine, who refers all our knowledge to the 



102 

perception of such agreement or disagreement. The accuracy of this 
proposition depends on the sense in which the word idea is to be taken. 
Sometimes it is used by Locke as synonymous with thought ; in one 
place he defines it to be whatever is the object of thought ; — a defini- 
tion which would comprehend both things which have a real existence, 
and things which we either believe never existed, or which we think 
of without regard to their existence ; and in this sense it is undoubtedly 
true that all knowledge consists in perceiving the agreement or dis- 
agreement of ideas. But we have a knowledge of external objects ; 
and there is no reason to suppose that Locke held the opinion, which 
was subsequently professed by Berkeley, that external objects are 
nothing but thoughts or ideas. We must conclude therefore that, in 
this proposition, he understood the word in a third sense, in which he 
frequently takes it, viz. as the image or representative of an object, by 
means of which image the object is perceived. But in this sense of 
the word, the proposition is untenable; for if these ideas or images be 
the only objects of knowledge, we could have no knowledge of the ex- 
istence either of ourselves, or of external objects, or of the Supreme 
Being. 

The illustrations given by him of this proposition are borrowed 
chiefly from mathematics, and the relations about which that science 
is conversant. When applied to these relations, it is possible to annex 
some meaning to such expressions as comparing ideas, the juxta-position 
of ideas, the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas; but 
in most other branches of knowledge, this language will be found to be 
without meaning.^ (Reid, Essay VI, ch. hi. Stewart, vol. II. ch. ii. 

§.1.) 

Art. 43. This Article contains a very brief example of the meta- 
physical arguments which Clarke and others have advanced as a proof 
of the existence of God. As the summary of them is here given, it 
agrees in substance with the proof given by Locke, but is not placed in 
the same form nor expressed in the same language. 

Locke comprises his proof, at first, in a few sentences, and then 
restates and amplifies it. As it appears in its first form, it has little 
force ; and in its second form, it is diffuse and ill-arranged, and some 
parts of it inconclusive. For example, towards the conclusion of it, 
he professes to prove that matter is notcoeternal with an eternal mind ; 
but his proof amounts only to this, that the contrary proposition cannot 
be proved. 

These remarks,— and others which precede, directing the reader's 
attention to some of Locke's opinions which are now generally deemed 
erroneous, — are made because they seem to be required by the occa- 



103 

sion ; and are certainly not offered with any disposition to disparage 
the fame of that great Author. Any attempt of that sort, if such a 
disposition should exist, must be fruitless. For those errors are pointed 
out with proper freedom by Reid, Stewart, Campbell, and other emi- 
nent philosophers; but their animadversions are accompanied with 
such strong expressions of their general admiration of him, that we 
may conclude, from the ample testimony rendered by men so capable 
of forming a correct judgment, that the fame of Locke, as one of 
the greatest ornaments of our nation, rests upon grounds which cannot 
be shaken. 

Art, 63. By the syllogistic art, we are taught how to draw just 
conclusions from given premises. But the chief opportunity for the 
exercise of judgment, is in determining whether the premises ought to 
be granted or not ; and in this difficulty, the art of syllogizing affords 
little assistance. In many examples which are given of syllogisms, the 
premises contain affirmations which are not more evident or more easy 
to be established than the conclusion -which is deduced from them. Fre- 
quently the major-premise expresses a general truth, and the conclu- 
sion expresses merely a particular instance of it. But those who admit 
the general truth, will probably admit the particular instance, without 
being impelled to it by the force of a syllogism. For example, when 
it is said : All tyrants deserve death ; Nero was a tyrant ; therefore 
Nero deserved death: if we suppose the three propositions of this 
syllogism each to require proof, it is probable that the greatest difficulty 
would be found in proving the first ; which, in the syllogism, is assumed 
without proof. Hence, the common remark appears to be well-ground- 
ed, that the syllogistic art, however useful it may be in enabling us to 
detect error, cannot assist us to the discovery of any new truth. And 
so great has been the change of opinion as to the utility of this art that, 
after having been for a long period considered the bulwark of reasoning, 
it is now generally neglected ; the authority of Bacon, of Locke, of 
Reid, of Stewart having been sufficient to shake the credit of a system 
which had been founded by Aristotle, and adopted by all learned 
men, during many centuries, as the only test of just reasoning and 
of truth. 

Stewart, having expressed his opinion of the real value of the 
syllogistic art, concludes with observing that he wishes it not to be 
supposed, that he considers a general acquaintance with it as of no 
value, even in these times. " The technical language connected with 
it is now so incorporated with all the higher departments of learning 
that, independently of any consideration of its practical applications, 
some knowledge of its peculiar phraseology may be regarded as an 



104 

indispensable preparation both for scientific and for literary pursuits." 
He then quotes, with approbation, the following passage from the In* 
troduction to the Compendium of Logic used in the University of 
Dublin : Utrum haecce ars per se revera aliquem praestet usum, qui- 
dam dubitavere. Quoniam vero in Auctorum insigniorum scriptis 
saepe occurrant termini Logici. hos terminos explicatos habere, ideoque 
et ipsius artis partes praecipuas, omnino necessarium videtur. (Stewart, 
Elem. Phil. vol. II. ch. iii. §. 3. Ed. Encyc. Art. Logic.) 



AN 



INTRODUCTION 



TO 



me gtuirg 



OF THE 



HOLY SCRIPTURES. 



BY THE 



Rev. EDWARD BUSHBY, M. A. 

FELLOW OF ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE. 



CAMBRIDGE: 

PRINTED BY JOHN SMITH, 

Printer to the University. 

1829 



Sk 



This Introduction to the Study of the Holy 
Scriptures .has been prepared for the use of the 
Students of St. John's College, and is intended to 
occupy them only for a small part of one Term, 
during which other subjects require their attention, 
I have thought it necessary therefore to confine it 
within narrow limits, from regard to the purpose 
for which it is designed. 

In the course of the work, references have 
been made to the Authors from whom the materials 
of it have been chiefly derived. Recourse may be 
had to them for further information, on subjects 
which the nature of my design has obliged me to 
treat with great brevity. 



CONTENTS. 



I. A Summary of the Principal Events in the Jewish 

History 1 

II. On the Forms of Government and Administration 

of Justice among the Jews 22 

III. On the Sects and other Orders of Men among the 
Jews 32 

IV. On the Jewish Priesthood 44 

V. On the Jewish Sacrifices 54 

VI. On the Jewish Festivals 62 

VII. On the Places accounted Holy among the Jews 76 



CHAPTER I. 



A SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE JEWS. 



1. Of the history of the human race before the 
deluge,, and during many centuries subsequent to it, 
no knowledge can be obtained by us, beyond that 
which is given in the Holy Scriptures. For such 
knowledge we must have recourse to the writings of 
Moses, who was enabled by divine inspiration to relate 
many important circumstances affecting the early genera- 
tions of mankind, with which we must otherwise have 
been unacquainted. From those writings alone, we 
derive an authentic account of the creation of the world, 
and of the introduction of sin and misery into it in 
consequence of the disobedience of our first parents 
to the command of their Maker. Respecting these 
great events, and all that befel the nations of the earth 
during a long succession of ages, profane history is 
either altogether silent, or is so mingled with manifest 
fable as to be entitled to no credit. In forming therefore 
a summary of the history of the Jews, we shall be 
occupied during a large period of it in making a statement 
of the most important circumstances, the authority for 
which is that of the Bible alone. 

2. The Jews derive their name from Judah, one of 
the sons of Jacob: Judah being also the name of that 
tribe to which, in the division that was made of the 

A 



2 

Holy Land, the largest ancf best portion was allotted, 
and of which Jerusalem became the capital. They were 
sometimes called Hebrews, probably from Heber one 
pf the ancestors of Abraham ; and Israelites from Israel, 
a name which was given to Jacob. Although the 
history of them as a nation begins properly at the 
time when they departed from Egypt to take possession 
of Canaan, it may be useful to make a brief mention 
of some circumstances which are recorded in the Bible 
prior to that period. 

To Adam and Eve were born sons and daughters ; but 
the number of them is not stated. The only three whose 
names are mentioned are Cain, Abel and Seth ; and of 
these three the sacred historian has chiefly confined himself 
to the posterity of Seth, probably because he was the pro- 
genitor of Noah, and therefore in his line the Messiah 
was to be born. In the time of Noah, who was the ninth 
in descent from Adam, God destroyed by a deluge all 
the inhabitants of the earth, except Noah and his wife, 
and his three sons and their wives, and two, male and 
female, of every species of animals. This judgment 
was inflicted upon mankind 2348 years before the birth 
of Christ. When Noah descended from the ark, he 
offered sacrifice as a thanksgiving for his preservation, 
and God made a covenant with him that there should 
not be any more a flood to destroy the earth. 

3. The descendants of Noah soon multiplied so 
greatly that a separation became necessary, and a part 
of them journeyed from the east, and settled in the 
land of Shinar, which is generally believed to be the 
same as Chaldsea, of which Babylon was afterwards 
the capital. Here they said, " Let us build us a city 
and a tower whose top may reach unto heaven, and 
let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad 



upon the face of the whole earth." Whatever the object 
of this work might be, it was displeasing to God, who 
by confounding their language so that they could not 
understand each other, compelled them to abandon the 
work, and to disperse themselves over the earth. 
Call of Abraham, the tenth in descent from Noah, 

Abraham* h as a l wa ys been regarded by the Jews as 
their great progenitor. His father Terah went forth with 
his family from Ur of the Chaldees, to go into the land of 
Canaan ; but he did not proceed further than Haran or 
Charran, in Mesopotamia, where he died. n Now the 
Lord had said unto Abraham, Get thee out of thy country, 
and from thy kindred, and from thy father's house, unto 
a land that I will shew thee ; and I will make of thee 
a great nation, and in thee shall all the families of 
the earth be blessed." In compliance with this command, 
Abraham departed from Haran and went into the land 
of Canaan, accompanied by Sarah his wife, Lot his 
brother's son, and all their substance. This removal 
took place 1921 years before the birth of Christ. " And 
the Lord appeared unto Abram, and said, Unto thy 
seed will I give this land;" — a promise which was 
fulfilled 476 years after it was given, when the Israelites 
took possession of Canaan under the command of Joshua. 
4. The Bible records many interesting particulars 
of the life of this patriarch, and also of Isaac and 
Jacob; but the statement of them is not necessary here. 
When Jacob went to live with his son Joseph in Egypt, 
his whole family consisted of 70 persons. They were 
placed near the head of the Delta on the eastern side 
of the Nile in the district of Rameses or Goshen, a fertile 
country, and well suited to their occupation as shepherds. 
Here they and their descendants " increased abundantly, 
and the land was filled with them. But at length 

a2 



there arose a new king over Egypt, which knew not 
Joseph." About 60 years after the death of Joseph, 
this new king, afraid lest the Israelites might soon be 
able to seize the whole kingdom, determined to check 
their progress by cruel exactions and labour. He also 
ordered the Hebrew midwives to put all the male infants 
to death as soon as they were born, and when this was 
not executed, he ordered that every male child of the 
Hebrews should be cast into the river. But the designs 
of the Almighty were now hastening to their accomplish- 
ment, and he began to interfere in behalf of his chosen 
people. And he called unto Moses out of the midst 
of a flaming bush and said, "> The cry of the children 
of Israel is come unto me: I will send thee therefore 
unto Pharaoh, that thou mayest bring forth my people 
out of Egypt." Being now increased to 600,000 men 
capable of bearing arms, they with their families and 
great possessions of flocks, herds, and other property, 
departed from Egypt 1491 years before the birth of 
Christ. 

Departure of A direct journey would have led them to 
the Israelites Canaan in a short time, but it pleased God to 
from Egijpt. punish them for repeated acts of distrust and 
disobedience, by causing them to wander in the wilderness 
of Arabia for 40 years. Moses has recorded the transactions 
of only three years, viz. the two first and the last, but he 
has mentioned all the places where they pitched their tents 
during the whole time they were in the wilderness. In 
the first year they were conducted to Mount Sinai, from 
which God delivered to them those commandments, statutes 
and ordinances, which are generally called the law of 
Moses, or the Mosaic Dispensation. When they arrived at 
Kadesh Barnea, not far from the south border of Canaan, 
Moses sent twelve men, a ruler from every tribe, to 



o 

ascertain the quality of the land, the strength of the 
inhabitants, and the state of the cities. They brought 
back a favourable report of the fertility of the land, 
but described the cities and people as so strong, that 
the Israelites refused to attempt the proposed conquest. 
Joshua and Caleb, two of the twelve spies, endeavoured in 
vain to convince them that their fears were unreasonable, 
and on account of their rebellion on this occasion, God 
commanded that they should turn back and wander in 
the wilderness 40 years, telling them also that, of all 
who had reached the twentieth year of their age, not 
one, except Joshua and Caleb, should ever enter the 
promised land. Many memorable events occurred during 
their subsequent wanderings, especially the rebellion of 
Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, in the second year, and 
in the fortieth year, the visitation of fiery serpents, by 
which great multitudes perished. In this last year 
Aaron died at mount Hor; and soon afterwards Moses, 
having viewed the promised inheritance from Pisgah 
the top of mount Nebo, died at the age of 120, when 
none of his faculties were impaired : " his eye was not 
dim, nor his natural force abated/' 

5. Joshua, having now assumed the command, pro- 
ceeded without delay to the conquest of Canaan. In 
seven years he subdued 31 kings; the term king being 
sometimes applied to a prince who reigned over a small 
number of subjects within a narrow territory, and 
consequently possessed little wealth or power. When 
the conquest was nearly completed, the land was divided 
by lot. To the tribes of Reuben and Gad, and to one 
half of the tribe of Manasseh, Moses had already allotted 
some conquered lands on the eastern side of the river 
Jordan, upon condition that they should assist their 
brethren to subdue the country on the western side of 

A3 



that river, and having fulfilled the condition, they were 
confirmed in the possession of those lands by Joshua, 
No allotment, except 48 cities to dwell in, was made 
to the tribe of Levi, because they were appointed to 
the services of religion, and received the tithes of the 
whole country for a maintenance ; but the whole country 
was divided into 12 parts, the descendants of Joseph being 
separated into two tribes, which from his two sons were 
called the tribe of Ephraim, and the tribe of Manasseh. 
Thus the great work was completed, u according to all 
that the Lord sware unto their fathers. There failed not 
aught of any good thing, which the Lord had spoken 
unto the house of Israel : all came to pass/' 

6. After the death of Joshua, the tribes were no 

longer united under one command. They soon fell into 

apostacy ; for, having begun to make the conquered 

nations tributary, instead of utterly destroying them as 

God commanded, they intermarried with the inhabitants, 

and took a part in the worship of idols. On account 

of their impiety, they were allowed to fall at different 

times under the yoke of neighbouring nations. Cushan 

king of Mesopotamia held them in subjection for more 

than eight years, till Othniel, a son-in-law and nephew 

of Caleb, raised an army against the oppressor, and 

having effected a permanent deliverance for the Israelites 

judged them in peace 40 years* In the person of 

Othniel began a series of such deliverers called Judges, 

who were raised at intervals, as public exigency required, 

to rescue their nation from the tyranny of neighbouring 

powers. This mode of government continued a little 

more than 300 years. The most eminent of the Judges 

were Deborah the prophetess, Gideon, Jephthah, Eli, 

Samuel. In the time of Samuel, a complete change was 

made in the form of government. When he was old 



„ 



e appointed his two sons to a share of his authority, 
and on account of their misconduct all the elders gathered 
themselves together, and petitioned that like other nations 
they might have a king. Samuel, by the command of 
God, protested against their proceedings, and represented 
the evils which would follow the establishment of regal 
authority, but they persevered in their request, and Samuel 
w r as therefore directed to anoint Saul, of the tribe of 
Benjamin, to be king of Israel. 

7. Saul began to reign 1095 years before the birth of 
Christ. His distempered mind brought him into great 
troubles, and the termination of his life was disastrous; 
for he died by his own hand, after being defeated by the 
Philistines. His reign continued 40 years, which was 
also the period of David's reign, and of that of Solomon. 
David experienced great variety of fortune, but the final 
result was prosperous, and he terminated his life in glory, 
having greatly extended the Israelitish power. The reign- 
of Solomon was peaceful and glorious, being particularly 
distinguished by the building of the temple, for which 
great preparations had already been made by his father. 
He laid the foundation of it in the fourth year of his 
reign, and completed it in the eleventh. In the latter 
years of his life, he tarnished his great name by resigning 
himself to concubines, many of them taken from idolatrous 
nations whose superstitions he adopted ; and he built high 
places near to Jerusalem for all his strange wives, H which 
burnt incense, and sacrificed unto their gods." This 
conduct drew upon him the indignation of the Almighty, 
who told him that his kingdom should be rent, and the 
largest portion pass away from his family. 
Separation of 8. This leads us to one of the most im- 

S2KJ- portant events in the Jewish history ' the 

Judah. departure of ten tribes from their allegi* 



8 

ance to the house of David, and the consequent establish- 
ment of the separate kingdoms of Judah and Israel. 
As soon as Rehoboam the son of Solomon ascended the 
throne, the people intreated him to lighten the yoke 
with which they had been burthened by his father, but 
he replied to their prayer, saying, " My father made 
your yoke heavy, and I will add to your yoke: my 
father also chastised you with whips, but I will chastise 
you with scorpions." On receiving this answer, ten of 
the tribes revolted and chose Jeroboam to be their king, 
while the tribes of Judah and Benjamin remained faithful 
to the son of Solomon. Thus originated a schism which 
was never healed, and was terminated only by the over- 
throw of the kingdom of Israel about 250 years after it 
was established, when the ten tribes were carried captive 
by Shalmaneser king of Assyria, and so scattered through 
his vast empire, that they seem never afterwards to have 
regained a separate and independent existence. This 
period of 250 years was occupied with frequent wars be- 
tween the kings of Judah and Israel, and between them 
and the neighbouring kings, and is marked in general by 
a series of murderous usurpations of the throne, idolatries, 
and oppressions of the people. This is chiefly observable 
of the kings of Israel, of whom there were 1& and it is 
said of them all, " that they did evil in the sight of the 
Lord, and made Israel to sin." Of these kings, the most 
conspicuous in the history are, (1) pmri, who built Sama- 
ria (923 B. C.) and made it his capital ; (2) Ahab his 
son and successor, who married Jezebel daughter of the 
king of Sidon, and in whose time Elijah and Elisha 
announced the divine judgments, and wrought many 
remarkable miracles ; (3) Jehu, who was raised by God 
as an instrument of his vengeance on the house of Ahab ; 
(4) Hoshea the last king, who was carried by Shalma- 
neser into captivity. 



9 

During this same period, some of the kings of Judah 
were remarkable for their obedience to the law of God. 
The most worthy of mention are Jehoshaphat (contem- 
porary with Ahab,) who was eminent alike for regard to 
religion and success in arms ; and Hezekiah. in the sixth 
year of whose reign Shalmaneser put an end to the 
Israelitish monarchy. 

9. Thus the kingdom of Judah remained alone. An 
attack was made upon it about ten years after the cap- 
tivity of the ten tribes, while Hezekiah was yet king, 
by Sennacherib who had succeeded Shalmaneser on the 
throne of Assyria. When he was threatening to destroy 
Jerusalem, c< an angel of the Lord went forth, and smote 
in the camp of the Assyrians 185,000 men" in a single 
night. Sennacherib was compelled to retreat, and was 
soon afterwards put to death at Nineveh by two of his 
own sons. The reign of Hezekiah is further memorable 
for his miraculous recovery from sickness, and for the 
intimation made to him by the prophet Isaiah of the 
approaching Babylonian Captivity ; — an intimation given 
for the purpose of checking the pride which he had 
exhibited in displaying the treasures of his house to a 
Babylonian embassy. The kings who succeeded Heze- 
kiah, with the single exception of Josiah his great 
grandson, concurred in filling up the measure of Judah's 
crimes by their wickedness and folly. "And the Lord 
said, I will remove Judah also out of my sight, as I have 
removed Israel; and will cast off this city Jerusalem 
which I have chosen, and the house of which I said, 
My name shall be there." Accordingly, Nebuchadnezzar 
king of Babylon invaded Judaea and took Jerusalem. On 
this occasion the children of the royal family and many 
of the people were sent captives to Babylon, and from 
this time, (606 years- B. C.) is to be dated the com-^ 



10 

mencement of the Babylonian Captivity,, which, according 
to the prediction of Jeremiah, was to continue 70 years. 
18 years after this first capture of Jerusalem, the Jewish 
monarchy was finally terminated, in the reign of Zede- 
kiah, who was sent in chains to Babylon. The walls 
of Jerusalem, the temple and all the buildings were 
destroyed ; and the inhabitants were carried away captive, 
except the poor of the land who were left to be vine- 
dressers and husbandmen. Thus ended the sovereignty 
of the house of David. 

Return of the 10 ' When C ? rus the Great ' havin S COn - 

Jews after the quered Babylon, issued his decree for the 

Babylonian restoration of the Jews, about 42,000 of them 
Captivity. an( j 7 000 servan t s placed themselves under 

the conduct of Zerubbabel, and returned to their country. 
In the beginning of the second year after their return 
they began to rebuild the temple upon the old founda- 
tions, and finished it in 18 years, having met with great 
interruption from the Samaritans. These Samaritans 
were descended from a mixed race w r hich had been 
drawn from various parts of the east, and planted by Shal- 
maneser in the country previously occupied by the ten 
tribes. They received the Mosaic law ; but united with 
the observance of it the idolatrous rites of their own 
countries. Being informed that the Jews were preparing 
to build a temple, they expressed a desire to take a part 
in the work, as being worshippers of the same God; 
but the offer was refused, and thereby that enmity be- 
tween the two nations was inflamed, which had taken 
its origin in the schism of the ten tribes and was never 
afterwards extinguished. 

Many of the sacred vessels and treasures of the 
temple were carried back from Babylon by Zerubbabel, 
and the rest a few years afterwards by Ezra, to whom 



11 

the Jews were chiefly indebted for the re-establishment 
of their worship and of civil order. To him also we owe 
the revision of the sacred writings and the arrangement 
of them in the order which they yet retain. Ezra was 
succeeded by Nehemiah, who obtained authority from 
the king of Persia to rebuild the walls of Jerusalem, 
which he completed in 52 days. He also exerted great 
diligence in completing the reformation of the State; 
and people having been brought from other parts of the 
land to re- occupy the city, it was seen again in something 
like its ancient splendour. 

11. It is probable that, after Nehemiah, no separate 
governor of Judaea was appointed, its affairs being admi- 
nistered by the high priests under the control of the 
prefects of Syria. In this state it continued till the 
overthrow of.the Persian empire by Alexander the Great, 
who treated the Jews with great lenity, allowing them 
to live under their own laws, and in the free exercise 
of their religion. From the time of his death, (323 B. C.) 
to the time when they were made tributary to the 
Romans by Pompey, (63 B. C.) they underwent a great 
variety of fortune, being sometimes favourably treated, 
at other times oppressed by the kings of Egypt and 
Syria, who held them successively in subjection. Ptolemy 
Lagus, (Alexander's general, and first of the family of 
the Ptolemies who were kings of Egypt,) having gained 
possession of Jerusalem by a stratagem, carried above 
100,000 of the Jews captives into Egypt; where however 
they were treated with great kindness both by himself, 
and afterwards by his son who permitted many of them 
to return to their own country. This son was Ptolemy 
Philadelphus ; a prince endowed with excellent qualities, 
and eminent, above all, for the translation of the Holy 
Scriptures into Greek, which was made at Alexandria 



12 

under his patronage by 72 learned Jews. This work 
was finished about the year 277 B. C, and from the 
number of translators has been ever since called the 
Septuagint. 

The family of the Ptolemies retained authority over 
Judaea about a hundred years, and were then compelled 
to resign it to Antiochus the Great, king of Syria. To 
him succeeded, first, his eldest son Seleucus, and then 
another son, Antiochus Epiphanes ; from whose tyranny, 
for three years and a half, the Jews underwent dreadful 
sufferings. During the reign of this oppressor (about 
166 years B. C.) arose the Maccabees, a family of 
brave men whose struggle with him and his successors 
ended in the complete liberation of their country from 
the Syrian yoke. This was effected about 129 years 
B. C; after which time the Maccabees held supreme 
authority, uniting in themselves the dignities of king 
and high priest, till the year 63 B. C. A contest having 
then arisen between two brothers, Hyrcanus and Aris- 
tobulus, respecting the succession, and application for 
support being made by both parties to Pompey, he ended 
the dispute by leading his army into Judaea and making 
it tributary to the Romans. Hyrcanus was made high 
priest and honoured with the title of prince; but he 
possessed little more than nominal power, and willingly 
allowed the government of the country to be conducted 
by Antipater, who was an Idumaean by birth, but had 
become a Jewish proselyte. 

Aristobulus and his sons made repeated efforts to 
displace their opponents, and gained temporary successes ; 
but in the end they were wholly discomfited. After the 
death of Antipater, the contest was carried on between 
his son Herod (generally distinguished by the name of 
Herod the Great) and Antigonus one of the sons of 



13 

Aristobulus; and though the greatest part of the Jewish 
nation was attached to the latter, probably from respect 
to him as being of the Maccabaean family, yet the fortune 
of Herod prevailed. Having fled to Rome and gained 
from the Senate, chiefly through the influence of Mark 
Antony, the title of king of Judaea, he returned to the 
contest : at the end of three years, Jerusalem was taken : 
Antigonus having been made prisoner was ordered by 
Mark Antony to be put to death : the Maccabaean dynasty 
after having continued nearly ISO years was thus finally 
overthrown, and Herod (37 B. C.) was established in 
full exercise of the power which his new title denoted. 



13. As Herod is a name that occurs frequently in 
the New Testament, and is applied to different persons 
of the same family, it is necessary that care be taken to 
distinguish them one from another. Herod the Great 
was approaching to the close of his reign, when our 
Saviour was born. Expecting that the Messiah was to be 
a temporal prince who might wrest the sovereignty from 
himself or his family, he determined to destroy him, and 
with that view ordered that all the children at Bethlehem, 
of two years old and under, should be put to death ; but 
his design was frustrated by the flight of Joseph with the 
young child and his mother into Egypt. In the second 
year after the birth of our Saviour, Herod the Great died. 
He is represented by historians as having possessed great 
abilities and courage, splendid in every exhibition of 
royalty, and especially in the magnificence of his build- 
ings. Samaria which he rebuilt, and called Sebaste in 
honour of Augustus ; the port and city of Caesarea on the 
coast of Phoenicia which he greatly improved and adorn- 
ed ; superb palaces ; and, above all, the rebuilding of the 

B 



14 

temple at Jerusalem, are proofs of his grandeur in this 
respect. But these good qualities were more than coun- 
terbalanced by extreme inhumanity. His disposition, 
naturally bold and ferocious, seems to have been irritated 
into frenzy by domestic troubles, and the difficulties 
which beset his throne. His wife Mariamne, an excellent 
princess, and once greatly beloved by him, was led to 
a public execution; the most powerful of his subjects, 
many of his friends, and even the greatest part of his 
own family fell victims to his cruel jealousy. When 
he was suffering by a painful disease, and saw that 
death was at hand, expecting that it would be hailed 
by his subjects with joy, he determined to leave them 
some cause for mourning. Having summoned all the 
chief men of his kingdom, and caused them to be 
surrounded with troops, he ordered that as soon as he 
expired they should be put to death. His successor 
however declined to execute this barbarity. 

14. Three sons of Herod the Great are mentioned 
in the New Testament, between whom by his will he 
divided his dominions, viz. (1) Archelaus, to whom he 
gave the kingdom of Judaea, together with Idumaea and 
Samaria; (2) Herod Antipas ; whom he appointed tetrarch 
or governor of Galilee and Peraea; (3) Philip; whom 
he also made tetrarch of Ituraea, Trachonitis and some 
other small districts situated beyond Jordan. 

Archelaus was acknowledged king by the people with 
loud acclamations, but their joy seems to have been of 
short continuance, for when he went to Rome shortly 
afterwards for the purpose of soliciting from Augustus 
a confirmation of his regal title, a deputation of Jews 
arrived to oppose his application, requesting that their 
country might be annexed to the province of Syria, and 
that they might be allowed the exercise of their own 



15 

religion and laws under Roman governors. Augustus 
however thought fit to ratify Herod's will, except that he 
withheld from Arehelaus the regal title, and gave him 
that of tetrarch, with a promise that the other should 
be granted when he had proved himself worthy of it. 
Having however after his return continued to act with 
great cruelty and injustice, at length, in the tenth year, 
of his government, such complaints were made against 
him by the chief men among his subjects, that Augustus 
banished him to Vienne in Gaul, where he died. Judaea, 
with Samaria and Idumaea, was made a Roman province 
and governed by Roman magistrates called Procurators, 
who were subordinate to the president of Syria. Coponius 
was the first procurator of Judaea, and the president of 
Syria at that time was Quirinus, (called by St. Luke 
Cyrenius) who, by the order of Augustus, made a taxing 
in Judaea and Syria. 

In the mean while, Herod Antipas and Philip 
remained in possession of their Tetrarchies. Herod 
Antipas is chiefly memorable for having put to death 
John the Baptist, and for having taken a part in 
questioning and mocking our Saviour before his con- 
demnation. Having deserted his wife the daughter of 
Aretas king of Arabia, he married Herodias the wife 
of his brother Philip; and this marriage was the cause 
of his ruin. For when the emperor Caligula had given 
the title of king to Agrippa, who was the nephew of 
Antipas, Herodias not being able to bear that Antipas 
should remain contented with the inferior dignity of 
tetrarch, urged him to go to Rome and solicit the title of 
king. But Agrippa countermined him, by giving Caligula 
just reason for suspecting his loyalty; so that instead of 
making him king, he banished him to Lyons, and after- 
wards to Spain, after he had held his tetrarchy 43 years, 

b2 



16 

Of his brother Philip, who was tetrarch of Ituraea 
and Trachonitis, little - mention is made in the New 
Testament. Josephus commends him as a mild and 
just prince. He died in possession of his tetrarchy, 
having held it 37 years. 

15. The next Herod of this family, is the Agrippa 
above-mentioned, sometimes called Agrippa the Great; 
who is spoken of in the Acts as having stretched forth 
his hands to vex certain of the Church, and as having 
killed James the brother of John with the sword, and 
cast Peter into prison. He was grandson of Herod the 
Great; being son of Aristobulus, who was one of those 
children of Herod the Great before alluded to as having 
fallen victims to their father's cruelty. To this Agrippa, 
Caligula gave, first, the title of king with the tetrarchy 
which had been held by Philip, and afterwards added 
the tetrarchy from which Herod Antipas was deposed. 
The emperor Claudius, who succeeded Caligula, further 
gave him Abilene, Judaea, and Samaria; so that his 
dominions became nearly the same as those of his grand- 
father Herod the Great. Like him, he delighted in 
great and magnificent buildings. Josephus represents 
him also as liberal, courteous, merciful: with which 
character however, his zealous persecution of the Christians 
cannot easily be reconciled. It is admitted by the 
historian, that some of his subjects retained little respect 
for his memory; and in the Acts of the Apostles, we 
find his death specially ascribed to the displeasure of 
God. In the fourth year after he had obtained from 
Claudius the kingdom of Judaea, when he was attending 
a public spectacle at Caesarea, and had made an oration 
to certain deputies, "the people gave a shout, saying, 
It is the voice of a god, and not of a man." For accepting 
this impious adulation, he was immediately smitten with a 
dreadful disease, which in a few days terminated his life. 



17 

16. The last of the family of Herod, whose name 
occurs in the New Testament, is Agrippa the younger, 
son of Agrippa the Great. As he was only seventeen 
years old when Agrippa the Great died, the emperor 
Claudius did not consider him competent to undertake 
the government of his father's dominions, but soon 
afterwards made him king of Chalcis, a small territory 
situated in the mountainous district by which the 
northern part of Judaea is separated from Syria. His 
government was afterwards extended over a part of 
Galilee; and in Judaea his influence was great, though 
he was never invested with the supreme authority. The 
appointment of the high priest belonged to him, and 
he had the care of the temple and of the sacred treasure. 
In what year he died is uncertain ; but it is known that 
he survived his country, having in vain endeavoured 
to prevent the fall of it by his prudent counsels. It 
was before this Agrippa, attended by Bernice and Festus, 
that St. Paul made his defence, before he was carried 
prisoner to Rome. 

On reviewing that part of the Jewish history which 
brings before us the family of Herod, and which is 
most interesting to us, as comprising the period of our 
Saviour's life, it appears, (1) that, during the infancy 
of Christ, Herod the Great was ruler both in Judaea 
and Galilee; (2) that, during all the remaining part 
of the life pf Christ, Herod Antipas was ruler in Galilee ; 
(2) that, in Judaea, after the death of Herod the Great, 
Archelaus held the chief power nearly ten years; and 
that afterwards it was governed by Roman procurators; 
except during the short reign of Agrippa the Great, 
whose government of Judaea commenced about eight 
years after the crucifixion of Christ. 

17- The corruption and wickedness of the Jews 
B3 



18 

became general and excessive in the times which im- 
mediately preceded their final overthrow. The severe 
rebukes addressed to them by our Saviour are in perfect 
accordance with the representations given by Josephus. 
He speaks of it " as a time fruitful of all sorts of wicked- 
ness., so that no evil was left unpractised. All were 
corrupt both in their private and public characters. They 
strove to exceed each other in impiety toward God, and 
injustice toward their neighbour ; the chiefs oppressed 
the people, and the people strove to ruin the chiefs. 
The former were ambitious of dominion and power ; the 
latter had an insatiable thirst of violence and plunder." 
When they had filled up the measure of their iniquity 
by putting to death the Messiah, their dreadful impreca- 
tion that his blood should be upon them and upon their 
children did not tarry long for its completion. 

Many intimations are given in the New Testament 
of the impatience with which they bore the Roman 
yoke. To a people so proud and licentious any regular 
authority would have been galling : but the rapacity 
of some of the Roman governors was unbounded, and 
their injustice and cruelty so wanton, that the most 
virtuous and patient subjects must have been excited to 
resistance. Many local tumults, in which great numbers 
perished, preceded the general revolt. The country for 
several years was in a state bordering upon anarchy; 
pillaged by robbers, and agitated by false prophets, 
who fanned the flames of discontent. The last of the 
Roman governors was Gessius Florus, in comparison 
with whose tyranny the conduct of all preceding 
oppressors appeared merciful. When Cestius Gallus 
the president of Syria visited Jerusalem, above 300,000 
of the Jews went out to meet him, imploring him to 
succour their afflicted country, and banish Florus who 



19 

was the very pest of their nation. Being exhorted to 
continue in obedience to the Romans, they cried out that 
they meant not to take arms against the Romans and 
Caesar, but against Florus who had used them so cruelly. 
Destruction of 18. The war began in the twelfth year of 
Jerusalem. t ] le re ig n f Nero. The Roman garrison at 
Jerusalem was put to the sword, and. the revolt soon 
became general throughout Judaea. Cestius Gallus, roused 
by the rapid progress of the insurgents, assembled an army 
of 25,000 men, and advanced to the walls of Jerusalem; 
but, having hesitated to make the assault, he thought fit 
suddenly to retreat, and being pursued by the Jews he 
sustained great loss. When intelligence of these events 
reached Rome, Nero perceived that the most vigorous 
measures must be adopted to reduce the rebellious pro- 
vince to submission; and he appointed Vespasian, who 
had been long distinguished in the wars of Germany and 
Britain, to the command of the army of Syria. Vespasian 
repaired thither without delay, and led into Judaea an 
army of 60,000 men. More than two years were spent in 
reducing cities and fortresses, before the way was open to 
Jerusalem; the Jews every where fighting with obstinate 
bravery, and in many cases preferring a voluntary death 
to submission, when all hope of successful resistance was 
at an end. In the mean time Vespasian, having been 
elected Emperor, returned to Rome to secure his new 
dignity and left his son Titus to finish the contest. In 
the beginning of April (A. D. 70) it being now the fourth 
year of the war, Titus began the siege of Jerusalem, at 
a time when great numbers were collected there to 
celebrate the Passover. Three separate factions occupied 
the city, and fought with more bitter hostility against 
each other than against the common enemy. Famine 
also and disease aggravated the misery of the besieged : 



20 

yet, though repeated efforts were made by Titus to 
induce them to save the city and themselves by submis- 
sion, they replied only with threats and insult. At 
length on the eighth of September, the Romans were in 
possession of every part of the city. Thousands of the 
Jews perished in the flames, and still more by the sword 
of the enemy, who spared neither sex nor age, nor 
desisted till their hands were fatigued with slaughter. Of 
those who escaped death, some were sent into Egypt to be 
employed in the public works, others were dispersed 
through the provinces of the empire, to fight as gladiators 
or with wild beasts in the Theatres. The whole city was 
levelled with the ground, so that those who had not seen 
it before could not suppose that it had been ever inha- 
bited : nothing was left standing except a part of the wall 
and three towers; which were intended partly as a 
defence for the garrison that remained there, and partly 
as monuments of the Roman valour which had mastered 
a city so strongly fortified. Such was the end of the 
Jewish nation. 

From the statements given by Josephus it has been 
computed that nearly a million and a half of the Jews 
perished in this war, the greater part of them in Jeru- 
salem itself; and it is probable that the miseries which 
they underwent during this period have not been paral- 
leled in any age of the world. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 

** B. C. 

Creation 4004 

The Deluge . 2348 

Building of Babel 2247 

Call of Abraham 1921 

Arrival of Jacob in Egypt 1706 

Departure of the Israelites from Egypt 1491 

Saul, the first king of the Jews, began to reign. . . 1095 

Revolt of the ten tribes 975 

The ten tribes carried away captive by Shalmaneser 721 

The Jews carried captive to Babylon 606 

Restoration of the Jews by Cyrus 536 

Alexander the Great went to Jerusalem. 332 

Rise of the Maccabees 166 

Invasion of Judaea by Pompey 63 

Herod the Great began to reign 37 

Our Saviour born four years before the vulgar aera. . 4 

A. D. 

Christ's first visit to the Temple, in his 12th year. . . 8 

John the Baptist began his ministry " in the 15th 1 ^ 

year of Tiberius." J 

Christ began his ministry 28 

Death of Christ 31 

Beginning of the Jewish war 67 

Jerusalem taken by Titus 70 

These dates are given according to the vulgar asra, by 
which the birth of Christ is placed four years too late. 
Unless notice be taken of this, the reader may be led into 
error. For example, it is stated in the table that Herod 
the Great began to reign 37 B. C. and since it is agreed 
that he lived one year at least after Christ was born, it 
might be inferred that his reign continued at least 38 
years, whereas it did not continue more than 34. 



CHAPTER II. 



ON THE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 
OF JUSTICE AMONG THE JEWS. 



1. X HE maintenance of the worship of one God 
was a fundamental principle of the Mosaic legislation. 
In order to secure attention to this principle in the 
minds of the Jews, Moses engaged them by a solemn 
covenant to accept God as their King; so that every 
act of idolatry was not only an apostacy from true 
religion, but a direct crime against the State. For 
this reason it was ordered that the idolater, having 
incurred the guilt of high treason, should be punished 
with death. Their commonwealth therefore was at 
first a theocracy ; for God was the founder of it, and had 
been acknowledged by them in a solemn covenant, not 
merely as the Sovereign of the universe, but as their 
own special Ruler, to whose protection they committed 
their national as well as individual prosperity. Accord- 
ingly they are often represented in Scripture as a chosen 
generation, a peculiar people, a holy nation, the portion 
of God. In the time of Moses, He vouchsafed to indicate 
his presence as their Ruler by the most conspicuous 
tokens. When the Law was delivered from Sinai, the 
Lord descended upon it in fire, the whole mount quaked 
greatly, and God answered Moses by a voice. He was 
visible also in the pillars of cloud and fire ; He decided 
questions of justice by oracles, and inflicted punishments, 



23 

not according to the secret procedure of Providence, but 
with immediate and the most ostensible manifestation 
of his power. And in subsequent times he continued 
to issue his decrees, and to signify his will from the 
tabernacle. 

As the sovereignty was thus assigned to God himself, 
the form of government established by Moses did not 
prescribe the appointment of an earthly king. The 
governor of the nation admitted of change as to the 
name and nature of his office, it being of inferior moment 
whether he was called a general, or a judge, or a king; 
and it appears that at certain times the tribes which 
composed the nation had no common ruler. They 
adhered to the patriarchal mode of life, as far as was 
compatible with the circumstances of a nation; living 
according to their tribes and families ; every tribe forming 
a lesser commonwealth, with its own peculiar interests, 
and all of them united in one great State. Every tribe 
had its own chief; and as we do not find that Moses 
appointed them, it is probable that this institution had 
existed among them in Egypt. The tribes were sub- 
divided into families; the heads of which are probably 
the same as the elders who are mentioned in the book 
of Exodus, as being gathered together by Moses and 
Aaron, and informed of their approaching release from 
bondage. These families were again sub-divided into 
households; so that a regular subordination was 
established in their civil and religious polity, all the 
degrees of which were alike subject to divine laws, and 
to the especial government of God. Hence it will appear 
how the State might subsist, not only without a king, 
but even occasionally without that magistrate who was 
denominated a Judge, and without any supreme council 
of the nation. Every tribe had always its own chief 



24 

magistrate, subordinate to whom were the heads of 
families ; and if there was no general ruler of the whole 
people, there were yet twelve lesser commonwealths, 
which upon great emergencies united together, and 
in their general convention would take measures for 
the common interest. And all these separate bodies 
were maintained in unity, by their respect for the same 
object and ceremonies of worship, and also by their 
regard to God as having separated them from the rest 
of mankind, and exercising over them a peculiar 
sovereignty. 

In conformity with this theocratic principle of govern- 
ment, we find that Moses and Joshua, and many of 
the leaders who succeeded them under the name of 
Judges, were appointed to their office, not by the people 
but by the nomination and authority of God. These 
Judges were not invested with legislative power, but 
acted as magistrates in peace or, as commanders, they 
led out the people in the divine strength to war, pro- 
fessing to exercise a delegated authority and guided in 
their steps by the immediate dictation of the divine 
Spirit. They held their office for life: but it was not 
hereditary, nor were they appointed in regular succes- 
sion; there being intervals of several years in which 
there were no such governors. It is also probable, 
that their authority did not in every case extend over 
all, but merely over particular tribes. Thus the Gilead- 
ites chose Jephthah as Judge and general, without 
waiting for the concurrence of the other tribes a : and 
on many important occasions, even in the conduct of 
wars, particular tribes seem to have acted independently 
and distinctly from the rest. 

a Judges xi. 6. 






25 



2. When this mode of government had continued 
more than 300 years/ the Israelites, perceiving that 
Samuel was broken with age and being dissatisfied 
with the administration of his sons, had the boldness 
to require a king like all other nations. Samuel expressed 
his displeasure at this demand, as it seemed to declare 
that they would no longer have God for their king; 
and he represented in strong terms the oppressions 
and the mischiefs they should suffer-under the kingly 
government. w Nevertheless, the people refused to obey 
the voice of Samuel; and the Lord said, Hearken unto 
their voice, and make them a king/' They did not, 
however, attempt to elect a king themselves, but waited 
for the divine appointment, so that care was taken to 
preserve in its full force the theocracy originally esta- 
blished. Although therefore the administration of the 
government was committed to the hands of kings, yet 
they were only the vicegerents of God, who was still 
looked upon as the supreme director, and reserved to 
himself the chief legislative authority. In one view 
this change was beneficial, as it secured an uninterrupted 
succession of governors, so that the nation after this 
period was never without a common head : but in 
other respects, it appears to have been a change in the 
name of the first magistrate, rather than in the functions 
of the office, and the kings, at the beginning at least, 
had little more power than the Judges who had pre- 
ceded. It is difficult, however, to collect from the Old 
Testament what were the precise powers with which 
the kings were intrusted, nor indeed is it likely that 
the Israelites were anxious to guard their liberties 
by stipulations of any sort. In their first eagerness 
to have a king like all the other nations, they would 
probably have been satisfied with a kingly despotism; 

C 



26 

that being the most prevalent form of government among 
the oriental nations. There is some ground for supposing 
that Samuel was more provident than themselves for the 
well-being of their State. For when Saul was appointed 
king, it is said that Samuel told the people the manner 
of the kingdom, and wrote it in a book, and laid it up 
before the Lord b . But the purport of the articles con- 
tained in this writing is no where stated. 

^ , , As to the order of succession to the throne, 

Order of sue- ... 

cession to the there was considerable irregularity : Saul 
throne. was ma( J e king by divine appointment, and 

by the same authority David succeeded him ; Saul's family 
being excluded from the succession by the express com- 
mand of God, as a punishment for his disobedience. 
Afterwards the succession was hereditary, but not ne- 
cessarily by the right of primogeniture; for David 
caused Solomon, who was not his eldest son, to be 
anointed as his successor, and the people confirmed the 
king's will, though Adonijah, the eldest son, was - sup- 
ported by Joab the commander of the army. But it is 
plain from the history of David's reign, that this arbi- 
trary right of selecting a successor, instead of appointing 
him according to an invariable law, was dangerous to 
his own security, as well as to the peace of the State : 
and since we do not find that any of the following 
kings acted upon this right, it is probable that they 
abstained or were prohibited from the exercise of it, on 
account of the experience which had been felt of its 
mischievous effects. 

Power of The power of the kings, estimated from 

the kings. their practice, was unsettled and precarious; 
— very limited on some occasions, whether by express 

b 1 Sam. x. 25. 



27 

compact or by the dread of popular resistance; while 
at other times, it is certain that they acted in an abso- 
lute and very tyrannical manner. On the one hand, 
they were checked by a fear of the army and of its 
commanders, and also by the chiefs of the tribes, which, 
even under the kings, exercised the right of making 
war, independently one of another and without the king's 
sanction. Thus, Saul was prevented by his army from 
inflicting death upon Jonathan as he had threatened 6 : 
and David, unable to punish Joab his nephew for the 
murders committed by him, lamented that he was weak 
although anointed king, and that his nephews "the 
sons of Zeruiah were too hard for him d ." On the other 
hand, as proofs of the power which they sometimes as- 
sumed, we find that Saul, at the very beginning of his 
reign, without any consultation of his subjects made war 
upon the Ammonites and commanded his whole people 
to appear in arms, under a threat of severe punishment 
if they disobeyed e . And acts of summary and even 
tyrannical judicial procedure were committed by him, 
and also by David and Solomon; such acts as betoken 
the possession and the harsh exercise of unrestrained 
authority. From these opposite indications we may infer 
that the power of the Jewish kings was not defined 
by stipulated forms, such as have been devised by the 
precautions of modern legislation, and of which long 
experience has taught mankind the utility ; and therefore, 
theoretically, the Jewish monarch might consider himself 
invested with power little less than absolute. But on 
the other hand, practically, he would in most cases be 
restrained from a capricious abuse of it by reverence 
for the laws of Moses, which enjoin upon all men the 

c 1 Sam. xiv. 45. d 2 Sam. iii. 39. e 1 Sam. xi. 7. 

c2 



28 

observance of equity; by regard to the ancient usages 
of the nation ; and, lastly, by respect for that sense of 
justice which has force among men, and which warns 
rulers that the excesses of uncontrolled power must at 
length be fatal to themselves. 

3. After the Babylonian captivity, while the Jews 
were subject to Persia, their kingly government was 
extinct. When the reformation of the State had been 
accomplished by Ezra and Nehemiah, the chief conduct of 
affairs was committed to the high priests, and the pay- 
ment of tribute was the only token of subjection, Never 
probably did the Jews enjoy so long a course of prospe- 
rity as under the mild rule of Persia ; governed by their 
own magistrates, according to their own laws, and allowed 
to obserye their own forms of worship. Under their 
Egyptian and Syrian rulers they were less fortunate; but 
their forms of government underwent no material change, 
till Antiochus Epiphanes attempted to deprive them of 
every vestige of liberty. The princes of the Maceabaean 
family, who had rescued them from this oppressor, were 
allowed to unite in their own persons the regal and 
pontifical dignity. They were next made subject to the 
dominion of Rome, under which they experienced many 
changes of condition. Rome itself during this period was 
submitted to rule in different forms and to masters of 
various character; the effects of which variety would extend 
in some degree to the provinces. And whatever be the 
uniformity of the government at home, the fortune of 
distant provinces must necessarily be much influenced by 
the particular conduct of the individual who has been 
deputed to be their governor. In general, however, under 
the procurators, the Jews enjoyed a large measure of 
liberty. Except in a very few instances, no offence was 
given to their religious scruples: they worshipped in the 






29 

temple and in their synagogues, followed their own cus- 
toms, and lived according to their own laws. The procu- 
rators dwelt principally at Csesarea, but on the great 
festivals or when any commotion was apprehended, they 
repaired to Jerusalem that they might maintain order. 
It was their duty to collect the imperial revenue, and to 
repress tumults; they also took cognizance of all capital 
causes. For the purpose of supporting their authority, 
a considerable Roman garrison was always stationed in 
the province. These were the chief circumstances in 
which the presence of foreign power was felt, and the 
Jews reminded of their loss of independence. 
Courts of 4. Moses delivered a multiplicity of laws 

judicature. which were so sacred as to be unalterable; 
nothing was to be added to the word which had been 
commanded, nor aught diminished from it: but he did 
not prescribe as unalterable any order of judges or 
courts of judicature by which the law was to be ad- 
ministered. He seems to have left to the people a dis- 
cretionary power of altering these, and adapting them 
to the varying circumstances of the nation. We are 
left therefore to form our opinion upon the constitution 
of the Jewish magistracy and courts of justice from 
facts incidentally mentioned, rather than from any de- 
tailed description of them given either in the Holy Scrip- 
tures, or by any writer of sufficient authority. 

Moses himself was for some time the sole judge 
of the Israelites. But the duty was greater than he 
was able to perform; and therefore at the suggestion 
of Jethro his father-in-law, <c he chose able men out 
of all Israel, and made them heads over the people, 
rulers of thousands, rulers of hundreds, rulers of fifties, 
and rulers of tens. And they judged the people at all 
seasons : the great matters they brought unto Moses, 

c3 



so 

but every small matter they judged themselves'." The 
appointment of judges according to this precise arith- 
metical principle was suited to the military system 
under which they lived in the wilderness, but could 
not be applied so well to their condition when they 
should become settled in the country; he therefore 
ordered that they should appoint judges and officers, 
seven in every city throughout the tribes g . Some 
Jewish writers assert that there was a court of twenty- 
three judges in every town that had 120 inhabitants, 
and a court of three in every place where there were 
fewer than that number. The first decided all affairs 
of justice arising within their respective cities, but an 
appeal was open from them to the great Council or 
Sanhedrim, which sat in Jerusalem. The court of three 
was for the determination of disputes respecting sales, 
contracts, and other such matters of common right 
between man and man. Neither in the Scriptures nor 
by Josephus is any mention made of either of these 
courts. 

The highest tribunal of the Jews, at least after the 
Babylonian captivity, was the Sanhedrim above-men- 
tioned. It consisted of 71 members, of whom the 
high priest was generally president. Some have referred 
the origin of this assembly to the time of Moses, who 
instituted a council of 70 persons, to assist him in 
the government at a time when he was harassed by a 
rebellion of the Israelites in the wilderness : but from 
the death of Moses to the Babylonian captivity there 
is no trace of this council, even in great commotions 
of the State, when it must naturally have interposed 

f Exod. xviii. 25, 26. 

s Deut. xvi. 18. Josephus, Ant. Book IV. Chap, viii. 



1 



31 






had it been in existence. It is probable therefore that 
the council instituted by Moses during a rebellion, and 
intended for his own particular service and security, 
did not remain a permanent judicial body, but ended 
with the occasion for which it had been formed. 

The Sanhedrim, as it existed in the time of our 
Saviour, possessed great power. It presided over the 
affairs of the whole nation, received appeals from the 
inferior courts, interpreted the laws, and regulated the 
execution of them. Most of the members were priests 
and Levites; some were scribes; but any one was 
admissible into it, provided he was of a good family 
and unblameable life. This is the council by which 
our Saviour was arraigned before Pilate. The authority 
of the governor was necessary to pronounce His con- 
demnation, for the Sanhedrim had been deprived of 
the power of deciding in capital causes; and their 
authority, though still great, was in many respects much 
reduced after Judaea became a province of the Roman 
empire. 



CHAPTER III. 

ON THE SECTS AND OTHER ORDERS OF MEN 
AMONG THE JEWS. 



1 . As the Mosaic dispensation was in many 
of its parts figurative of the Christian and pre- 
paratory to it, so especially it was the office of the pro- 
phets to excite in men an expectation of the Messiah, 
and to give intimations of the approach of him who was 
to be the Saviour of the world. But the duty with 
which the prophets were charged did not necessarily 
imply, and certainly was not confined to, the prediction 
of future events. They were sometimes commissioned by 
God to be the messengers of his rebukes and threatenings, 
sometimes of his commands and exhortations to particular 
individuals, to nations, or to mankind. He sent them 
to teach, or to reprove, or to foretell things to come, 
and sometimes empowered them to confirm the prophecies 
they delivered, and to afford manifest proofs of their 
divine mission, by the working of miracles. The title 
therefore of Prophet is given in the Holy Scriptures 
to men possessing the gift of inspiration in various 
degrees, according to the various occasions to which 
the supernatural communication was to be applied. 
Abraham is the first to whom the name is given in the 
Old Testament. But Adam, Noah, and others had been 
favoured with extraordinary intimations of the divine 
will, so that the name might be properly applied to 






33 

them, in the same extensive sense in which it was given 
to many others after the time of Moses. 

Mention is made in the Old Testament of companies 
of prophets a . These were probably assembled in schools, 
in which the truths of religion were particularly taught 
and the study of the divine law formed the chief occupa- 
tion. It is not certain that all who were in these schools 
had the power of predicting future events, or were 
endued with any supernatural knowledge. But it is 
certain that to many individuals during a long series 
of years, from Moses to Malachi, peculiar communications 
were vouchsafed by the Almighty, in furtherance of the 
great scheme of his dispensations to mankind. Individuals 
were selected to execute important commissions, and 
foretelling events which were beyond the reach of human 
penetration they gave thereby the strongest proof that 
the dispensation of which they were the ministers pro- 
ceeded from God. 

Some of the prophets, as Elijah, Elisha, and others, 
committed nothing to writing: their predictions, being 
chiefly of a temporary nature, are inserted in the historical 
books together with an account of their fulfilment. 
But those who were appointed to deliver prophecies 
the accomplishment of which was far distant, were 
directed to commit them to writing. The prophetic 
books of sixteen of these yet remain, and form a part 
of the sacred canon* They are usually divided into 
two classes, the greater and the minor prophets; not 
from any supposed difference in their authority, but 
because the writings of one class are of greater length 
than those of the other. Jonah, the earliest of them, 
lived about 800 years B. C. ; and Malachi the latest, with 

a 1 Sam. x. 5. and xix. 20. 



34 

whose work the Old Testament is closed, lived about 

400 years after him. 

2. It is remarkable that so long as there 
Sadducees. , , _ 1 

were prophets among the Jews, there arose no 

sects among them; the reason of which probably is, that 

. the prophets learnt God's will immediately from himself, 

and therefore the people must either obey them and 

receive from them the interpretation of the law, or no 

longer acknowledge the God who inspired them. But 

when the law of God came to be explained by fallible 

men who disagreed in their opinions, a separation into 

sects was the unavoidable consequence. The most ancient 

sect was that of the Sadducees, whose founder Sadoc 

lived about 250 years B. C. He was a disciple of 

Antigonus Sochaeus president of the Sanhedrim, who 

taught that men ought to serve God disinterestedly, 

from love and reverence^ and not from servile fear of 

punishment or hope of reward. Sadoc, misapplying 

these instructions, inferred that there was no future 

state of rewards or punishments, thus far agreeing with 

the doctrine of Epicurus: but he admitted that God 

made the world, and governs it by his providence, and 

that, for the support of this government, he has ordained 

rewards and punishments in the present life. For this 

reason he enjoined the worship of God, and obedience 

to his laws. Whatever were the opinions of Sadoc 

himself, it appears from the New Testament that his 

followers in the time of our Saviour maintained that 

there is no resurrection, neither angel nor spirit b . They 

rejected all traditions, acknowledging the authority of 

the written law alone. It has been argued by some 

writers that they also rejected all the Scriptures except 

b Acts xxiii. 8, 



35 

the five books of Moses, while others suppose that they 
did not wholly reject them, but preferred the books of 
Moses to the rest : for these opinions however there does 
not appear to be sufficient ground. On the subject of 
free-will and predestination they held, in opposition to 
other sects, that man is absolute master of his own actions, 
and perfectly free to do either good or evil according to 
his own choice. Thus thinking that every man has full 
power in himself to avoid whatever the law of God 
forbids, and to do what it commands, it was remarked 
of them that they were always inclined to severity when 
they sat in judgment upon criminals. The members 
of this sect were few in number, but they were in general 
eminent for wealth and dignity. Several of them were 
appointed to the high priesthood. Josephus, however, 
says that they had not much power, for when they 
were in the magistracy they were obliged to conform 
to the measures proposed by the Pharisees, who were 
supported by a great majority of the common people . 

3. The Pharisees derive their name from 

Pit CL V I S €€S 

P haras, a Hebrew word which signifies sepa- 
rated or set apart, because they separated themselves from 
the rest of the Jews, and affected a peculiar degree of 
holiness. Most of the common people were on their side ; 
but the title of Pharisee seems to have been almost en- 
tirely appropriated to men of leisure and substance, the 
rest being considered rather an appendage than a part of 
the sect, and always called plainly the people, the multi- 
tude, and the like. The time of their origin cannot be 
accurately determined. Their rise was probably very 
gradual, as they do not appear to have acknowledged 
any particular founder. The earliest account of them 

c Jos. Ant. Book XVIII. Chap. ii. 



36 

is in Josephus, who says that they were a considerable 
sect at the time when John Hyrcanus the high priest 
forsook them and became a Sadducee, that is, about 
110 years B. C d . The distinguishing character of this 
sect was a zealous adherence to the traditions of the 
elders,, to which they ascribed even greater authority 
than to the written law. They pretended that Moses 
received from God two laws, one written, the other 
oral; that this oral law had been handed down uncor- 
rupted from generation to generation, and was to be 
taken as a supplement and explanation of the written law, 
which they represented to be in many places obscure 
and defective. But from the frequent reproaches ad- 
dressed to them on this point by our Saviour, it is 
evident that under pretence of explaining the law by 
their traditions, they had in reality made it of none 
effect. Their religion consisted chiefly in the observance 
of external ceremonies; in ablutions and purifications; 
in frequent fasting, and long prayers which they made 
ostentatiously in public places ; in avoidance of all com- 
munication with reputed sinners; in scrupulous payment 
of tithe of the least thing; and in rigorous observance 
of the sabbath, so as to reckon it unlawful to pluck a few 
ears of corn, or to heal the sick on that day. In order to 
attract attention, they made broad their phylacteries e , and 
enlarged the fringes of their garments. By this outward 
appearance of sanctity they gained the esteem and venera- 
tion of the multitude : but omitting the weightier matters 

d Jos. Ant. Book XIII. Chap, xviii. 

e Phylactery (derived from (pvXdrToi) signifies a memorial or 
a preservative. Phylacteries were long and narrow pieces of parch- 
ment, on which were written passages out of Exodus and Deuter- 
onomy. These they bound,' to their foreheads and left-arms, in 
memory of the law. 



37 

6i thfc law, judgment, mercy, and faith, and veiling pride, 
malice, and impurity under the garb of extraordinary 
piety, they were frequently rebuked by Christ in the most 
severe language as a generation of hypocrites. 

Their doctrines, though more pure than their practice, 
were mingled with much error. On the subject of 
predestination and free will they were opposed to the 
Sadducees, but their own opinions are no where clearly 
stated so as to be intelligible. According to Josephus, 
they ascribed all things to God and fate, and yet left to 
man in many things the freedom of his will f . How they 
made one part of this doctrine compatible with the other 
is not explained. The Holy Scripture testifies that they 
believed in the resurrection, and in the existence of angels 
and spirits g . But from the account given by Josephus, it 
seems probable that their opinion respecting these matters 
was derived not from the Holy Scriptures but from the 
philosophy of Pythagoras, and that the resurrection meant 
by them was the transmigration of the souls of good men 
into other bodies h . This notion had become prevalent in 
Judaea in the time of Christ, and according to it, his 
disciples asked him in the case of the man that was born 
blind, " who did sin, this man (that is, this man in some 
antecedent state of being) or his parents, that he was born 
blind?" And when the Jews were forming conjectures on 
the character of our Saviour, some said that he was Elias, 
others Jeremias, or one of the prophets: that is, they 
thought that the soul of one of these had re-appeared in 
him. It remained for Christ himself, who brought life 
and immortality to light, to teach the true resurrection of 
the body and soul together. 



f Jos. de Bell. Jud. Book II. Chap. vii. s Acts xxiii. 8. 

h Jos. ibid. 

D 



3$ 

S. A third sect among the Jews was that of 

iliSSBTlCS 

the Essenes. Of these there is a full account in 
Josephus and Philo, who are very copious in praising 
them; but they are no where mentioned in Scripture^ 
probably because, living chiefly in solitude and taking no 
part in public affairs> they did not fall under our Saviour's 
notice. Their number also was small : Philo says that 
there were about 4000 of them in Syria and Palestine. 
It is supposed that they had their origin in the time of 
Antiochus Epiphanes, by whose tyranny great numbers 
of the Jews were driven into the wilderness, and became 
inured to a temperate and laborious mode of life. Philo 
divides them into two classes, the practical, who lived in 
Judaea and Syria, and the contemplative, who were dis- 
persed through many parts of the world, but were most 
numerous in Egypt. The practical Essenes did not alto- 
gether abandon the society of the rest of mankind, and in 
some respects were less rigid than the contemplative; sub- 
stantially, however, their maxims were the same. They 
believed in the immortality of the soul, and held the Scrip- 
tures in the highest reverence, but considered them as 
mystic writings and expounded them allegorically. It does 
not appear that they placed any reliance upon tradition. 
They sent gifts to the temple, but offered no sacrifices. 
They held the doctrine of absolute predestination, not 
allowing that man has freedom of will in any of his 
actions. In the regulations of their society they observed 
the greatest strictness. None gained full admission 
among them till after a probation of three years. In 
their mode of living they were extremely temperate ; they 
attended to no secular occupation except agriculture, and 
held all things in common. All were considered equal; 
yet great order was maintained among them, by means 
of the voluntary respect which they paid to the elders. 



39 

Although no express mention is made of this sect in 
the New Testament,, it is supposed that they are alluded 
to both by our Saviour and St. Paul 1 . If this supposition 
be correct, they are spoken of, by the apostle at least, 
with disapprobation. It is clear indeed, even from the 
favourable description of them given by Josephus and 
Philo, that they were led into many superstitious usages, 
and indulged in fanciful and enthusiastic speculations. 
It is remarked by Prideaux that almost all their 
peculiar tenets are condemned by the spirit of Christi- 
anity 11 . Such were their "voluntary humility" and 
" neglecting the body/' their superstitious washings, their 
abstinence from meats which God created for man's use, 
and other like usages which God never required of them. 
And, in maintaining that men are bound down in all their 
actions by irresistible fate and necessity, they destroyed 
the very foundations of religion and virtue. 

4. These are the three sects into which the Jews were 
divided. There were among them other classes of men 
not distinguished by peculiar religious tenets, but either 
professional, as the scribes and publicans, or political, as 
the Herodians and Galileans. 

Scribes, doctors of the law, and lawyers, appear 
to have been different names for the same class of 
persons. The scribes are mentioned very early in the 
Sacred History l . Their occupation originally was to tran- 
scribe copies of the law, as their name imports ; but, from 
the knowledge thus acquired, they soon became in- 
structors of the people, and were made judges in their 
sanhedrims, or teachers in their schools and synagogues. 
Most of them were attached to the sect of the Phari- 



1 Matt. xix. 12. Col. ii. 18— 2a. * Prideaux, Part II. Book 5. 
J % Sam. viii. 17. 

V2 



40 

sees, for they were the authors of those numberless com- 
ments and opinions which the Pharisees received as tra- 
ditions transmitted by Moses ; and the learning and skill 
of the scribes were chiefly exercised in explaining the 
oral law which they had themselves fabricated. 

5. The publicans were employed by the Romans 
to collect the taxes and customs. The Roman 
publicans are mentioned by Cicero as being the flower of 
the equestrian order m ; but those were probably men who 
farmed the revenues of whole provinces, and certainly very 
different from the class so often introduced under the title 
of publicans in the New Testament. These were inferior 
agents, generally Jews of low condition, whose office was 
accounted disreputable. The people bore with extreme 
impatience the taxes imposed by the Romans, and there- 
fore all who were engaged in collecting them were 
viewed with hatred, especially their own countrymen, 
whom they regarded as traitors that were conspiring with 
the Romans to enslave their nation. And this feeling was 
aggravated by the extortions practised, and by the rigorous 
manner in which the taxes were usually exacted. Hence 
the whole body was held in detestation, insomuch that the 
Pharisees imputed it as a great crime to our Saviour that 
he sat at meat with . Publicans, whom they themselves 
avoided with abhorrence. 

' ,. 6. Respecting the Herodians, whom we find 

HcvodicLiis 

mentioned in the gospels as having gone with 

the Pharisees to ensnare Christ 11 , we have no means of 

determining by what peculiar opinions they were distin-^ 

guished. Some have thought that they were so called 

because they believed Herod to be the Messiah; others, 

with more probability, that they were a set of men attached 

» Orat. pro. Plancio. n Matt. xxii. 16. Mark xii. 13. 



41 

to the family of Herod, and followers of his policy. It is 

probable that like him they advocated submission to 

the Romans, by whose support Herod was made and 

continued king, and also were inclined to conform to 

the Roman customs and the forms of heathen worship 

in particulars which the Jewish law would not allow. 

It is further probable that they were chiefly of the sect 

of the Sadducees, since that which is called in one 

gospel the leaven of the Sadducees, is called in another 

the leaven of Herod . 

7- The Galilaeans were a political faction 
Galilceans. , . . _ . . . , ., 

which had its origin at the time when Cyrenius, 

after the expulsion of Arehelaus, first laid a tax upon 

Judaea. They were distinguished by an extreme zeal for 

liberty, but in all their principles they accorded entirely 

with the Pharisees. Their chief was one Judas of Galilee 

who laboured to excite the people to rebellion, alleging 

that submission to the tax would be an acknowledgement 

of slavery and inconsistent with their duty to God, 

who was their only sovereign. Topics of this sort 

operated upon the Jews with peculiar force at this 

time, when their expectation of a Messiah, or triumphant 

deliverer, inspired them with disdain as well as hatred 

of the Roman yoke. Judas perished, and his followers 

were for a time dispersed p.* but he may be considered 

as one of the earliest and chief movers of that spirit of 

turbulence which became general among the people and 

was not extinguished till it had wrought the ruin of the 

Jewish nation. 

_ 8. Frequent mention is made in the New 

Proselytes. ^ ^ 

lestament 01 proselytes, lnese were Gentiles 

who embraced the Jewish religion either in whole or in 

e Matt. xvi. 6. Mark viii. 15. P Acts v. 36. 

d3 



42 

part; for they are usually divided into two sorts, Pro- 
selytes of the gate, and Proselytes of righteousness. 
The former were permitted by the Jews to live within 
their gates, without being bound to the whole law, 
but only to comply with the seven precepts, which, as 
the Jewish writers pretend, God gave to Adam and 
afterwards to Noah, who transmitted them to posterity. 
These precepts were (1) To abstain from idolatry; (2) 
from blasphemy; (3) from murder; (4) from adultery; 
(5) from theft; (6) to appoint upright judges ; (7) not to 
eat the flesh cut off from any animal while it retained 
life. They were allowed to worship in the temple, but 
were forbidden to enter farther than into the outer 
court, which was called the court of the Gentiles. It 
does not appear that any ceremony was performed on 
the admission of Proselytes of this order. 

The Proselytes of righteousness, or, as they are 
sometimes called, Proselytes of the covenant, undertook 
the observance of the whole law, and were initiated 
with three ceremonies, circumcision, baptism, and a 
sacrifice: after which they were admitted as adopted 
children to all the ceremonies and religious privileges 
used by the Jews. But though they were thus adopted, 
and though great zeal was shewn, especially by the 
Pharisees, in making proselytes, yet they were consi- 
dered inferior to those who were Jews by birth and 
descent, were admitted to no office, and were treated in 
general with great contempt. 

It must be added that this distinction of the prose- 
lytes into two classes rests upon the authority of ancient 
Jewish writers, but in the Scriptures there does not 
appear to be any foundation for it. Hence, some are 
of opinion that proselytes were those, and those only, 
who took upon themselves the obligation of the whole 



43 

Mosaic law. Gentiles were allowed to worship in the 
outer court of the temple, and some of them probably 
renounced idolatry without embracing the Mosaic law; 
but such persons do not appear to be called proselytes, 
in Scripture or in any ancient Christian writer q . 

q Lardner, vol. VI. p. 522. Tomline, vol. I. p. 266. 









CHAPTER IV. 



ON THE JEWISH PRIESTHOOD. 



1. It has been already stated that when the pro- 
mised land was divided among the tribes, no allotment 
was made to the tribe of Levi, because the Levites were 
appointed to the service of religion, and a peculiar kind 
of provision was made for them. In the earliest times 
the priesthood appears to have belonged to the first-born 
of every family ; and when God smote all the first-born 
of the Egyptians but spared those of the Israelites, he 
was pleased to ordain that for the future all the first-born 
males should be set apart unto himself, that the memory 
of the miracle and of their deliverance from bondage 
might thereby be preserved. But when the tribe of 
Levi on a remarkable occasion discovered great zeal 
against idolatry, he appointed that whole tribe, instead 
of the first-born of Israel, to the honour of attending 
his immediate service a . On their first institution in the 
wilderness, their chief duty consisted in taking down 
the tabernacle, carrying it about with all the instruments 
and sacred vessels belonging to it as the Israelites 
removed from place to place, and setting it up again 
when they pitched their tents. But when the Israelites 
were settled in Canaan, and the tabernacle was no longer 
carried about as before, the service of the Levites was 

a Exod. xxxii. 26. 



45 

changed,, and required less bodily labour. On which 
account, from the time of David, they entered on the 
discharge of their duty at an earlier age, and continued 
in it later, than according to the original appointment 
of Moses. They were from the beginning divided into 
three classes, Gershonites, Kohathites, and Merarites, so 
called from Gershon, Kohath and Merari who were the 
sons of Levi. Each of these classes had its peculiar 
duties. When David had fixed the tabernacle at Jeru- 
salem, he added several regulations respecting their 
different employments, and made a new division of them. 
The tribe was numbered by his order, and (without 
including the priests) was found to contain 38,000 men, 
from the age of 30 years and upwards 6000 of these 
were made officers and judges. The rest were divided 
into three equal classes. To one class (containing 
54,000) he assigned the duty of assisting the priests by 
preparing flour, wine and oil for the sacrifice, and other 
services of that kind ; the second class (containing 4000) 
had to perform the music prescribed in the divine service ; 
and the third (containing 4000) had to keep a constant 
guard about the temple. Each of these classes was 
divided into 24 courses, which in successive weeks 
attended to the duty. While one course was attending 
to the service of the temple, the rest were dispersed 
among the tribes, in the 48 cities which were allotted 
for their residence. They were then occupied in teaching 
the people, and explaining to them the law : they also 
kept the public records and the genealogies of the several 
tribes. 

Those who were on duty at the temple had 
Nethinim. * . J 

under them some persons called Nethinim, that 



b 1 Chron. xxiii. 3. 



46 

is, given ; because they were given to them as servants. 
Their business was to carry the water and wood, and what- 
ever else was wanted in the temple. The Gibeonites were 
at first employed in this work, as a punishment for the 
artifice by which they obtained a league of peace with the 
Israelites ; and those who in subsequent times continued 
to be condemned to this servitude were probably the 
descendants of these, along with some of the captives 
from other nations. 

2. The priests, who were to be taken from a 
Pvicsts 

particular family of the tribe of Levi, viz. that of 

Aaron, were appointed to an office more sacred and of 
higher dignity than the common Levites. They also were 
divided into 24 courses, which performed the divine 
service weekly by turns. Each of them had a president; 
and it is probable that these presidents were the same as 
the chief priests so often mentioned in the New Testa- 
ment. The order in which the courses were to serve 
was determined by lot; and each course was, in all 
succeeding ages, called by the name of him who was its 
president at the time of the first division. Thus Zacha- 
rias is said by St. Luke to be of the course of Abia, 
because Abia was president of the course in the time of 
David. The whole number of Priests in David's time 
was probably about 5000, but when Josephus wrote, 
there were not less than four times that number d . Since 
the law enjoined that they should belong to a particular 
family, all who aspired to the office were required to 
establish their descent from that family; on which account 
the genealogies of the priests were inscribed in the public 
registers and preserved in the temple. It was necessary 
also, before they were admitted to the office, that they 

& Josh, ix, d Jos. contr. Ap. cap. 2. ' 



47 

should be declared free from bodily blemish, and be 

purified from any legal pollutions which they might have 

contracted. Celibacy was not enjoined upon any of the 

sacerdotal order, but the law respecting marriage was 

in some particulars more strict to them than to the 

common people. 

The duties which they had to perform were of great 

variety, and were assigned by lot four times every day 

to those whose turn it was to be in attendance. It was 

their business to serve immediately at the altar and offer 

the sacrifices; to guard the inner part of the temple; 

to light the lamps in the sanctuary ; to burn the incense ; 

to keep a continual fire upon the altar of burnt-offerings, 

and to offer the loaves of shew-bread, which were 

changed every sabbath. Other important parts of the 

priestly office were : to preserve the volumes of the law, 

and pronounce a blessing on the people in the name of 

God; to instruct the people; to judge of controversies, 

of leprosy and other pollutions, and of the fitness or 

unfitness of victims ; to fix the price of redemption for 

the persons and things that were devoted to God; to 

proclaim the sabbath and solemn feasts; to call assemblies, 

and in war to animate the people. These and other 

duties were assigned to them and specified with great 

minuteness. 

3. There were among them several degrees 
High Priest. „ ,. . - , , ,- • * i i 

of distinction and subordination. At the head 

was the high priest, who had great authority, being ac- 
counted next in rank to the king or prince, and sometimes 
uniting the regal and pontifical dignities in his own person. 
After the institution of the Sanhedrim, he was generally 
the president of it. Aaron was the first person appointed 
to the high priesthood. From him it passed to Eleazar 
his eldest son, whose descendants held it through several 



48 

successions till the time of Eli, who was of the family 
of Ithamar, Aaron's second son, and was the first in that 
line who was made high priest. In the reign of Solomon, 
it returned into the family of Eleazar in the person of 
Zadok, and remained in it until the Babylonian captivity. 
During this period the high priest was usually elected 
by the other priests, or by an assembly consisting chiefly 
of priests; but sometimes by the king. Thus Zadok 
was appointed by Solomon in the room of Abiathar, 
whom Solomon had deposed 6 . After the captivity, they 
were generally appointed by the kings of the countries 
to which Judaea was subject. According to law, the 
office was held for life. But under the Roman govern- 
ment this was disregarded, and the dignity and authority 
of the high priest were greatly reduced. The office was 
now frequently transferred from one to another according 
to the caprice or interest of those who held the supreme 
power, and was given or sold to young, illiterate, and 
obscure persons, sometimes even to men who were not 
of the sacerdotal race. Very different from this was 
the care taken in earlier times to support the honour of 
this sacred office. According to the Law of Moses, if 
any one, not of the family of Aaron, attempted to execute 
the duties of the high priest, he was put to ddath. It 
was necessary also that he should be of an honourable 
family, and that he himself should be perfectly without 
blemish. The strictest injunctions were given by Moses 
with regard to the purity both of him and of his family. 

He was consecrated, on his institution to the office, 
with a solemnity suited to his sacred character. (1) He 
was presented to the Lord at the door of the tabernacle, 
in the presence of all the people: (2) he was purified 



e 1 



Kirres ii- 35. 



49 

with water; (3) he was invested with the pontifical 
garments, which were of great splendour, and different 
from those of the other priests; (4) he offered various 
sacrifices; lastly, he was anointed with the sacred oil, 
the composition of which was prescribed by God, and was 
not to be used for any other purpose. These ceremonies 
were repeated seven days successively. The other priests 
and even the common Levites were also consecrated, on 
their admission to office, with particular ceremonies. The 
Levites were distinguished from the rest of the Israelites 
by a robe of white linen ; but all ranks of the sacerdotal 
order put off the vestments peculiar to them, when they 
were not engaged in the divine service. 

The high priest could perform any of the functions 
of the other priests, but that which peculiarly pertained 
to him was to make expiation for the people ; which he 
did once a year with great solemnity in the Holy of 
Holies. It was also granted to him alone to consult the 
oracle of God in the sanctuary; but in the second temple 
this mode of declaring the divine will was discontinued. 
When he was incapable of attending the service through 
sickness or any legal pollution, a deputy called Sagan 
was appointed to supply his place. Some think that the 
office of the Sagan was not occasional but permanent, and 
that it was his business to assist the high priest generally, 
in superintending the service and the affairs of the temple. 
The title of high priest seems to have been sometimes 
given to this officer; which will explain an expression 
of St. Luke who mentions Annas and Caiaphas as being 
high priests at the same time f . Annas was probably the 
Sagan. It is probable also that when the office was 



f Luke iii. 2. 
E 



50 

transferred from one to another, those who had once held 
it retained the title after they had resigned the power. 

The Jewish writers mention other sorts of sacerdotal 
officers superior to common priests, but inferior to the 
high priest and Sagan. It was the business of the priest 
of the camp to exhort the army. There were two, called 
Catholics, who were assistants or substitutes for the Sagan, 
and were next to him in station and honour ; and seven, 
who kept the keys of the court of the priests. To others 
were committed the sacred vessels and vestments, the 
treasures of the temple, and the revenues arising from the 
oblations : regulations of this sort being absolutely neces- 
sary in a service of such great length and variety. 
Mention is made of another sort of ecclesiastical persons 
called stationary men : these were chosen out of the several 
tribes as representatives to attend at the sacrifices offered 
for all Israel ,* the Law requiring that the persons for 
w T hom sacrifices were offered should be present at the 
offering. But it being impossible that all the people 
should be present, representatives were chosen for the 
whole body, who were divided, like the priests and 
Levites, into twenty-four courses, and attended by rotation. 
4. As the tribe of Levi was to be interspersed 
among the other tribes, and was prevented by 
an express law from having any share in the division of 
the country, it remains to be stated in what places they 
dwelt, and what provision was made for their subsistence. 
Forty-eight cities, with their suburbs, were assigned to 
them : of which thirteen belonged to the priests and were 
all situated near Jerusalem, one belonging to the tribe of 
Simeon, four to Benjamin, and eight to Judah. Some of 
the cities of the Levites were fixed among each of the 
other tribes, in order that being dispersed they might 
more conveniently perform the duties to which they were 



51 

appointed. Around the cities a small portion of land was 
given them for gardens, fields and vineyards, from the 
produce of which arose part of their subsistence, when 
they were not attending at the temple: but their chief 
support was derived from the tithes which the Law 
allotted to them; — a tenth of all the vegetable produce 
of the earth and also of the cattle. The Levites collected 
these tithes and gave a tenth of them to the priests. 
There were many other sources of revenue for the sup- 
port of the national worship. The first-born of living 
creatures and the first-fruits of all kinds of corn and 
fruit were consecrated to God. A price of redemption 
was paid for the first-born of men and of unclean animals. 
To the priests were assigned also certain parts of many 
of the victims that were offered in sacrifice. It must 
be remarked, however, that some portion of the payments 
above-mentioned was applied not directly as a provision 
for the priests and Levites, but for the building, the 
ornaments, and other public expences of the temple. 
Nor can it be doubted, that the revenues prescribed by 
the divine Law were adequate both to support the dig- 
nity of the service, and to relieve its ministers from all 
secular employment, that they might devote themselves 
wholly to the discharge of their sacred duties. 

Of the cities assigned to the Levites, three on each 
side of Jordan were appointed to be cities of refuge 
for those who had committed involuntary homicide. 
When a person who had caused the death of another 
fled to one of these, the judges proceeded to examine 
whether the act had been committed designedly or not. 
If designedly, he was condemned to death; if not, he 
remained in the city of refuge till the death of the high 
priest, when he was at liberty to return home. 

5. These regulations with regard to the tribe of 
e2 



52 

Levi afford a striking proof of the divine wisdom of 
their author, and certainly have no parallel in any system 
of heathen legislation. It is true, soothsayers and diviners 
and ministers of religion were found in every State; 
but they attempted nothing beyond the performance 
of religious ceremonies, or employing the influence which 
their sacred functions gave them to promote private gain 
or the schemes of political parties : to instruct the people, 
they seem not to have considered any part of their duty. 
But the Jewish legislator set apart the entire tribe of 
Levi, one-twelfth of the nation, not merely to perform 
the rites and sacrifices which the ritual enjoined, but 
to diffuse among the people religious and moral instruc- 
tion. For this purpose the peculiar situation and 
privileges of the tribe of Levi admirably fitted them. 
Possessing no landed property, but supported by tithes 
and offerings, they were little occupied with labour or 
secular care: they were also deeply interested in the 
support of the worship and laws of God, since if these 
were neglected, the sources of their maintenance would 
necessarily fail. Their cities being dispersed through 
all the tribes, they were every where at hand to admonish 
and instruct : exclusively possessed of all religious offices, 
taking a large part in the administration of justice, and 
guardians of the cities of refuge to which those who were 
guilty of homicide fled for an asylum,, they must have 
acquired such influence as could not fail to secure attention 
to their instructions. Thus circumstanced, they were 
assuredly well calculated to answer the purpose of their 
institution, to preserve the union of all the other tribes, 
and to promote their improvement in knowledge, virtue, 
and piety. Considering indeed the rank of the priests 
and Levites, as ministers of religion, as the men of 
best understanding and knowledge in the laws, as of 



53 

great interest in the nation, and influence in the adminis- 
tration of justice, an apprehension might arise that the 
power committed to them was too great to be possessed 
by a single tribe. But this danger was effectually guarded 
against by the manner in which they were dispersed 
among the other tribes. They were so separated from 
one another, that they could not prosecute in concert 
any ambitious design: and it was in the power of the 
people, on suspicion of any ill designs of the Levites, 
to put a stop to their means of subsistence, and seize 
on all their persons at once. Hence, whatever power 
the Constitution gave them to do good, the same carefully 
provided to put it out of their power to do harm, either 
in disturbing the peace or endangering the liberties of 
their country g . 

* Graves, Vol. I. p. 294. Lowman, ch. vi. 



e3 



CHAPTER V. 



ON THE JEWISH SACRIFICES. 



It cannot be determined with certainty that sacrifice 
was offered originally by the command of God ; this being 
a point on which the Scriptures are silent. But that 
it was so, may reasonably he inferred from the strong 
attestation which God gave of his acceptance of sacrifice 
in the case of Abel, again in that of Noah, afterwards 
in that of Abraham, and above all, from the systematic 
establishment of it by divine authority in the dispensation 
of Moses. We are warranted by Scripture in concluding 
that the sacrifices prescribed in the Mosaic law, were 
ordained by God as a type of the sacrifice of Christ a ; 
this being a true and effective sacrifice, whilst those of 
the law were but faint representations intended for its 
introduction. It is probable, therefore, that the rite was 
at the beginning ordained by God, as a type of that 
great sacrifice in which all others were to have their 
consummation b . The object of the Mosaic sacrifices was 
principally typical ; but the institution of them compre- 
hended other excellent uses, besides that for which we 
have authority to believe that they were principally 
designed. 

It is not however intended to treat, in this chapter, 
of the origin or design of sacrifice; — subjects which admit 

* Heb. ix. and x, b Magee, Vol. I. p. 46. 



55 

of much discussion ; but to give a brief account of the 
principal offerings and sacrifices prescribed by Moses, 
what they were and on what occasions presented. They 
may be classed under two general heads, bloody offerings, 
or sacrifices strictly so called; and unbloody offerings, as 
of corn, wine, and perfumes. 

1. Bloody offerings were subdivided into three sorts: 
(1) whole burnt-offerings, (2) sin or trespass- offerings, 
(3) peace-offerings. A whole burnt-offering, was the most 
excellent of all the sacrifices, since it was all consecrated 
to God, the victim being wholly consumed upon the 
altar; whereas some parts of the others belonged to the 
priests, and to those who offered the victims. Of this kind 
was the daily sacrifice : four lambs, all of the first year, 
were offered every day, two in the morning, and two 
in the evening. The whole burnt-offering seems to have 
been the most ancient kind of sacrifice, since we find 
that it was offered by Noah, Abraham, and other 
patriarchs . It is not stated in the Bible what was 
the peculiar design of it: but as we are taught by 
St. Paul that the sacrifices under the law were 
typical of the great sacrifice of Christ, the whole burnt- 
offering appears to be a type particularly expressive, 
since nothing less than the full and perfect sacrifice 
of the Son of God could atone for the sins of the 
world. 

Between sin-offerings and trespass-offerings, there 
seems to have been little difference. Some suppose 
that sin-offerings were for acts which were admitted to 
be against the law, but had been done undesignedly; 
and that trespass-offerings were for acts respecting which 
there was reason to doubt whether they were sinful or 

c Gen. viii. 10. and xxii. 13. Job i. 5. 



56 

not. Others think that sin-offerings were made for 
sins of commission ; and trespass-offerings for sins of 
omission d . In both of them, the person who offered 
the sacrifice placed his hands on the victim's head, 
and confessed his sin or trespass over it, saying, " I have 
sinned, I have trespassed, and do return,, by repentance 
before thee, and with this I make atonement." The 
victim was then considered as bearing the sins of the 
person by whom it was offered, who received forgiveness 
from God upon condition of repentance, without which 
there could be no remission. The appointed occasions 
for these offerings were not only for acts of sin or 
trespass, but also on account of certain legal pollutions, 
as at the purification of a leper, of a woman after child- 
birth, and others which the law specified. There were 
also sin-offerings of a more solemn nature offered on 
extraordinary occasions, not on the altar but without 
the camp. Such was the sacrifice of the red heifer, 
whose ashes mixed with water, served to purify those 
who had been polluted by touching a dead body e . The 
heifer was to be carried out of the camp, where the 
high priest killed it, and sprinkled of the blood seven 
times towards the sanctuary: it was then burnt, and 
the ashes were gathered and laid up for use. Whoever 
had touched a dead body was to be sprinkled with water, 
with which some of these ashes had been mixed. As 
Jerusalem became afterwards to the Jews, what the camp 
had been during their abode in the wilderness, those 
victims which were ordered to be burnt without the 
camp, were, after the building of the temple, to be 
burnt beyond the walls of the city. Wherefore Jesus 

d Mich, on the Laws of Moses, Art. 187. 
e Numb. xix. 



57 

also,, says the Apostle, suffered without the gate, that 
he might sanctify the people with his own blood f . 

Peace-offerings were so called, because they were 
offered in token of peace between God and man. Whole 
burnt-offerings and sin or trespass-offerings were made 
under the notion of some guilt having been contracted, 
which they were the means of removing ; but in peace- 
offerings, the offerer was supposed to be at peace with 
God, and they were made either as an acknowledgement 
for mercies received, or as joined with supplication for 
further blessings. 

With respect to all the three kinds of sacrifices, it 
may be observed that there were only five sorts of 
animals which could be offered, viz. oxen, sheep, goats ; 
and among birds, pigeons and turtle-doves. In the 
selection of victims, the utmost care was taken to choose 
such as were free from blemish. Sacrifices at first 
were offered at the door of the tabernacle; but after 
the temple was built, it was unlawful to sacrifice any 
where but in it, except in one or two specified cases g : 
(It seems however that this command was frequently 
transgressed, even under the best of the Jewish kings h .) 
The law required that all the victims should be sprinkled 
with salt before they were laid on the altar, and that 
the priest should sprinkle the blood upon the altar, 
which was the most essential part of the sacrifice; for 
the blood is the life, and by the sprinkling of it the 
atonement was made. In common sin-offerings and in 
peace-offerings the fat alone was burnt: in sin-offerings 
all the flesh belonged to the priest; in peace-offerings the 

f Heb. xiii. 12. 

« Deut. xii. 3— -14. Levit. xiv. 49. Deut. xxi. Numb. xix. 2. 

h 1 Kings xxii. 43. 2 Kings xii. 3. xiv. 4. xv. 4. Mich. Art. 188. 



58 

breast and right- shoulder belonged to the priest, and the 
rest to the person who made the offering. 

2. Unbloody offerings, which are called in the Bible 
meal-offerings, consisted of meal, bread, cakes, ears of 
corn, and parched grain, accompanied with libations of 
wine and sometimes mixed with oil and frankincense. 
They were offered along with the bloody sacrifices; a 
certain quantity of flour, wine, and oil, being presented 
with every animal that was sacrificed. The wine was 
partly poured upon the brow of the victim to consecrate 
it, and part of it was allotted to the priests. Some of 
these offerings were also presented singly and apart, as 
(1) those which were offered as sin-offerings by the poor, 
whose means were not sufficient to provide two turtle- 
doves or two young pigeons; (2) incense, consisting of 
several spices which are specified in the law 1 : this was 
offered in the sanctuary every morning and evening by the 
priests, and once a year by the high priest in the Holy 
of Holies ; (3) the shew-bread, twelve loaves of which 
were placed every sabbath on the golden table in the 
sanctuary ; (4) the sheaf of the first-fruits of the harvest, 
offered at the celebration of the passover ; (5) two loaves of 
leavened bread offered at the feast of pentecost. 

Various oblations which the law prescribed may be 
classed under the head of unbloody offerings. The firsts 
fruits of corn, wine, and oil, were consecrated to God for 
the use of the priests. They had also the first of the 
fleece of sheep k . The Law did not fix the quantity of 
these first-fruits: the liberal gave a fortieth and even a 
thirtieth, others a sixtieth part. After the first-fruits 
were offered, every one paid the tenth of his produce to 
the Levites, who gave a tenth of what they received to 



Exod. xxx. 34. k Deut. xviii. 4. 






59 

the priests. Besides this tithe which the people paid 
to the Levites, they set apart another tenth., which was 
carried to Jerusalem and consumed with festivity in the 
temple, as a token of thankfulness to God. To these feasts 
they were required to invite the Levites, widows, orphans, 
strangers, the poor, and their own servants, and thus give 
them a day of rejoicing. But every third year, instead 
of carrying this tithe to Jerusalem, the owner kept the 
feast at home, in order that such of the poor as were aged 
and infirm might not be wholly excluded from this feast 
of thanksgiving. 



The laws relative to sacrifices and offerings 
Synagogues. ... _ _ _, . . . 

were delivered by Moses with great minute- 
ness, and in the observance of them consisted the national 
worship of the Jews. If it should be thought that the mul- 
tiplicity of them must have formed a system exceedingly 
burdensome to the people, let it be remembered that it 
was administered by a body of men set apart for the duty, 
and that it was a ritual of national, not of personal 
worship, limited to one temple and one altar at the place 
which God had chosen. It was not established in towns 
and cities throughout the land, and therefore could not 
be designed to be a system of individual or of family 
devotion for the whole Jewish people. In regard to 
this, it is necessary to make a distinction between the 
worship in the temple and that which was performed in 
the synagogues. These were instituted at a much later 
period, and probably originated in the. public reading 
of the Law after the sacred writings had been collected 
by Ezra. Conscious that the calamities which had be- 
fallen the people arose from their wickedness, and that 
this was greatly owing to their ignorance of the Scrip- 
tures, they were led to the institution of synagogues, one 



60 

in every place where there were ten persons of sufficient 
age and leisure,, that the people might meet for prayer, 
and hear the Scriptures read and explained. The syna- 
gogues were opened three days in the week, and thrice 
on each of those days. The Pentateuch was divided 
into sections, and the reading of them so arranged that 
the whole was finished at the end of the year. The 
other sacred writings were not all read, but at every 
meeting such parts were selected as had relation to 
what had been previously read from the books of Moses. 
The ministration of this service was ,not confined to the 
sacerdotal order, but was committed to any one of com- 
petent learning. But, that order might be preserved, 
elders were appointed in every synagogue, who were 
solemnly admitted to their office by the imposition of 
hands. In the New Testament these are called rulers 
of the synagogue. Next to them was the minister, 
whose office it was to offer up public prayers to God 
for the congregation. There were other inferior minis- 
ters, who had the care of the sacred books, and of the 
building and all things belonging to it. The service 
consisted of prayers, reading and expounding the Scrip- 
tures, and preaching. For the prayers they had public 
liturgies. When the time came for reading the Scriptures, 
the rulers of the synagogue called out some one to 
officiate; a priest first, and then a Levite, if such were 
present, and then any other of the people, till the number 
seven was completed. Hence every section of the law 
Was divided into seven parts, each reader having his 
assigned portion. As Hebrew had ceased to be the com- 
mon language, an interpreter was appointed, whose duty 
consisted in interpreting the lessons into Chaldee, as they 
were read to the congregation in Hebrew. It does not 
appear that any fixed ministers were appointed for ex- 



61 

pounding the Scriptures and for preaching : this duty was 
done by the scribes or any learned men, authorized by 
the rulers of the synagogue without any permanent 
appointment. 

It is remarkable that after the Babylonian captivity 
the Jews were strongly averse to idolatry, though they 
had been very prone to it before that event : the probable 
reason of which appears to be that after the captivity 
a greater knowledge of the Holy Scriptures was diffused 
among them by means of the institutions above-mentioned. 
While they had no places for public worship or instruc- 
tion, except the temple at Jerusalem or the cities of the 
Levites, the laws of God were imperfectly known, and on 
that account the people were easily misled to adopt the 
usages of neighbouring nations. But when in every city 
synagogues were erected in which the Holy Scriptures 
were read, and the people regularly instructed in their 
duty and exhorted to the performance of it, an abiding 
dread of God's displeasure was impressed upon their 
minds, and the seductions of idolatry were opposed by an 
effectual barrier 1 . 



Graves, Vol. I. p. 328. Prideaux, Part I. Book 6. 



CHAPTER VI. 



ON THE JEWISH FESTIVALS. 



1. The year was distinguished by the Jews into the 
civil and the ecclesiastical year. The civil year began 
with the month Tisri, about the middle of our September ; 
there being an ancient tradition among them that the 
world was created at that time. All contracts were dated 
and the Jubilees computed according to this year. The 
ecclesiastical year began with the month Nisan or Abib, 
about the middle of our March; that being the time of 
the year when the Israelites came out of Egypt. 

The beginnings of their months were not determined 
by astronomical rules, but by the phasis or actual appear- 
ance of the new moon; and their ordinary year consisted 
of twelve of these lunar months. But since the sum of 
them fell short of the solar year by eleven days,, it was 
necessary to intercalate an additional month in the third 
year, or sometimes in the second, in order that their 
months, and consequently their festivals, might always 
fall nearly at the same season. It has not been ascer- 
tained with certainty what rule they had for determining 
which new moon should mark the beginning of the year ; 
but, whatever the rule was, they could not make their 
festivals always fall exactly at the same season, according 
to their method of reckoning by lunar months. 

The Jews had two sorts of weeks, the ordinary one 
of seven days, and another of seven years which occurs in 
the prophetic writings and is called a week of years. 



63 

Their days were also distinguished into natural, reckoned 
from one sun-set to another; and artificial or civil, 
reckoned from the rising to the setting of the sun. The 
civil day was divided into four parts, each of which 
consisted of three hours, and therefore, since one of these 
hours was a twelfth part of the time which the sun 
continued above the horizon, their hours in summer were 
longer than in winter. The night was also divided into 
four parts called watches, each consisting of three hours. 
The first began at sun-set and was called the beginning 
of the watches or the evening; the second was called the 
middle watch or midnight; the third the cock-crowing ; the 
fourth the morning 7vatch. 

2. The Jewish Sabbath began at sun-set in the evening 
of Friday, and ended the next day at the same time. 
It was a festival instituted by God in memory of the 
creation of the world, and also as a day of rest for men 
and their cattle, that they might not be exhausted by 
uninterrupted labour. In the first view, it was calculated 
to prevent idolatry and the worshipping of creatures, by 
setting one day apart for the service of the one true God, 
the Creator of all things. As a day of rest, it was 
observed with the utmost strictness : they were forbidden 
to gather the manna which had fallen from heaven, to 
kindle a fire, and to sow or reap a . It was commanded 
that " no man should go out of his place on the sabbath- 
day b ;" that is, according to the interpretation given by 
the Jewish doctors, that no man should go above 2000 
cubits (about two -thirds of a mile) ; which in Scripture 
is called a sabbath-day's journey. Many regulations were 
introduced for which tkere was no authority in the laws 
of Moses. They were taught that it was not lawful to 

a Exod. xvi. 22. xxxv. 3. xxxiv. 21. b Exod. xvi. 29. 

f2 



64 

fight, even in self-defence, on that day. For this notion 
they suffered severely in the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, 
and afterwards from Pompey, who taking advantage of 
their superstition carried forward his works against the 
city on the sabbath without opposition. Our Saviour 
taught us the true meaning of the Law of God concerning 
rest on the sabbath, when he said (e The sabbath was 
made for man, and not man for the sabbath;" that is, 
it was intended for man's benefit, for his rest and religious 
improvement, and not as a yoke of bondage restraining 
him from works of necessity or mercy. 

The law enjoined that the sabbath-day should be kept 
holy. It is not stated in what way, further than by cessation 
from labour, this should be done, except that a sacrifice 
of two lambs was to be offered on that day in addition to 
the morning and evening sacrifices. But reason alone 
taught men that God having reserved this one day for 
his service, it ought to be spent in religious exercises 
and meditation. That the command was understood in 
this sense by the Jews of every age, may be inferred from 
various parts of the Sacred History c . 

The sabbatical year, which was every seventh year, 
was first celebrated by the Jews in the fourteenth year 
after their entrance into Canaan; seven years having 
been spent in conquering and dividing the country, and 
six in the cultivation of it. They were commanded by 
Moses to sow their fields and prune their vineyards, and 
gather the fruit thereof for six years successively, and 
to let the land rest on the seventh d . During the sabba- 
tical year there was a total cessation from agriculture, 
and the spontaneous products of the ground were enjoyed 



c 2 Kings iv. 23. Luke iv. 16. Acts xiii. 14. & xv. 21. Jennings* 
Jewish Antiquities, Book 3. ch. iii. d Levit. xxv. 3, 4. 



65 

in common, by the proprietor of the ground, his servants, 
the stranger that was sojourning with him, and the 
cattle. This then being a year of leisure, Moses com- 
manded the priests the sons of Levi and the elders of 
Israel, that in the solemnity of the year of release in 
the feast of tabernacles the Law should be read before 
all Israel in their hearing, that they might learn to fear 
the Lord their God, and observe to do all the words of 
his law e . The observance of this year further consisted 
in the remission of all debts from one Israelite to another ; 
and, according to some writers, in the release of all 
Hebrew servants; but it is more probable that masters 
were obliged to release their servants at the end of the 
seventh year, whether it happened to be the sabbatical 
year or not; unless they renounced their liberty, and 
made a formal declaration before the judges that they 
voluntarily embraced a continuance of servitude- As 
there was little produce from the land during the 
sabbatical year, it was necessary to make provision for 
it in the six preceding years, and God was pleased to 
promise that he would command his blessing upon the 
land in the sixth year, and that it should bring forth 
fruit for three years f . But the Jews frequently violated 
the laws regarding this institution, which was one 
among their national sins that caused them to be led 
into captivity, that the land might enjoy the sabbaths 
of which it had been defrauded. After they had been 
thus punished for their disobedience, they became scru- 
pulous in observing the law on this subject; but it 
does not appear that God renewed the extraordinary 
blessing which he first promised, and on that account 
the sabbatical year was always a year of scarcity. There- 

e Deut. xxxi. 10. ' Levit. xxv. 21. 

F3 



66 

fore when Christ told his disciples, Pray ye that your 
flight be not on the Sabbath, some have supposed him 
to allude to the sabbatical year, when sustenance could 
not easily be procured, and thence the necessity of 
quitting their habitations would be attended with aggra- 
vated suffering. 

The j ubilee was celebrated every fiftieth year, and 
was similar to the sabbatical year in many of its 
observances. Debts were cancelled, and slaves and 
prisoners set at liberty. Even those mentioned above 
as having submitted to a continuance of servitude, were 
yet made free at the jubilee; for then liberty was to be 
proclaimed throughout all the land to all the inhabitants^ 
Lands which had been sold returned to their original 
proprietors, so that an estate could not be alienated for 
more than fifty years, and therefore no family could be 
sunk in perpetual poverty. From this law, however, 
houses in walled towns were excepted : these were to be 
redeemed within a year, otherwise they belonged to the 
purchaser and could never be reclaimed. The effect of 
the institution of the jubilee was favourable to the poor, 
since it prevented perpetual slavery, and tended to pre- 
serve an equality of possessions. Being also a year of rest 
from labour, since all cultivation of the ground was 
forbidden, its commencement was proclaimed with public 
tokens of joy, and hailed, by the poor at least, with great 
delight. 

3. Of the other Jewish festivals some were of divine, 
and others of human institution. The most solemn of 
those that had been instituted by God were the passover, 
the pentecost, and the feast of tabernacles ; each of which 
was to be celebrated every year at the place which the 

8 Levit. xxv. 10. 






67 

Lord should choose, that is, at Jerusalem after the sanc- 
tuary had been fixed there; and all the Israelites were 
obliged to attend, unless they had good reason for being 
absent. Women were exempt from this obligation, and also, 
it may be presumed, children and old men; but Scripture 
is silent with regard to any fixed limitation of age. 

The passover derived its name from God's 
Passover. . _ 

passing over the houses of the Israelites, and 

sparing their first-born, when those of the Egyptians were 
put to death. The name of passover was given to the lamb 
slain in memory of that deliverance; and sometimes to the 
feast-day on which the paschal lamb was slain, or lastly, to 
the entire continuance of the festival, which commenced 
with the slaying of the lamb and continued for seven days. 
On the fourteenth day of the month Nisan, in the evening, 
the festival began with killing the lamb, which was to be 
a male of the first year, and without blemish. If one 
family was not large enough to eat the whole lamb, two 
or more were united. The victims were slain by persons 
belonging to these several families, and the blood was 
poured by the priests at the bottom of the altar. The 
fat was consumed on the altar, after which the lamb was 
returned to the person by whom it had been offered. 
It was to be roasted whole, without a bone being broken, 
and was to be eaten with unleavened bread and bitter 
herbs. None of it was to remain till the morning: if it 
were not all eaten, that which remained was consumed 
with fire* Those who were prevented by illness or by 
any legal pollution from celebrating the passover on the 
day appointed, were commanded to do it on the four- 
teenth day of the next month 11 . During the whole 
continuance of this festival it was not lawful to eat any 

Numb. ix. 11. 



68 

leavened bread, nor even to have it in their houses ; and 
on that account it is sometimes called in Scripture the 
feast of unleavened bread. In general the fifteenth day 
of the month (but in one or two places the fourteenth, in 
the evening of which the paschal lamb was killed) is 
called the first day of the feast 1 . On the sixteenth was 
offered the sheaf of the first-fruits of the barley-harvest, 
which in Judaea was usually ripe at that season. This 
was done in acknowledgement of the goodness of God 
<c who gives rain, both the former and latter rain, in its 
season, and reserves to men the appointed weeks of 
harvest k ." On all the days of the festival peculiar 
sacrifices were offered in behalf of all the people: but 
the first and last days (the fifteenth and twenty-first) 
were solemnized above the rest by abstaining from servile 
work, and by holding a holy convocation. That the 
passover had a typical reference to our Saviour is inti- 
mated both by St. John and St. Paul 1 . Christ is our 
passover: his blood was shed to protect mankind from the 
divine justice, like as that of the paschal lamb, sprinkled 
on the door-posts of the Israelites, saved their first-born, 
while those of the Egyptians were destroyed. 
Feast of The feast of pentecost (irevTrjKoo-Trj) was so 
Pentecost, called because it was kept on the fiftieth day 
after the feast of unleavened bread, that is, after the fif- 
teenth of the month Nisan. It was sometimes called the 
feast of weeks, because it was celebrated seven weeks after 
the passover ; and also the feast of harvest or of the first- 
fruits, because on it the first-fruits of the wheat-harvest, 
viz. two loaves of leavened bread made of the new corn, 
were offered as a token of thankfulness to God for the 

1 Numb, xxviii, 17. Matt. xxvi. 17. Mark xiv. 12. 

k Jerem. v. 24. 1 John xix. 36. 1 Cor. v. 7. 






69 

bounties of harvest 111 . This offering was accompanied with 
a number of animal sacrifices and with several other offer- 
ings and libations. The festival continued but one day, 
and was kept with great rejoicing. The chief design 
which Moses had in the institution of it seems to have 
been that they might acknowledge the goodness of God in 
giving the fruits of the earth; but it was celebrated by 
the Jews with a further view, viz. in commemoration of 
the Law having been given from mount Sinai on that day. 
And in either view it appears to have had a typical refer- 
ence to the first-fruits of the Holy Spirit, which descended 
upon the Apostles on the day of Pentecost, and enabled 
them to be effectual ministers of the new law of the gospel, 
which its divine Author had recently given for the salva- 
tion of the world 11 . 

Feast of The feast of tabernacles began on the fif- 

Tabernacles. teenth of the month Tisri and lasted seven 
days. It was instituted for a memorial of the Israelites 
having dwelt in tents or tabernacles while they were 
wandering in the desert. The design of it was also to 
return thanks to God for the fruits of the trees, especially 
of the vine, which were gathered about this time, and to 
beg a blessing on those of the ensuing year. On this 
account it was called the feast of in-gathering; and an 
eighth day was added, to which their rejoicings for the 
fruit-harvest appear to have been chiefly appropriated. It 
is probable indeed that the feast of tabernacles was wholly 
distinct from the feast of in-gathering, but as they were 
kept in a continued succession of days, they are mentioned 
as one festival, and the name of either of them is applied 
indifferently to both . The principal ceremonies observed 



Exod. xxiii. 16. Lev. xxiii. 15—21. Numb, xxviii. 26—31. 
Acts. ii. ° Jennings' Antiquities, Book III. Chap. vi. 



70 

were the following: (1) during the festival they dwelt 
in tents, which were placed on the flat roofs of their 
houses; (2) numerous sacrifices were offered peculiar to 
each day of the festival ; (3) they carried in their hands 
branches of palm-trees, olives, myrtles, and willows, 
and with these they walked in procession round the 
altar, singing some words of an appropriate hymn, in 
which they prayed for the coming of the Messiah p ; (4) a 
remarkable libation (not commanded in the law of Moses 
but introduced at some later period) was offered every 
day of the feast, at the time of the morning sacrifice. 
Water drawn from the pool of Siloam, was mixed with 
wine and poured upon the sacrifice as it lay on the altar, 
the people singing in the mean time these words of Isaiah, 
with joy shall ye draw water out of the wells of salvation* 1 . 
Our Saviour is supposed to allude to this ceremony, when 
on the last day, the great day of the feast of tabernacles, 
he stood and cried saying, If any man thirst let him 
come unto me and dri?ik r . 

No festival was attended with greater rejoicings than 
this: and as it happened to take place at the time of 
vintage, some ancient authors were led to believe that 
it was celebrated in honour of Bacchus 8 . 
Fast of 4. The fast of expiation or day of atonement 

Expiation, began in the evening of the ninth day of the 
month Tisri and lasted till the evening of the tenth. It 
differed from the festivals above-mentioned, in that they 
were days of joy and thanksgiving, but this was a day of 
fasting, humiliation, and confession of sins; and it was the 
only one, of that kind, of divine appointment. It was to 
be kept with all the religious regard of a sabbath, and 

p Psal. cxviii. 25. q Isai. xii. 3. r John'vii. 37. 

s Plutarch. Sympos. Lib. IV. quaest. 5. Tacit. Hist. Lib. V. c. 5. 



71 

with the offering of sacrifices,, first for the high priest and 
his family, and then for the people. Of the numerous 
victims offered on this day the most remarkable were the 
two goats which the high priest was to receive from the 
congregation, and to present before the Lord at the door 
of the tabernacle ; casting lots which of the two should be 
sacrificed as a sin-offering, and which should be sent as a 
scape-goat into the wilderness. The service of this day 
was chiefly performed by the high-priest; it being his 
duty to kill and offer the sacrifices, and sprinkle their 
blood with his own hands. This was the only day in the 
year in which he was permitted to enter into the Holy of 
Holies; and therefore he was obliged to prepare himself 
for that great solemnity several days beforehand with par- 
ticular care. On the day of the fast, he first entered with 
a large quantity of incense, that the smoke of it might fill 
the place so as to cover the mercy-seat from sight: he 
then came out and dipped his fingers in the blood of the 
bullock which he had offered for himself, and went and 
sprinkled it towards the mercy-seat seven times. This 
done, he killed the goat as a sin-offering for the people, 
and went and sprinkled the mercy-seat with the blood 
of it as he had done with that of the bullock, and by 
these aspersions the tabernacle was purified from the 
pollution of the people's sins and transgressions. Next, 
the scape-goat was brought to him, and having confessed 
his own sins and those of the whole nation, and laid them 
as it were upon its head, he sent it into the wilderness*. 

The whole of this ceremony had a typical reference 
to the atonement made for the sins of the world by Jesus 
Christ. The expiatory sacrifices were typical of the true 
expiation made by Him ; and the high priest's confessing 

Levit. xvi. 



72 

the sins of the people and laying them upon the head of 
the scape-goat was figurative of the imputation of sin to 
Christ, c ' who was made sin for us" and " on whom is laid 
the iniquity of us all u ." The entering of the high priest 
into the Holy of Holies with the blood of the sacrifice, is 
interpreted by St. Paul to be typical of Christ's ascension 
to heaven, and of his intercession for mankind in virtue 
of the sacrifice of his death x . 

Moses appointed other festivals, which were observed 
with less solemnity than the preceding; and it was not 
required that all the Israelites should be assembled to 
celebrate them at the place of the sanctuary. The new 
moons, that is, the first days of the several months, were 
regarded as holy, yet so that work on them was not 
forbidden. The celebration of them consisted in certain 
additional sacrifices and offerings 7 . But one particular 
new moon was distinguished from the rest and ordered 
to be kept as a sabbath, by the intermission of all manner 
of work. This was the new moon of Tisri, the first 
month of the civil year. It was called the feast of 
trumpets; for besides sounding the trumpets over the 
sacrifices as on other new moons and festivals, this was to 
be "a day of blowing the trumpets/' that is, as the ancient 
Jewish writers understand it, they were to be blown from 
morning to evening, or at least more on this day than on 
any other 2 . The reason of this festival is no where given 
in Scripture. Some have conjectured that it was to 
commemorate the creation of the world, which was sup- 
posed to have taken place at this season ; others, that it 
was to render the beginning of the civil year more 



u 2 Cor. v. 21. Isai. liii. 6. * Heb. ix. 

y Numb, xxviii. 11. z Levit. xxiii. 23. Numb. xxix. 1. 



73 

observable, since by it were regulated all their contracts 
as well as their sabbatic years and jubilees a . 

3. Besides the festivals instituted by Moses, many 
were introduced by the Jews in later times. The follow- 
ing chiefly deserve notice : (1) the feast of lots, called in 
Hebrew Purim, celebrated on the fourteenth and fifteenth 
of the month Adar * in commemoration of the deliverance 
of the Jews from the cruel designs of Haman b , who had 
procured an edict from the king of Persia to destroy 
them; and had inquired by lot what time would be fittest 
for carrying his designs into effect . (2) The feast of 
dedication, instituted by Judas Maccabeus as a grateful 
memorial of the purifying of the temple and altar, after 
they had been profaned by Antiochus Epiphanes. It 
continued eight days, beginning on the twenty-fifth of 
the month Chisleu,* and was spent in singing hymns, 
offering sacrifices, and in all kinds of rejoicing. (3) The 
fasts of the fourth, fifth, seventh, and tenth months, kept 
respectively in memory of the taking of Jerusalem by 
the Babylonians; of their burning the temple and city; 
of the murder of Gedaliah, who had been appointed ruler 
over those Jews that remained in the country when the 
rest were carried captive to Babylon, and had gained 
their esteem by his benevolent government; of the com- 
mencement of the siege of Jerusalem, which was begun 
by Nebuchadnezzar on the tenth day of the tenth month d . 



Benevolent The celebration of the passover and of the 

desttrn of the 

festivals. feast of tabernacles continued several days ; but 



* Adar corresponds to part of our February and March ; Chisleu 
to part of November and December. 

a Univ. Hist. Vol. I. p. 609. * About 500 years B. C. 

c Esth. vii. d 2 Kings xxv. 

G 



74 

the law did not command that all of them should be ob- 
served with equal strictness. The first and last were sab- 
baths on which there was to be no work ; yet the prohi- 
bition, even with regard to them, was less rigorous than 
with regard to the weekly sabbath. On the intermediate 
days labour was not prohibited, and it is thought by some 
writers that the great yearly fairs of the nation were held on 
these days, when there was so great an assemblage of people 
from all parts of the country e . There can be no doubt that 
they were celebrated with mirth and festivity. In a former 
chapter it was stated that a second tithe and the first- 
fruits were to be appropriated for offerings, and since 
these could only be made at the sanctuary, the Israelites 
were obliged to go thither and set on foot offering-feasts, 
in order to consume the tithe and first-fruits. In this 
way the festivals were days of pleasure; and entertain- 
ments were given or received, in the joys of which the 
poor and the slaves were entitled to participate. The 
benevolent design of these festivals is apparent, and their 
influence on the community was in many respects most 
salutary. By means of them the people of the different 
tribes became more closely connected; they learnt to 
regard each other as fellow-citizens, and were less likely to 
be separated into a number of small States. As each tribe 
was regulated by its own laws and had its own peculiar 
interests, there was danger lest jealousies should arise, 
which in process of time might completely alienate them 
from one another. The yearly festivals were calculated 
to have a great effect, for the prevention of this calamity. 
While the tribes frequently assembled for the purposes 
of religious worship and social enjoyment, they became 
more intimately acquainted with each other; intermar- 

. . ... ... — — - — . ...i t i. ■> 

e Mich. Art. 197. 



75 

riages took place, whereby the interests of families 
belonging to different tribes became intermixed, and thus 
the twelve petty States were united into one powerful 
people. Jeroboam was well aware of this, when he was 
appointed king of the ten tribes which had separated 
from the tribe of Judah. Sensible that the separation 
could not be permanent if the people continued to pay 
their annual visits to Jerusalem, he issued a prohibition 
of them, and, contrary to the law of Moses, appointed 
two places for divine service within his own territories. 

It may be further remarked of these festivals, and 
particularly of the sabbatical year and the jubilee, that 
in the very institution of them is implied a strong 
argument of their divine origin f . When all the Israelites 
were assembled, as they were three times every year, in 
Jerusalem, what defence was left in the country against 
foreign invasion? And when cultivation of the ground 
was forbidden every seventh year, whence were the 
people in that year to procure subsistence ? God had 
promised " that no man should desire their land when 
they should go up to appear before the Lord their God 
thrice in the year g ;" and it is remarkable that no such 
evil ever befel them on these occasions: he had also 
promised with regard to their subsistence that " he would 
command his blessing upon them in the sixth year, and 
that the land should bring forth fruit for three years V 
But no legislator would have ventured to propose such 
institutions, except in consequence of the fullest conviction, 
on the part both of himself and the people, that God had 
really so promised, and that they were under the pro- 
tection of his peculiar providence. 



* Graves, Vol. I. p. 170. e Exod. xxxiv. 24. k Lev. xxv. 21. 

G 2 



CHAPTER VII. 



ON THE PLACES ACCOUNTED HOLY BY THE JEWS. 



From the earliest ages of the world, particular 
places have been appropriated to the exercise of religious 
worship. In ancient times it was usual to seek for that 
purpose the retirement of groves and mountains. Thus 
it is said of Abraham, when he dwelt at Beer-sheba, that 
he planted a grove there, and called upon the name of 
the everlasting God a . And it was upon one of the 
mountains in the land of Moriah, that God ordered him 
to offer in sacrifice his son Isaac. But when the worship 
of false gods had become prevalent among men, the 
solitude of such places was found to be favourable for 
the practice of dreadful crimes and impurities, with 
which idolatry has been ever associated. And the strong 
tendency which the Israelites had to adopt the idolatrous 
customs of heathen nations is amply testified in the sacred 
history. It is recorded of them that they set up images 
and groves in every high hill and under every green 
tree, and there burnt incense in all the high places, and 
wrought wickedness to provoke the Lord, as did the 
heathen b . It was with the view therefore of preserving 
them from idolatry that they were prohibited from ofFer- 



a Gen. xxi. 33. b 2 Kings xvii. 11. 



77 

ing worship in groves or in high places, and were 
commanded to make sacrifices and oblations in that place 
only which God should choose, 

1. In the first year after the departure from Egypt, 
Moses received orders respecting the construction of the 
tabernacle. It was built in the form of an oblong, thirty 
cubits in length, and ten in height and breadth*. The 
interior of it was divided by a veil into two parts, one 
of which was called the Sanctuary or Holy Place, and the 
other the Holy of Holies. The sanctuary contained the 
table of shew-bread, the golden candlestick, and the 
altar of incense. The Holy of Holies contained the ark 
of the covenant. This ark was a small chest, in which 
were placed the two tables of stone, having the ten 
commandments engraven upon them by the finger of 
God. In the time of Solomon it contained nothing 
besides, but St. Paul seems to speak of it as containing 
also the golden pot that had manna and Aaron's rod 
that budded : probably the contents of it were not always 
the same ; or his expression may be interpreted to signify 
that those articles were near, not within the ark c . The 
lid of the ark was called the Mercy- Seat, at the extremities 
of which were two cherubim with their faces looking 
towards each other, and their wings expanded. It was 
between them that the cloud used to appear, which was 
a visible token of the shechinah or divine presence ; and 
hence God is frequently represented in Scripture as 
dwelling between the cherubim a . 

A court of one hundred cubits in length and fifty 
in breadth surrounded the tabernacle. In this court 



* A cubit was nearly equal to twenty-two inches. 

c Exod. xvi. 33. Numb. xvii. 10. 1 Kings viii. 9. Heb. ix. 4. 

a Psal. lxxx. 1, xcix. 1. 

g3 



78 

stood the altar for burnt-offerings, and the brazen laver 
in which the priests washed their hands and feet when- 
ever they were about to offer sacrifice or to enter the 
tabernacle. When Aaron presented his first burnt- 
sacrifice for himself and the people, the fire was kindled 
from heaven in token of acceptance, and God commanded 
that it should be kept continually burning on the altar, 
without ever going out 6 . 

The tabernacle was carried about by the Israelites in 
all their marches until they arrived at the land of Canaan. 
It was then fixed first at Gilgal, where it remained seven 
years, and afterwards in Shiloh. In the reign of David 
and at the beginning of Solomon's reign, it was at Gibeon 
in the tribe of Benjamin ; after which time the Scriptures 
are silent respecting it. The ark of the covenant had 
been separated from it at the time when Eli was judge, 
and was probably never replaced in it. Having been 
brought from the tabernacle into the camp, it was taken 
by the Philistines, and was afterwards removed from 
place to place till David prepared a tent for it at 
Jerusalem. Lastly, it was placed in the temple of 
Solomon and was probably consumed along with it, when 
Jerusalem was destroyed by Nebuchadnezzar f . 

2. The temple was built by Solomon on Moriah, 
a part of mount Sion, which was the general name of 
a range of hills near Jerusalem. The plan of it was formed 
after that of the tabernacle, but it was of much larger 
dimensions. The temple itself, strictly so called, formed 
only a small part of the sacred building, for it was 
surrounded with spacious courts, making a square of half 
a mile in circumference. The first court, which encom- 
passed the temple and the other courts, was called the 

• Lev. vi. 13, t Home's Introduction, Part III. Chap. i. 



79 

Court of the Gentiles, because the Gentiles were allowed 
to come into it, but were prohibited from advancing 
further. It was surrounded with porticoes or cloisters ; 
the eastern side of which was called Solomon's Porch, 
because it stood upon a vast terrace which Solomon built 
up from the valley beneath, in order to enlarge the area 
on the top of the mount, and make it equal to his 
intended building. Within the court of the Gentiles on 
higher ground was the court of the women, so called 
because women were not allowed to proceed beyond it. 
From this there was an ascent to the inner or men's 
court, within which again was the court of the priests, 
separated from the former by a low wall, one cubit in 
height. This wall inclosed the altar for burnt- offerings, 
and to it the people brought their oblations and sacrifices, 
but the priests alone were allowed to enter the inclosure. 
From the court of the priests they ascended by twelve 
steps to the temple properly so called. This consisted 
of a portico, the sanctuary, and the Holy of Holies. The 
portico was adorned with several valuable offerings made 
by kings and princes, and with spoils and trophies taken 
in war. The sanctuary and Holy of Holies in the temple 
were furnished in the same manner as in the tabernacle. 
They were separated one from the other by a double 
veil, which is supposed to have been the veil that was 
rent during our Saviour's crucifixion. Into the Holy of 
Holies no person was ever admitted except the high 
priest, who entered it once a year on the great day of 
atonement. 

This temple, built by Solomon, retained its original 
magnificence only for a short period. During the reign 
of Rehoboam, Shishak king of Egypt carried away its 
treasures, and it was finally plundered and burnt by the 
king of Babylon. The second temple, built under the 



80 

direction of Zerubbabel, was greatly inferior to the first, 
as appears from the questions put by the prophet Haggai : 
" Who is left among you, that saw this house in its first 
glory? and how do you see it now? is it not in your 
eyes, in comparison of it, as nothing &?" It is said to 
have wanted five remarkable things which were the chief 
glory of the first temple, viz. the ark of the covenant, 
the shechinah, the holy fire on the altar which had been 
kindled from heaven, the urim and thummim *, and the 
spirit of prophecy. In the eighteenth year of his reign, 
Herod the Great undertook to repair this second temple 
or rather gradually to rebuild it, and vast labour was 
expended in adding to its magnitude and splendour. 
Josephus says, that he finished it in nine years, which 
must be understood of the main body of the building; for, 
long after Herod's death, the Jews continued to enlarge 
and adorn it, and the workmen were not dismissed till 
the time of Agrippa the younger, Herod's grandson, 
about sixty years after the birtfr of Christ. The Jews 
therefore might say to our Saviour with perfect truth 
that the temple was forty and six years in building, 
exactly so many having elapsed since Herod commenced 
the work. Tacitus says that it was a temple of immense 
opulence, and Josephus represents it as the most astonish- 
ing structure he had ever seen or heard of, as well on 
account of its architecture as its magnitude and likewise 
the richness of its various parts and the reputation of its 

8 Haggai ii. 3. 

* These were contained in the breast-plate of the high priest, but 
no explanation respecting them is given in Scripture. The opinion 
most generally received is, that they were twelve precious stones on 
which were engraven the names of the twelve tribes of Israel, and 
that the oracle was delivered by causing such letters as formed the 
answer to shine with a superior lustre, or to appear prominent above 
the rest. See Jennings, Book I. Chap. v. Graves, vol. I. p. 318. 



! 



81 

sanctity h . When the disciples of our Lord shewed him 
the grandeur of its buildings, he warned them of its 
approaching downfall, and not many years passed away 
before the foundations of it were ploughed up by the 
Roman soldiers. 

3. Jerusalem is frequently called in the Scriptures 
the holy city, as being hallowed in a peculiar manner 
by the presence of God in the temple. It was formerly 
called Jebus from one of the sons of Canaan 1 , and some 
authors suppose, without any certain authority, that it 
was the ancient Salem, of which Melchizedek was king. 
After it had been taken by Joshua, it was inhabited both 
by Jews and Jebusites till the time of David; who, 
having driven the Jebusites out of it, greatly enlarged it, 
and built a palace there, in which he fixed his residence. 
On this account it is sometimes called the city of David. 
It was divided into the upper and the lower city : the 
upper (according to the general opinion) being towards 
the south on mount Sion, the lower to the North on the 
hill Acra. Eastward from Acra was the site of the 
temple; at one corner of which stood Fort Antonia, 
which overlooked the courts of the temple, and com- 
municated with them by passages, so that the Roman 
garrison could readily descend to quell any tumult which 
might arise during the festivals. The circumference 
of the city in the time of Josephus was thirty-three 
stadia, or nearly four miles and a half; and Hecataeus, 
who wrote about three centuries earlier, says, that the 
number of its inhabitants in his time was 120,000 k . 

The mount of Olives, from which Christ ascended 
to heaven, was on the east side of Jerusalem, fronting the 



h Tacit. Hist. Lib. V. c. viii. Jos. de Bell. Jud. Lib. VI. c. iv. 
1 1 Chron. xi. 4. k Jos. contr, Ap. 



82 

temple, and was about a mile distant from it. The 
village Gethsemane was at the bottom of the mount; 
and on the further side were Bethphage and Bethany. 
Between the mount of Olives and Jerusalem there was 
a valley, through which ran the brook Kedron. Mount 
Calvary or Golgotha, the scene of our Saviour's crucifixion, 
was on the western side of the city at a short distance 
beyond the walls; to which the Apostle alludes when 
he says that "Jesus also suffered without the gate.' 9 

4. All Judaea was accounted holy, as being the 
inheritance of God's chosen people, and specially appointed 
for the performance of his worship. In modern times 
also, it has obtained the name of the Holy Land, on 
account of its having been the abode of the lioly 
Patriarchs, Prophets, and Apostles, and consecrated above 
all by the presence and sufferings of Jesus Christ. 
Anciently it was called the land of Canaan, from Canaan, 
the youngest son of Ham, who settled here after the 
dispersion from Babel, and divided the country among 
his eleven children: and Palestine from the Philistines, 
who, having migrated from Egypt, settled on the borders 
of the Mediterranean and gave their name to the whole 
country, though they never possessed more than a small 
part of it. In Scripture it is frequently distinguished 
by other names, such as the Land of Promise, the Land of 
God, the Land of Israel. 

It is impossible to give, within the necessary limits 
of this work, any satisfactory description of the 
boundaries and provinces of Judaea, or of its numerous 
cities, and many circumstances pertaining to it which are 
worthy of notice: the few remarks therefore which follow, 
will relate merely to its general aspect and the produc- 
tiveness of its soil. 

It is described by Moses as " a good land, a land of 



83 

brooks of water, of fountains and depths, that spring 
out of valleys and hills; a land of wheat and barley, 
and vines, and fig-trees, and pomegranates, a land of 
oil-olive, and honey 1 ." It even exceeded the land of 
Egypt, so much celebrated for its fertility by ancient 
wrijters; especially in the number of cattle which it 
produced, and in the quantity and excellence of its wine, 
oil, and fruits. Those parts of it which in Scripture are 
called deserts or wildernesses were not desolate, as the 
words appear to imply: many of them, though unfit 
for tillage, were inhabited, and afforded pasturage for 
cattle. Some districts are mountainous and rocky, but 
the industry of the Jews, whose attention was occupied 
chiefly with agriculture, made the most barren places 
yield some kind of produce. The very rocks which 
now appear quite bare and naked, were made fruitful, 
being covered by the ancient proprietors with earth, 
which has been since washed away; and there were 
few spots in the whole land that were not improved, 
to the production of something or other ministering to 
the support of human life m . Besides therefore supporting 
its own great population, it was able to supply other 
countries with large quantities of corn and fruits 11 . Such 
is the description of the ancient fruitfulness of Judsea, 
given in the Scriptures, and also by many profane 
writers . Nor, even in its present decayed and neglected 
state, are indications wanting of its natural richness and 
fertility, sufficient to show that want of cultivation is the 
chief if not the only cause of the comparative poverty 
in which it is now seen. This poverty is not owing 

1 Deut. viii. 7, 8. m Maundrell, p. 65. 

n 1 Sam. xxiv. 1 Kings v. 11. Acts xii. 20. 
Hecat. apud. Joseph, contr. Ap. Tacit. Hist. Lib. V. c. vie 
Plin. Lib. V. c. xiv, xv. 



84 

to the unfruitfulness of the soil,, but to the want of 
inhabitants,, and the aversion to industry in those few 
who possess it. Otherwise, were it as well , peopled 
and cultivated as in former times, it would still be capable 
of supplying its neighbours with corn and other products, 
as it did in the time of Solomon p . Its present state, so 
far from affording ground for calling in question the 
accounts of its fertility given in the sacred writings, 
confirms their authority ; for all these evils were predicted 
and denounced against the Israelites, if they should 
forsake the covenant which God made with their fathers 
when he brought them out of Egypt q . And the exact 
accomplishment of these prophecies verifies the declaration 
of the Psalmist, that God turneth a fruitful field into 
barrenness, for the wickedness of them that dwell therein r . 
<c The Lord rooted them out of their land in anger and 
in wrath, and in great indignation, and cast them into 
another land, as it is this day. The secret things belong 
unto the Lord our * God : but those things which are revealed 
belong unto us and to our children for ever, that we may 
do all the words of his law V 



p Shaw's Travels, p. 336. quarto. <i Levit. xxvi. 32. 

* Psal. cvii. 34, ■ Deut. xxix. 28, 29. 

On the subjects of this and the preceding chapters, see Beausobre's 
Introduction to the New Testament, and Reland's Antiquitates 
Hebraorum. 



LB JL II 






Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: Sept. 2004 

PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 

1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 16066 
(724)779-2111 



